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CHINA
HER HISTORY, DIPLOMACY, AND COMMERCE



RICCI AND PAUL ZI (COSTUME OF MING DYNASTY)
From an old picture published by the Chinese Jesuit Père Hoang

TRANSLATION OF WORDS IN CORNER

The sire Zi (canonised as) Wên-ting (learned, resolute) with Li-tsz Ma-teu "Licus," or Ricci Matthew) discussing the Word picture.

Frontispiece

CHINA

HER HISTORY, DIPLOMACY AND COMMERCE

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE
PRESENT DAY

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WITH MAPS

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PREFACE

THE greater part of the present book has been compiled from Chinese records, and its contents are based on a personal acquaintance with China.

I put these facts in the forefront of my preface because so many excellent works have lately been written on China by persons who have never lived there, and who have not examined any of the records in the original. In justification of my presuming to instruct the public on a few facts connected with the trade and foreign relations of the Chinese Empire, I may plead the circumstance that I have passed a quarter of a century at a dozen or so of its ports, besides travelling about seven thousand miles in half a dozen provinces, and spending a couple of years in Corea and one in Burma. Fate so ordained, moreover, that I should reside for a year in Sz Ch'wan, and for two more in Hainan; and that I should pay frequent visits to Indo-China and Japan. The necessity of coming home from time to time, and of returning refreshed, further suggested visits, duly paid and utilised, to Siam, the Malay Peninsula, India, the Dutch Islands, and sundry other places where Chinamen are found. Hence it comes that, in struggling through the voluminous chapters of native records on "barbarians," I have not been so completely at a loss as if I had not seen the people

and places described. I have seen the Celestial in all these strange lands, under the conditions depicted by the historians, and I have been struck correspondingly with the fidelity of the Chinese annals. I cannot but think that I shall have made a bad use of my experience if it does not avail to help the British settler and trader to an intelligent acquaintance with his new home and customers.

Coming now to speak of the assistance derived from the works of abler men, I must express my obligations first of all to two industrious physicians, who have found ample time amid the gaieties of Peking life to prescribe for the mind as well as for the "stinking bag" (as the Chinese poets call the body). I refer to Dr. S. W. Bushell of the British Legation, and Dr. E. Bretschneider of the Russian. Neither of these gentlemen is a professed sinologue (a word which may be defined as a murderer of the Chinese language, always on the look-out to slay his kind), but both of them have contributed more to accurate sinology than some others who "profess too much." Then come my former colleagues, rightly crowned with the appropriate laurel, to wit, Professor E. Chavannes of Paris, and Professor F. Hirth of Munich. I have found the works of both these gentlemen (often very stiff reading) particularly useful in confirming obscure points in history as to which I have sometimes been in doubt. The few observations I have hazarded upon the subject of trade would not have been worth much without the experiences of Her Majesty's Consuls in the Far East, as presented in the published Trade Reports; and, although these officers are by no means so indifferent to the interests of

commerce as some newspapers occasionally assert, it is certain that their notions would not assume a very practical shape were it not for the invaluable Quarterly and Annual Returns issued by Sir Robert Hart, whose obliging Commissioners invariably give access to the manuscript tables, before publication, in the early spring of each year.

I ought now, perhaps, to say a few conciliatory words to the public and the critics: but I don't. I am one of the public myself, anxious to serve it, and never want to be anything better than one of the public. As to the critics, I bow my head in humble anticipation of their chastisement, and if they can whilst administering the rod, suggest any useful improvements, I may perhaps find other opportunities to oblige them. Meanwhile I may say that this is rather an Indicator of Facts to be Examined than a Book of Facts to be Accepted: the idea is to suggest, in skeleton form, a sort of guide through the mazes of Chinese colonising lore and Chinese trade relations, leaving it to the serener judgment of those writers whose minds have not been warped by studying the natives on the spot to add at their leisure the requisite touches of imagination and grace; and I may add that the Index has been made as complete as possible in order that, assisted by the maps, the general reader may be in a position to piece together, at a moment's notice, what are apt to appear isolated and unessential statements of fact.

E. H. PARKER

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
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CHINA

CHAPTER I.

GEOGRAPHY

IF we desire to obtain accurate notions touching the political and commercial capacities of China, we must first endeavour to realise what her territory is like. It has been the native practice in modern times to style "China Proper" by the collective name "Eighteen Provinces." As a matter of fact, since frontier questions with European Powers became acute, the "East Three Provinces" (Manchuria) and the "New Territory" of Turkestan have been so reorganised that there are now practically twenty-two directly governed provinces; and Formosa formed in a modified degree yet another new one, until, five years ago, the Japanese insisted upon its cession. It will be more convenient to ignore these recent changes, and to consider first the compact and thickly populated territory lying between the various deserts or steppes and the sea—in other words, the "Eighteen Provinces," which are, or were until recently, surrounded to the north, west, and south by tributary or independent states, and to the east by the Pacific Ocean. The natural boundaries of China Proper, as thus limited, have always been much the same—that is, deserts

or steppes beyond mountain chains have prevented the rapid expansion of cultivators in any direction except along the valleys of rivers which run eastwards into the sea. If the political boundaries have in our times, as often before, been pushed into the desert or upon the plateau, that does not seriously affect the one salient feature of the vast Chinese Empire, which is that, out of an irregular triangle covering an area of 5,000,000 square miles and supporting a total population of 400,000,000 souls, one corner embracing barely one-third of the total surface consists of regulation provinces, ruled under one uniform system, and containing nine-tenths of the population; whilst the rest of the triangle consists of poorly watered desert or plateau, thinly peopled by races forming majorities over the Chinese settlers. It is only when, as in the case of Manchuria and the New Territory of Turkestan, the Chinese element becomes in some way predominant or equal, that political measures are taken to assimilate an "outer" portion.

The Eighteen Provinces thus form a rough circular mass occupying nearly one-third of the empire's surface. But, if we bisect this mass from north to south, we shall find that the western half has a general tendency to be mountainous, whilst the eastern half has a corresponding tendency to be flat. We shall find, moreover, that out of a total population of between 300,000,000 and 400,000,000, the eastern half contains three-quarters, whilst the mountainous half only contains one-quarter. As we proceed with our inquiry, we shall discover, besides, that, taken as a whole, the western half is not self-supporting, and contributes nothing to the Central Government at Peking, whilst the eastern half supports itself, feeds the Central Government, and also assists the impecunious west. The

wealthy province of Sz Ch'wan rather interferes with the truthful harmony of this sweeping arrangement; but none the less the broad facts are as stated, for it is only the eastern half of Sz Ch'wan that pays a surplus.

We have now got under our eyes a material upon which to work, and it is thus evident from a commercial point of view that the interests of Great Britain lie almost entirely upon the coasts, upon the embouchures of three or four great rivers, upon the valleys of those rivers and their tributaries, and upon the head waters of the Yang-tsze in Sz Ch'wan. In other words, geographical considerations indicate the eastern half of China Proper as the most accessible and the most valuable field for our commercial development; and, if this region be kept open to us, we can, without great violence to our feelings, relegate to a second place Manchuria, Tibet, and Yün Nan, where the legitimate competition of Russia and France is likely to be most keen.


Familiar though the names of Chinese provinces are to those who have passed a lifetime in the Far East, I am aware that the general reader is apt to get confused if too many strange names be thrust upon his attention at once. I therefore give here a simple map with a list of the Eighteen Provinces in order to illustrate my remarks (see next page).

When we Europeans approach China, which is usually done by sea, we are unconsciously impressed with the notion that, the farther inland we go, the more we leave "civilisation" behind us. But it must not be forgotten that, from the native point of view, the coasts are the ends of the earth, and the places where least of the true Celestial spirit is to be found. All the solid part of Chinese tradition and history seems to show that the original inhabitants of the Central Kingdom (who have

THE EIGHTEEN PROVINCES

Name of Province.	Translated Meaning.	Archaic Name (as separate State).	Remarks.
An Hwei .	Peace-Glory . . .	Wan {	Part of old Kiang Nan : <i>i.e.</i> An (king) and Hwei (chon)
Chêh Kiang .	Chêh River . . .	Yüeh {	The Kiang (Yang-tsze) once had a mouth here
Chih Li . .	Direct Rule . . .	Yen {	Peking not under Viceroy
Fuh Kien .	Happy-Establish . .	Min {	Established (I think) about A.D. 700
Ho Nan . .	River South . . .	Yu {	South of the (Hwang) Ho
Hu Nan . .	Lake South . . .	Ch'u {	South of the (Tung-ting) Lake
Hu Peh . .	Lake North . . .	Ngoh {	North of the (Tung-ting) Lake
Kan Suh . .	Sweet-Sedate . . .	(no general name)	Kan (chon) and Suh (chou)
Kiang Si . .	River West . . .	Kan {	West (reach of the) Kiang
Kiang Su . .	River (and) Su . . .	Wu {	The Yang-tsze about Soochow
Kwang Si . .	Broad West . . .	Yüeh {	The west and east parts of Kwang Nan, or the old Annam seat of power
Kwang Tung .	Broad East . . .		
Kwei Chou .	Noble Tract . . .	K'ien {	Perhaps a euphonic form of the old "Kwei State," or Devil Country
Shan Si . .	Mountain West . . .	Tsin {	Chih Li used once to fall within the parts east of the (Hêng) Mountain Range
Shan Tung .	Mountain East . . .	Ts'i {	
Shen Si . .	Shen West . . .	Ts'in {	West of Shen (an old state practically meaning "the Pass")
Sz Ch'wan .	Four Streams . . .	Shuh {	Once called "Three Streams"
Yün Nan . .	Cloud South . . .	Tien {	South of the Sz Ch'wan Mists, or the Misty Range (Yun Ling)
Shêng King .	Prosperous Capital .	Liao {	Also called Fêng-t'ien
Kih-lin . .	Happy Forest . . .	(none) {	The ancient Manchu cradle: possibly from the old Chinese-Corean Kilin Province
Hêh-lung Kiang	Black Dragon River .	(none)	Also called Tsitsihar
Sin Kiang . .	New Domain . . .	(none)	Kashgaria-Dzungaria
T'ai Wan . .	Terrace Bay . . .	(no general name)	Formosa (now Japanese)

It will be noticed that there are two Yüeh and two Kiang. The Chinese characters alone can express the distinctions to the eye.



never possessed any national or ethnological designation in the sense of "German," "Turk," "Russian," etc.) were first heard of as moving from the north and west down the valley of the Hwang Ho (Yellow River), the lower half or mouth of which has shifted from time to time, sometimes leaving the mountain mass known as the Shan Tung Promontory to the south, and sometimes to the north. The old capitals of the kings were all in the valleys of the Yellow River or in those of its tributaries, such as the River Wei in Shen Si. Hence all the legends of even the mythical emperors are centred between Si-an Fu and Peking, near which place (Tientsin) the Yellow River once entered the sea. In fact, the trade area now belonging to the single port of Tientsin nearly covers the whole of semi-historical China. Even so far north as Kalgan there are ancient remains of what appear to be signal towers or tombs dating as far back as B.C. 200. On this undoubted fact—that some of the earliest known Chinese advanced from the north and north-west—many ingenious theories have been propounded, connecting them with Babylonia, the Accadians, Persians, Hindoos, and what not. By assuming errors in ancient Chinese records here and there, by rigidly adhering to our own Scriptural texts, and by indulging our imagination a little, we might perhaps even trace the first Chinaman back to the Tower of Babel, or, for the matter of that, to the North Pole. I can only state the moderate impressions which the perusal of original Chinese history has left upon me. A capable and settled political race is first heard of in possession of lands along the Yellow River: it is occupied in fighting for its existence with the horse-riding nomads to the north, who raid the stores of wealth accumulated upon cultivated lands by industrious workmen, and who disappear, when pursued, into their trackless deserts.

It is continually being reinforced by other bodies of its own kind coming from the north-west.

The next great historical advance seems to be south-west into modern Sz Ch'wan ("Four Streams"), and then through the two great lake regions down south by way of the navigable Kan River of Kiang Si, and the Yüan and Siang rivers of Hu Nan into the region of Canton, which, as will be seen from our sketch map, belongs to an entirely different catchment area. But the valley of the Yang-tsze, as a whole, and the provinces south of it and at its mouth, do not appear to have become properly assimilated, either politically or industrially, before the commencement of our Western era. Moreover, the portions of all the seaboard provinces lying very near to the coasts seem to have been out of hand up to a very recent date—say 500 years ago; so that we must picture in our minds the Chinese race spreading like a fan from the southern bend of the Yellow River towards Upper Yang-tsze and the coasts, its political force becoming weaker and weaker as it approaches those coasts and the Tibetan highlands. Hence we find that, whereas throughout the whole of interior China one tongue is now spoken—subject to more or less serious variations in dialect, never of an incongruous or impossible kind—in the coast provinces south of the Yellow River, and in those alone, are spoken dialects so exceptional as to rise almost to the distinction of separate languages; but only so in the sense that Swedish, Danish, German, and Dutch are languages foreign to one another; that is, though words differ in sound, they are easily traceable to one indefinable or elastic original. Thus we Europeans, approaching China from the sea, are at once confronted with a practical difficulty which is not nearly as much felt by the Chinese themselves

approaching the extremities from the heart, and one of the chief obstacles to our success is this confusion of tongues, which unduly localises every European's efforts.

I have above divided the Eighteen Provinces into the eastern and western halves. In a very rough way the eastern half may be stated to be rich, and densely populated by pure Chinese; the western half to be poor, and thinly populated by mixed races, often exceeding the Chinese in numbers. In the northern portion of the eastern half there is probably not now left a single individual of aboriginal race, though up to about a thousand years ago certain unidentified "barbarian" tribes were still mentioned along the southern (Hwai River) bed of the Hwang Ho. In the southern portion of the eastern half there are still a few independent or semi-independent tribes, known as Yao or Miao, occupying the border mountains which separate Kwang Tung on the south from the Hu Nan and Kiang Si on the north. But these tribes give very little trouble, and possess no political importance of any kind. In the mountains of Fuh Kien I have myself come across remnants of strange aboriginal tribes, and even in Chêh Kiang there are a few. Still, in a general way, and ignoring trifles, it may be truthfully stated that the wealthy, populous, eastern half of China Proper contains none but pure Chinese, or aborigines so closely assimilated as to be indistinguishable from Chinese.

On the other hand, the western half of the Eighteen Provinces is largely foreign. The miserably poor province of Kwang Si contains many obscure tribes, usually grouped under the main heads of Shan (Siamese) or Miao (no ethnological clue as yet). Not only so, but there are still many aboriginal officials, responsible, however, not to the Central Government direct, but to local

Chinese prefects or magistrates. In the adjoining province of Kwei Chou there are also a good many 'Miao tribes, some groups of which I saw myself when there; they are in appearance not unlike the Kachyns of the Burmo-Chinese frontier, who are known to be of Tibeto-Burman origin. In Yün Nan there are a great many tribes of the Shan race, not only within the border, but also in those recently delimited districts which now belong politically to Burma (Great Britain) or Tonquin (France). Among the mountains of north-east Yun Nan and south Sz Ch'wan, the powerful confederation of so-called Lolo tribes still maintains its independence. A French missionary named Paul Vial, who has lived amongst them, has recently published a very valuable memoir upon the subject. The Lolos possess a written system of their own, a specimen of which (discovered by Mr. E. C. Baber in 1880) I have before me, together with a sheet from Père Vial throwing light upon its nature. From time to time very serious collisions take place between the Lolos and the Chinese armies, the result always being a patched-up peace, leaving the uncivilised men very much to their own devices as before. The Kachyn tribes* seem to form a link between the homes of the Shans and Tibetans. They extend along the Upper Irrawaddy and the western frontiers of Yün Nan. The Kamti tribes of the Upper Irrawaddy (the Mali-kha branch) are, however, pure Shans, and their language possesses a strong affinity with Laotian and modern Siamese. On the western frontiers of Sz Ch'wan we have numerous and sometimes very formidable independent Tibetan tribes, such as do not fall within the hierarchical administration of Tibet proper. Mrs. Bird-Bishop has given us interesting particulars about

* Cf. my detailed account of these tribes. *Fortnightly Review*, 1897.

some of these, but she appears to have some reasons (not stated) for suggesting that they are not Tibetan as usually supposed. The cave-dwellers of eastern Sz Ch'wan have mostly disappeared, but their abandoned dwellings in the mountain-sides may still be seen anywhere to the west of Chungking; some of these tribes still exist to the extreme south-east, near the Kwei Chou frontier. In the island of Hainan there are at least two groups of "savages," or non-Chinese, one of which I personally ascertained to be of Shan kinship. Despite the utter confusion which reigns both in the Chinese and the European mind touching the south-west barbarians, taken as a whole, I am disposed to think that in all probability most of them will be found to range themselves either under the Shan or the Tibetan head.

We have seen how the advance of Chinese civilisation has been along the Yellow River and then up its great tributary, the Wei, to the head waters or tributaries on the left bank of the Yang-tsze. A combined movement from those head waters and from the lakes of the Hwai (old Yellow River mouth) system seems then to have gradually taken in the whole Yang-tsze Valley, including the old *débouchure* at Hangchow. A glance at the map will show how their next obvious move was across the Poyang and Tungting lakes to Canton. Let us examine these rivers in order. The Yellow River, the discovery of whose exact source engaged the earnest attention both of the ablest Mongol and the most ambitious Manchu Emperors, rises among a group of small lakes called Odon-tala (lat. 35° N., long. 96° E.) It then runs through Charing Nor eastwards for 300 miles, turns sharply back to the north-west, bisects Kan Suh north-east, and takes a tremendous northerly sweep round part of the desert, inclosing within its bend the often-contested Ordos

region. It then turns due south, and forms the dividing line between Shen Si and Shan Si. The pass of T'ung Kwan, at its southern bend, was for many centuries the key to the possession of empire, in the days when the political centre of gravity always lay within a hundred miles' radius of that point. The water is clear up to its entry into the *löss* region—in fact, the Mongols style it the Black River; but as soon as it reaches Shen Si it begins to take a yellowish tinge from the fine “loose” sandy soil which covers a vast area on both sides of its valley, and the presence of which, according to a theory of the distinguished geologist Von Richthofen, is to be accounted for by untold generations of dust blown over from the deserts. This part of the Yellow River is extensively used by salt boats, and by junks conveying iron and other metals from the Shan Si mines; but from the moment it emerges into the lowlands (between Hwai-k'ing and Ho-nan cities), it becomes erratic, and is practically useless for navigation. Every year or two it bursts its banks, and temporarily destroys some tract or other; every few centuries it changes its course altogether. Its old bed is often useless, whilst the new one has to be raised or buoyed up between dykes, sometimes high above the surrounding plain. Directly or indirectly, millions of taels are annually wasted in patching it up and in feeding a corrupt army of speculating official harpies. In a word, the Yellow River amply justifies its traditional sobriquet of “China's Sorrow,” and it would be a great blessing for China if proper scientific European specialists would take the matter seriously in hand. Meanwhile the Chinese engineers who manipulate the complicated system of lakes and levels forming a network about the Grand Canal and Hung-tsêh Marsh, are almost as expert in

an empirical sense as the wary Dutchmen who keep an ever-watchful eye upon the Zuider Zee and the intricate system of Netherlands dykes. The supply of water and the sacrifice of land are carefully measured and jealously watched with a view to keeping open the Canal and preventing disasters of great magnitude.

The Yang-tsze River is considered by the Chinese to take its rise in the north-west corner of Sz Ch'wan, not far from the point where the Yellow River, as above described, suddenly turns north-west between mountains 20,000 feet high. The reason for this view of the matter is that the rich plain of Ch'êng-tu was colonised centuries before anything of a definite nature was known of Yün Nan, which remained practically a sealed book up to the time of Kublai Khan, 650 years ago; and even now the Chinese have very little acquaintance with what we call the Upper Yang-tsze above P'ing-shan, which is the limit of navigation for all but very small boats. After this, up stream for some distance, it is to nearly all intents a Lolo river, and for several hundred miles forms the boundary between Sz Ch'wan and Yün Nan. When we speak of the Yang-tsze valley in a commercial sense, we really, without intending it, mean the river taken in its Chinese sense just described, and this river with its feeders drains half the area, containing one-half the population of the Eighteen Provinces.*

I need not say any more about the rest of the stream, the Middle and Lower Yang-tsze, which is already so well known from Ich'ang downwards. European pilots know every bank, and follow the changes of channel day by day: it is marvellous with what skill they will

* The Rev. S. Chevalier, s.j., has just published a magnificent atlas, with detailed plates, showing the exact configuration of every fraction of the Great River's course between P'ing-shan and Ich'ang.

bring a huge steamer down at full speed on the blackest of nights. Touching what European geographers consider the source of the Yang-tsze—that is the longest water-course above Sz Ch'wan—its head waters are not very far from those of the Yellow River. The latest maps of the Upper Yang-tsze show three small streams in the lofty valleys between the Kunlun and Tangla ranges (lat. 34° N., long. 90° E.). These three combine to form the River Drichu, which flows south-east through the country of the Dargé tribes, past Bathang, into Yün Nan. A thousand years ago the possession of all this Yün Nan region was being contested by a powerful Shan empire on the one side, and the Tibetans on the other. At present it has no commercial, and very little political significance, and is one of the least known parts of the world.

There yet remains a third great water system, that of the Si Kiang, or West River of the Two Kwang provinces. All its head waters are in eastern Yün Nan, and for some distance it forms the boundary between Kwei Chou and Kwang Si. The trade of all its branches and tributaries concentrates at the new treaty port of Wu-chou on the borders of Kwang Tung and Kwang Si.

In touching upon the above drainage systems, I wish first of all to illustrate how naturally the invading Chinese have in their expansion invariably followed the lines of least resistance; and, secondly, to prepare the reader for certain important results affecting the course of modern trade, and more especially the enormous native salt trade, which is organised strictly in accordance with the facilities offered by rival water routes. I think it specially useful to insert here a sketch map of the Yang-tsze Valley, so as to bring vividly before

the eye some points upon which I have touched. What little there is to be said about the geography of Tibet, Mongolia, and Manchuria will be introduced under those or other heads. It only remains now to mention one or two of those historical mountain ranges of the Eighteen Provinces which play a part in determining political or commercial divisions.

The great natural barrier between the Chinese and the Tartars has always been, and to a great extent still is, the range known as Yin Shan, or "Sombre Mountains," which may be roughly stated to form a backing to the Great Wall all the way from the northern Ordos bend of the Yellow River to Corea. Then there are the Nan Shan, or "South Mountains," of Kan Suh, which divide off the Turko-Tartar from the Tibetan groups: it has always been the policy of China to keep these two apart. Another important range separates the valley of the Wei (tributary of the Yellow River) from that of the Han (tributary of the Yang-tsze): it is called by various names in the maps, but I have never been able to satisfy myself what the proper Chinese name is. Then there is the Mei Ling, or "Plum Range," which separates the river systems of the Yang-tsze and the Chu Kiang (Pearl or West River). There are many other notable mountain ranges in China, mostly offshoots of the great Central Asian Range usually known as the Kunlun. Several of these ranges I have crossed myself; but it would be of barren interest to enumerate them here, or to enter into wearisome details as to what this spur does, or how that system re-appears. I confine myself to naming the few chains which, in my own experience of history and travel, appear to play a prominent practical part. The best way for those readers who really take a close interest in the geographical

features of the Eighteen Provinces to gratify their special propensities would be to study the map which I have always found the simplest and clearest for general purposes—that of Dr. Bretschneider (revised edition, 1900). It is wonderfully accurate, and sets out all topographical peculiarities in excellent proportion.

CHAPTER II.


HISTORY

THE human interest in Chinese history begins with their foreign relations. Just as early Roman history loses itself in an ill-defined mist of Etruscans, Volscians, Sabines, or other petty tribes, and makes the ordinary reader, who honestly desires to start from the beginning, anxious to get on to the livelier subject of the Carthaginian and Gallic wars; so do students of Chinese, who have embarked on the voyage of discovery, dread the wearisome duty of wading through the insipid stories of early Chinese times: how the great Yü cleft the mountains and guided the waters; how the noble king A, of a new dynasty, got rid of the tyrant B of an old one, when he was feasting on mountains of flesh and rivers of wine, regardless of his people's poverty, surrounded by beautiful, if mischievous, houris. I have been through it all once in the original, and will therefore be more merciful to those who do me the honour to read me than I have been even to myself: I will not inflict any of it upon them—not so much as a summary—I sweep it totally away. Even Confucius' history, which treats of comprehensible human beings who do not irritate us with their excessive rectitude and virtue, is inexpressibly flat and insipid. He may be said to be the first to deal at all with concrete facts, extending in this case over 250 years of his own state's experiences (722–

481 B.C.): but he wrote merely as a pedagogue, utilising these events as lessons for the ruling princes, and with the single object of magnifying the imperial or royal supreme house. The earlier histories, or such fragments as remain, are downright stupid. There are no intelligent generalisations: simply bald annals interspersed with a few exhortations, orders to act, and personal anecdotes. Chinese thought, usually very hazy, appears rather in their ethical works. I am not surprised that the first Great Emperor, who effected a pretty clean sweep of the ancient kings, the feudal princes, and the literary men, about 220 years after Confucius' death, made a desperate effort to annihilate the existing literature too—more especially that portion which consisted of polemics, philosophy, and opinion—sparing only works on matters of positive fact, such as medicine, husbandry, divination (by astrology, then ranked as a science); and particularly the annals of his own time. There are, however, some smart conceits even in the "Spring and Autumn" annals, or history of Lu (Confucius' own state); and the industrious French sinologist M. Edouard Chavannes has just provided us with a word for word translation of Sz-ma Ts'ien's great history, which practically tells us all that is known of ancient times, and may be regarded as the true basis of all Chinese history. I refer to that monumental work those whose consciences will not permit of their resting satisfied with my assurances as to the unprofitable nature of earlier annals: there is no excuse for their shirking the duty, if they think someone should undertake it, as the *Shi-ki* now exists in accessible form, done into faithful French.

The things which chiefly interest me in ancient Chinese records are a few observations about the raids of the horse-riding nomads of the north, and the measures

ROUGH SKETCH MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE ETHNOLOGY OF CHINA AND THE CHINESE EXPANSION



EARLY CHINESE DYNASTIES.

NAME OF DYNASTY.	NUMBER OF RULERS.	DURATION OF DYNASTY.	REMARKS.
"Five Monarchs"			
Hia	Nine	2852-2206	Altogether mythical.
Shang	Eighteen	2205-1767	Legendary and largely mythical.
Chou	Twenty-eight	1766-1122	Chiefly legendary.
"	Ten	1122-828	Semi-historical kings.
"	Twenty-five	827-255	Recognised as historical by Sz-ma Ts'ien.

the Chinese took to repel them; but it is only in the first century before Christ that we get any consecutive account of these movements. The Great "First" Emperor of the Ts'in dynasty, who unified the Chinese dominion in B.C. 222, and whose ancestors seem to have been of a race more or less foreign to the Chinese, broke away impatiently from all old traditions, and became sole master: hitherto his external influences had been chiefly exercised over Tibetan tribes. Dr. Bretschneider's map, which gives in various tints a very good idea of the land levels, shows clearly what was the natural configuration that determined this great movement. In the words of the late W. F. Mayers, who possessed in the highest degree the historical instinct, the new empire extended "from the plains of Yen and Chao (the modern Ho Nan and Chih Li) to the banks of the Yang-tsze and the hills of Yüeh (the modern Chêh Kiang), and from the Lake of Tung-ting to the Eastern Sea." The nomads, then called Hiung-nu, were for the first time driven beyond the northern bend of the Yellow River, and nearly the whole of what we call Southern China was officially annexed, if in a loose sort of way. All China and Indo-China was, and still is, peopled by a set of people who speak monosyllabical languages, with tones for each separate word; just as Aryans are inflective, and the Turanians agglutinative in their genius. The quality of these southerly annexations and the degree of human kinship existing between the Chinese and the peoples of the south may be compared with the northerly annexations of the Romans, and the degree of Aryan kinship existing between them and the Gauls and Germans. Similarly, though in the reverse direction, the hereditary enemy Carthage may be compared with the ancient Hiung-nu

foe. But despite the division of nearly the whole area of the Eighteen Provinces of to-day into thirty-six governments, this first truly imperial dynasty, called that of Ts'in from the principality of its origin (Shen Si), seems only to have ruled immediately and directly over the Chinese plain. Like the earliest settled states of America, the oldest of these thirty-six divisions were conceived on a very small scale, whilst the newly conquered “territories”—like early and half-Spanish Texas as compared with ancestral Massachusetts—each covered an area almost as great as that of all Old China.

This powerful dynasty of Ts'in soon collapsed, apparently from a general incapacity to digest and assimilate all it had so hastily conquered. The Hiung-nu soon re-appeared upon the frontiers. It was now that the first definite tidings of Japan (then only known as an agglomeration of the Wo or Wa tribes) began to arrive over the sea. Amongst the ambitious generals who contested the imperial succession was a self-made man of peasant origin named Liu Pang: he after three years of incessant fighting was proclaimed Prince of Han, and ultimately assumed the imperial title as Emperor of the Han dynasty. To this day, in memory of this glorious house, the Chinese (with the exception of the Cantonese) call themselves “men of Han” when they wish to differentiate themselves from Tartars, Tibetans, or foreigners. This is, indeed, the nearest approach to a national designation. During his seven years of effective reign (B.C. 202–194), and during the administration of his puppet son, subject to and followed by the usurpation of the widowed consort (194–179) (the first of the Chinese Catherines, and in political character very like the present Dowager-Empress), there occurred the first really authentic and properly recorded

relations with the Hiung-nu, who were then quite able to assert their perfect equality with China, and even presumed to talk of marriage alliances. The Great Khan Mehteh even sent a flippant poem to the Dowager, proposing what he called a "swap." The whole history of the Hiung-nu wars of the Han dynasty is intensely vivid and interesting, yielding not one whit in any respect to the Greek accounts of the Scythians and Huns in the respective times of Alexander and Attila. There is excellent ground for believing that the Scythians, Huns, and Hiung-nu were practically re-shuffles of one and the same people—the Turks of later date.

The ill-assimilated conquests of the short-lived Ts'in dynasty left to the Han house, in addition to Tartar troubles, a legacy of further wars with Corea (then called Chaosien) and the southern coasts of China. It is possible that one of the motives for marching on Corea was the desire to turn the left flank of the Hiung-nu. Although in modern times the "Yüeh" of Canton is written at least (but not spoken) in a different way from the "Yüeh" of Chêh Kiang, there was no such difference then, and there is reason to believe that one race, more akin to the Annamese than the Chinese, then occupied the whole of the coast regions south of the Yang-tsze, including the whole valleys of the Canton (Si Kiang) and Tonquin (Red and Black) rivers. It also seems that most, if not all, of the settled countries bordering on China were then ruled by Chinese adventurers; or at all events by native princes acquainted more or less with the Chinese system of records, and having a Chinese blend in their blood derived from immigrants. Here, again, we must look for a parallel to the Romans, who, simply from the fact of their possessing business-like records and archives, soon spread out on all sides, and

colonised the surrounding Italian towns or states. The period of conquest extended from 138 to 110 B.C., and at the time when Wu Ti began his military career (128-108), the King of Ch'ang-sha (now still the capital of Hu Nan) was the only one really subject to the Emperor of China. The Canton state was called "South Yüeh," and the Foochow state "Min Yüeh"; even the north part of the latter, with capital at the modern Wênchow, was called the "Eastern Seaboard of Yüeh." The princes of both the latter were descendants of one common King of Yüeh, in feudal times a powerful sovereign. Subsequently to 110 B.C. their populations were moved to the River Hwai region. The conquest of Corea led to the further discovery by land of the Japanese, who then occupied (whether as immigrants or as aborigines is not yet settled) the tip of the Korean peninsula, as well as the southern half of the Japanese islands. The necessity of "turning the flank" of the Hiung-nu, over whom the Chinese gained a decisive success in B.C. 119, led to alliances with other nomad races in modern Ili and the New Territory, and finally to the annexation of Khotan, the Pamirs, Kokand, and, in short, the whole modern Chinese Empire. Although the Hiung-nu were not yet completely subdued, yet their lines of communication were pierced. Parthia, Mesopotamia, and even Syria were distinctly "located," if not officially visited, and there are numerous indications pointing to an acquaintance with the Greek dynasties of Bactria and Afghanistan. Now first Buddhism was heard of, and India; the attempt to reach India by way of Yün Nan carried with it the discovery and partial annexation of the various Shan, Miao, and Tibetan tribes. Hindoo missionaries began to find their way to China through Turkestan, and the Burmese (then called Tan) are first

mentioned. King An-tun, of Great Ts'in, is said to have sent an expedition or mission by way of Tan in A.D. 166, and there seems good reason to suppose this word must be "Antoninus." Whoever the traders were who undoubtedly used to come from the West by sea, it is stated that they were called Ts'in (possibly = Syr) on account of their comely appearance like the Chinese Ts'in people. The annexation of Nan-yüeh involved that of Hainan, Kwang Si, the Lien-chou peninsula, and at least half of Cochin-China. It is even thought that Christians and Jews found their way to China *via* Tartary during the After Han dynasty, which reigned for two centuries after Christ at modern Ho-nan Fu, as the Early Han did for two centuries before Christ at Ch'ang-an (Si-an Fu).*

Instead of the thirty-six provinces of Ts'in, the After Han dynasty divided the modern Eighteen Provinces into only thirteen, of which eight represented Old China, then as now extended up to modern Shanghai and the sea, whilst the whole of the south was divided into four, and the west was made one, proof that these parts were still but half opened to civilisation. The satrap system was in full vogue; princes were given provinces "to eat," and not to govern as centralised officials. North of the Great Wall were the Hiung-nu (now broken up and

* I append particulars of the dates of Wu Ti's conquests in tabulated form :—


B.C. 127-5. Ordos, both corners of the northern bend of the Yellow River.

B.C. 115-111. Modern Kan Suh (Suh-chou, Liang-chou, Kan-chou), up to Tun-hwang (Purun-ki River).

B.C. 111. Modern Canton, Tonquin, Hainan, Kwang Si, and part of Kwei Chou.

B.C. 110-9. Western Yün Nan and Sz Ch'wan. Eastern ditto.

B.C. 108. Corea (northern half only).



partly driven west) and the Tungusic hunter-nomads (aiming at the decrepit empire of their former masters the Hiung-nu). Then came the pastoral Tibetan tribes of the Kokonor region and the Upper Yang-tsze, gradually merging into the Shan peoples of Yün Nan, the unorganised Miao of Kwang Si, and the slowly retreating Yüeh tribes, originally extending from modern Ningpo to Canton. These last seem to have very soon lost their separate identity, and to have either permanently retired into Annam proper or to have been merged into the Chinese.

From A.D. 220 to about 265 China was split up into three empires: a branch of the old Liu family of Han in Sz Ch'wan (Shuh), the Sun family south of the Yang-tsze (Wu), and the usurping Ts'ao family in the north (Wei). This state of affairs is very similar to the partition of the Roman Empire into the East and West monarchies at Constantinople and Ravenna, or Rome. The continuity of imperial history is now broken, for the southern dynasty has nothing to do with the long struggles between Tunguses, Hiung-nu, and Tibetans for predominance in the north; whilst the northern dynasty lost all touch with the Syrians, Hindoos, Javans, and other mercantile people coming in trading vessels to Canton and other marts on the coast. In A.D. 222 the Emperor of Wu divided the old realm of Kiao-chi (South Yüeh) into two manageable halves. The name of Kwang-chou was given to what is now the double Canton province, and Tonquin was called Kiao-chou. Corea slipped away, and Chinese influence disappeared from the Far West. In a word, the whole *Weltpolitik* of the great Han dynasty crumbled to pieces. This period of division is by no means uninteresting, but events are not sufficiently connected to admit of pour-

CHINESE DYNASTIES WITH A CONTINUOUS INTELLIGIBLE HISTORY.

NAME OF PERIOD OR DYNASTY.	DURATION.	NUMBER OF RULERS.	REMARKS.
Ts'in	255-206	Five	{ The fourth declared himself "First Emperor" in 221. From 206 to 202 there was general anarchy. { From A.D. 25 the eastern branch moved its capital from modern Si-an Fu to modern Ho-nan Fu. { The northern one (Wei) is the one chiefly in evidence. { From A.D. 317 the eastern branch moved its capital to modern Nanking.
Han	B.C. 202-A.D. 220	Twenty-seven	
Three Empires	220-265	Average of three in each	
Tsin	265-420	Seventeen	

From 309 to 439 there was a bewildering succession of Hsiung-nu, Bastard Hsiung-nu, Tungusic, Tibetan, Tibetotungusic, Migrated Tungusic, and rebel Chinese "dynasties," ruling in various parts of the north, from Corea to Kokonor; in addition to, and in competition with, first the Tsin Empire, and later the Northern Empire of the Tobas and the contemporaneous Chinese Empires at Nanking.

traying the situation with a few strokes in a brief sketch like this.

From A.D. 265 the Sz-ma family (distantly related to the famous historian) were for a time nominally sole rulers of China, under the style of the Ts'in dynasty. This word must not be confused with the older Ts'in, which, by retrospective philological processes peculiar to China, means that *Sein* must not be confused with *Zün*. The imperial house was distinctly literary and peaceful, rather than warlike and ambitious;—in fact, it developed those qualities which we now consider peculiarly Chinese. It was the great age of calligraphy, *belles lettres*, fans, chess-playing, wine-bibbing, and poetry-making; of strategy rather than hard fighting, and of political timidity. From this time dates the rule that no one should set foot in China, at least to remain, without bringing tribute. Moreover, a succession of Tartar dynasties of very short duration kept the whole of the extreme north in a perpetual ferment. One curious and permanent result of all this was that the Chinese centre of gravity was entirely changed. At the present day, if we wish for etymological accuracies, we find them most perfect in Canton and Corea; that is, the best representative of the language spoken under the two divisions of the Han dynasties is now to be found in the descendants of emigrants to the south; whilst the Coreans, cut off for many centuries by Tartars from intercourse with literary China, have rigidly preserved, in or according to their ancient form, the early Han pronunciation of the Chinese words they borrowed 2,000 years ago. The rough nomads who swarmed into North China not only mixed their blood with that of the Chinese, but debased the language; hence we find that the “mandarin” forms of speech, in their relation to

old theoretical Chinese, bear much the same relation to the coast dialects that French does to Spanish, Portuguese, or Italian, which, though not so fashionable, are all of them nearer old Latin than the French can claim to be.

The rival Tartar dynasties in the north were finally dispossessed by a Tungusic family called Toba, which ruled for 200 years with great vigour over North China, whilst the pure Chinese governed the southern half. This was the period known as the "North and South Dynasties," and ever since that time it has been as much the rule as the exception for Tartars of some kind to divide the empire on equal terms with native dynasties. Here, again, we find a close parallel in Roman history. The Stilichos, Ricimers, Alarics, and Theodorics all made way for the permanent northern Frankish empire of Charlemagne. But neither the northern nor the southern half of China was continuously ruled: instead of puzzling the reader with a confused narrative of how this was arranged, the result of which would probably be to leave him in as thick a fog as before, I draw up a short table showing the succession of Tartar and Chinese houses, one to the other. I must mention that capitals were often temporarily shifted; also that the list of northern dynasties here given is by no means exhaustive. It will be noticed that the intermarriages between Han and the Hiung-nu produced dangerous results, for one barbarian based his claim to found a Chinese dynasty on the pretext that he was the only true direct descendant of the first Han emperor. It will also be seen that the Tibetans never had more than one short innings; never again did they assume imperial airs, although they made many conquests in later times. But the Hiung-nu (Turks) and Tunguses (Kitans, Nuchêns, Manchus) will often re-

Dynasty.	Family Name.	Capital (modern name)	Duration (A.D.)	Remarks.
(West) Tsin .	Sz-ma . .	Ho-nan Fu .	265-317	Pure Chinese
(East) Tsin .	do. . .	Nanking } Si-an Fu }	317-419	do.
Sung . . .	Liu . . .	Nanking .	420-478	do.
Ts'i . . .	Siao . . .	do. . .	479-502	do.
Liang . . .	do. . .	do. . .	502-556	do.
Ch'ên . . .	Ch'ên . . .	do. . .	557-588	do.
Sui . . .	Yang . . .	Si-an Fu .	581-618	do.
<hr/>				
Han . . .	Liu . . .	Ho-nan Fu } Si-an Fu }	304-329	{ Hiung-nu ; des- cended from Han by marriage
Chao . . .	Shih . . .	Ho-nan Fu .	319-352	{ "Wether" tribe of Hiung-nu
Yen . . .	Mu-yung	Lin-chang } Ting-chou }	334-399	A Tungusic family
Ts'in . . .	P'u (or Fu)	Si-an Fu .	352-395	A Tibetan family
(After) Ts'in.	Yao . . .	do. . .	384-417	do.
(West) Ts'in.	K'i-fuh . .	near Kokonor	385-428	A Tungusic family
Hia . . .	Hê-lien . .	Ning-hia .	407-428	Hiung-nu
Wei . . .	Toba . . .	Ho-nan Fu .	386-534	Tungusic
(West) Wei .	{ Yü-wên Toba . . }	Yung-p'ing Fu	535-557	do.
(East) Wei .	Kao . . .	Ho-nan Fu } Lin-chang }	534-550	do.
(North) Ts'i.	do. . .	do. . .	550-577	do.
Chou . . .	Yu-wên . .	Si-an Fu .	557-581	do.
Sui . . .	Yang . . .	do. . .	581-618	Pure Chinese

appear; as to the Mongols, they seem to have been Turkified Tunguses.

At last Yang Kien, an energetic general of distinguished descent in the service of the Chou dynasty, succeeded in unifying China once more under one sceptre. He was murdered by his son, who, though a madman of the Caligula type, ruled for a few years with extraordinary vigour, and carried his arms or his prestige to the uttermost ends of the empire. It is recorded of this monarch that he wished to communicate with Fulin, or "the Franks." Some argue

from this that their name could not have been known so early, and that "Fulin" must mean some other people. But it must be remembered that this allusion is made retrospectively by historians of the T'ang dynasty after it was known who the Franks were. Exactly the same thing occurs in the Ming History, which explained all about the Franks of 1520, under the events of that date, but after Ricci, in 1600, had for the first time made it clear that the Franks, Fulin, and Ta Ts'in were all one.

To revert to the Toba Tunguses of North China, who for 200 years had managed things pretty much in their own way. During this period (386-582) another nomadic power called the Juju, or Jeujen (Gibbon's Geougen), had become formidable in the Desert region, and had also succeeded in subduing most of the Hiung-nu remnants in Southern Siberia and elsewhere. One of their subject Hiung-nu hordes was that of "Türk," so called from an alleged native word meaning "helmet," having reference to the helmet-shaped mountain overshadowing one of their chief valleys (lat. 40° N., long. 102° E., or thereabouts). These Turks were mostly smiths by profession, and were employed by their Jeujen masters to forge weapons and armour; but as the power of the Tobas declined, the Turks found an opportunity to measure their strength with the Jeujen. Not only did they destroy this nomad power and take its place, but they began to domineer over the last two Tungusic dynasties of North China, and to demand marriage alliances. The Sui dynasty (581-618) succeeded in repelling the pretensions of the Turks, and also overran Corea as a punishment for her diplomatic coquetting with their Khan. At that time the modern Mukden was the Corean capital, and the old name

of Chaosien had been abandoned in favour of Kaoli (locally pronounced exactly like our word "Corea"). Relations with Annam were reopened; that country was divided into thirteen provinces in Chinese style, and tribute was exacted for the first time. The attempted conquest of Corea brought a mission in A.D. 608 from Japan, which now for the first time took the name of Ji-păn, or "Sun's-rise," and claimed an imperial status. In the same way the closer relations with Annam had the result that Chinese envoys were despatched to Red Earth State. By this appears to be meant the modern Siam, but the Tai or Shan race had not yet been given that name, which is simply the Burmese word Sham, written by the Portuguese Sciam, and corrupted by us into a dissyllable. For the first time Loochoo was heard of, and by that name (Liu-k'iu); the Chinese even sent a quasi-piratical expedition in order to exact tribute. Strange to say, nothing whatever is yet known even of the bare existence of Formosa, though later tradition mentions it as a dependency of Loochoo, at first under the apparently Sanskrit name of P'i-she-ja (some such sound as Vichâna or Vaisadja). The Western Turks were an impenetrable barrier between China, Persia, and India; and the Tibetans had not yet become an aggressive power. Such was China under the Sui dynasty, which collapsed before the T'ang house as quickly as, 800 years earlier, the house of Ts'in had fallen before Han; and for the same reasons: it was too revolutionary, and it was unable to digest all that it had swallowed.

The Great T'ang dynasty (618-907) ranks with the Han as one of the two "world-powers" of Chinese history. To this day the only Cantonese word for "China-man" is "man of T'ang," which fact tends to show that

the south had been isolated ever since the Han lost their prestige there, and that none of the short-lived Nanking dynasties had left any permanent impression on the popular mind.

Li Shī-min, the real founder of the T'ang dynasty, son of the nominal founder, Li Yüan, is perhaps the only instance in the whole course of Chinese history of a sovereign who was, from a European point of view, at once a gentleman, and a brave, shrewd, compassionate man, free from priggishness and cant. He personally subdued the Turks and Tunguses in such a way that for half a century the Tartars were under direct Chinese rule from Corea up to the frontiers of Persia, the fugitive sovereign of which latter country actually came to China for protection. For the first time in Chinese history the Emperor effectively conquered the three kingdoms of the Corean peninsula, which was also for a few generations governed directly as a set of provinces. During the reigns of his successors (one of them was a concubine, Chinese Catherine No. 2, who became rather irregularly the Empress of his son, and Regent over his grandson), the Turkish power, after a period of revival, was finally broken, and passed into the hands of a kindred race known as the Ouigours. Within the past decade numerous Turkish and Ouigour monuments have been discovered, chiefly by Russians. Not only has it been possible to reconstruct the old Turkish language by the light of these inscriptions, sometimes bilingual or trilingual, but the main points in Turko-Chinese history are sufficiently confirmed by them. The Turks clearly were, and are definitely stated to have been, the old southerly Hiung-nu; and the petty Ouigour subdivision of the Baikal group of Hiung-nu, which of course had no cause for appropriating the equally petty

tribal name of "Türk," did, when it became the ruling tribe over kindred tribes, exactly what the Turks, Mongols, Manchus, Russians, English, French, and other dynastic families have done all over the world,—it applied to the whole dominion the generalising name of a tribal part of it.

The Mahometans, in their struggles with the Turks of the Bokhara region, were soon brought into contact with China, and relations with the Caliphs became fairly regular and intimate. The Tibetan *gialbos* of Lhasa also first became a power contemporaneously with the T'ang dynasty: bilingual inscriptions of this date, in Chinese and a modified form of Sanskrit, are still to be seen at the Tibetan capital. A third great power, which seems to have been practically Siamese, contested supremacy with the Tibetans in the Yün Nan-Sz Ch'wan region, and we find both Ouigours and Abbasside Arabs taking part with the Chinese in these struggles round and about the Upper Yang-tsze. Both the Tibetans and the "Chao confederation" (*chao* is still Siamese for "prince" and "principality") came within an ace of securing the imperial throne under the weaker T'ang emperors; and as it was, the Tibetans for some decades held possession of Chinese Turkestan. During this dynasty an able Corean general in Chinese employ carried the Chinese arms into the region of Kashmir and Balti, and Nepaul is heard of for the first time; the various princes of India also opened up diplomatic relations with China. Annam remained a Chinese prefecture, but had to be defended against the ambitions of the Siamese confederation and of Ciampa. Since A.D. 940 Annam has been ruled by native dynasties tributary to China. The relations with the South Seas seem to have had leisure to develop themselves peacefully during these

severe struggles all along the line of the land frontiers. The Hindoo trading colonies of Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and Sulu were gradually displaced by those of the Arabs, whose merchants also acquired a firm footing in Canton, Zaitun (Ts'üan-chou), Canfu (Kanp'u near Hangechow), and other places on the Chinese coast. Europeans now begin to be vaguely heard of as Fulin, Folang, or "Franks," a name which is almost certain to have been introduced by the Arabs overland by way of Persia. They are identified by the Chinese of the eighth century with the old Ta-ts'in; and, as all the world knows, the celebrated Nestorian stone of the seventh century discovered by European missionaries at the T'ang capital of Si-an Fu 300 years ago, describes in Syriac and Chinese the Christian religion of Ta-ts'in. At this time the Chinese do not seem to have quite understood that the sea and land routes to Arabia both led to the same place; nor is there yet any trace of "Franks" coming by sea.

Just as the destruction of the Hiung-nu power by the house of Han paved the way for Tungusic dynasties in North China, so the destruction of the Turkish power by the house of T'ang paved the way for the Kitans, Nüchêns, Mongols, and Manchus. Moreover, just as a few Hiung-nu dynasties enjoyed short leases of power before the Tobas obtained a firm seat, so a few Turkish dynasties reigned in the north before the Kitans (the name origin of Marco Polo's Cathayans) secured a real hold. The T'ang power finally collapsed in 907, and of the five dynasties that rapidly succeeded one another, until the house of Sung once more reunited the greater part of China in 960, three were of Turkish extraction. It was during this period of anarchy that Annam finally slipped away.

The Sung dynasty (960-1260), like the Tsin, was never able to get quite rid of unpleasant northern intruders; and, also like the Tsin, it was peaceful, literary, and strategical in its inclinations rather than warlike, bold, and ambitious. The Sung era is undoubtedly the Augustan era of China in all these senses. The Kitans formed a powerful empire (with a capital for the first time at modern Peking) which lasted for 200 years (915-1115). They were replaced by their eastern subjects the Nüchêns, the southern branch of whom had already (700-900) formed an influential and civilised buffer state on the north frontier of Corea. The Nüchêns governed their empire with success for over a century (1115-1232), until they in turn were overthrown by the Mongols. Roughly speaking, both Kitans and Nüchêns ruled only over Old China, *i.e.* the four provinces of Chih Li, Shan Si, Shen Tung, and part of Ho Nan; but also over what we now call Mongolia and Manchuria:—in other words, over the trade area now fed from Tientsin. Turkestan and Tibet lay entirely outside their spheres, and a semi-Tibetan, semi-Toba state called Hia (Marco Polo's "Tangut") formed in the region of Ordos and the Yellow River Loop a barrier (895-1237) between them and the West. During all this time the Sung dynasty, with capitals at various towns in modern Ho Nan province, and finally at Nanking and Hangchow, had a complete monopoly of southern affairs and the ocean trade; whilst Corea, Hia, and the Ouigours kept up a trimming policy, first with one, then with the other, often with both of the Chinese powers. It is curious to observe that the true Chinese were not now to be found in Old China, but in all those parts which, as emigrants, their ancestors from Old China had populated. It is like Scotland being repopulated at the expense of the Picts by Scots coming from Ireland.

At the beginning of the thirteenth century there arose the mighty Genghiz Khan, whose vast empire had its origin in a petty squabble between himself and an envoy sent by his Nüchên suzerain to enforce from him more respect. The Mongols soon made short work of not only both the Chinas, but also of their tributary states, such as Hia and the Ouigours; they moreover swept over Turkestan, Persia, and the steppes beyond; annexed Russia; ravaged Hungary; and even threatened the existence of Western Europe. In the south, Kublai for the first time effectively conquered Yün Nan, and even Burma, Annam, and several of the Shan states between them. It must here be mentioned that so far back as 330 B.C. the feudatory King of Ch'u (Hu Nan) had conquered Yün Nan; but owing to wars with revolutionary Ts'in the conquering general could not get back, and he had therefore founded a kingdom there. To resume,—Corea was made a subservient dependency, and Mongol influence was extended all over the southern seas, at least as far as Ceylon. But Kublai came to signal grief in his attempt to subdue Java; still more so in his persistent and presumptuous expeditions against Japan, not one inch of whose soil has ever been sullied by foreign conquest. Kublai Khan perhaps came nearer being Emperor of the World than any monarch, Eastern or Western, has ever been before or after him; and, though the Chinese affect to despise the "frowzy Tartars" (*sao ta-tsz*), their historians frankly admit that "Hu-pilie" (as they call him) ruled over a vaster empire than any other Chinese sovereign had ever done before.

But the Mongols soon became quarrelsome and degenerate after Kublai's death. A young bonze named Chu Yüan-chang, from an obscure village not very far from

the Han founder's birthplace, raised a patriotic force of "Boxers," and drove the Mongols back to their pristine deserts. He speedily established friendly relations with Corea, united the whole of the Eighteen Provinces once more under a native Chinese dynasty, sent a Frank messenger back to Europe to notify the change, and summoned all the petty powers of the southern seas to their "duty." Never was there such marine activity in China as during the first reigns of the Ming dynasty (1368-1643). Chinese junks, under the command of a very distinguished eunuch, amply supplied with funds, ammunition, and fighting men, went as far as the Arabian and African coasts; the Red Sea was first vaguely heard of, and tribute was for some time regularly sent from Arabia, Ma'abar or Malabar, Ceylon, Sumatra, the Malay states, Siam, Java, Sulu, Loochoo, and Borneo, besides innumerable other petty island rulers too insignificant to enumerate here. Towards the end of the sixteenth century the armies of the great Japanese Napoleon Hideyoshi overran Corea, his ultimate aim being to conquer China. The Ming dynasty, though already decrepit, rendered signal aid to Corea in driving the Japanese out. During the two preceding centuries the Japanese pirates had actively harassed the Chinese coasts, and in 1609 they temporarily carried off China's tributary, the King of Loochoo. Manchuria is scarcely even mentioned during the 280 years this house of Ming occupied the throne. There were frequent wars with the Mongols, and it was in the course of this isolated period that the obscure power of the Eleuths had time to grow. One Chinese emperor was taken captive at a place (still so called) just outside the Great Wall styled T'umu, and was detained by the chief Essen for some years.

Luzon (Manila) is first mentioned in 1410 as sending tribute to China; but nothing more is heard of the place until 1576, when the sea-borne Franks (Fulangki) begin to attract serious attention. At first this term was applied indifferently to the Portuguese, Spaniards, and French; but the Dutch (Ho-lan), and afterwards the English, were specially known as "Red-hairs." Chinese influence had almost disappeared from the south seas before Europeans put in an appearance; but after the settlement of Malacca by the Portuguese, the whole political field was practically abandoned; the Chinese traders there willingly submitted to the government of natives and Europeans without attempting to secure the protection of either the Ming or the Manchu power—in fact, the latter was always disposed to view trading emigrants in the light of pirates or traitors. In one case, however, the Manchus put their foot firmly down: they secured possession of Formosa, whence the Dutch were ignominiously driven.

The Ming dynasty waged a long war with Burma and the Shan states under the latter's protection; on the whole successfully. It also maintained a preponderating influence in Annam, Siam, Ciampa, and Cambodgia. Tribute was occasionally sent from Arabia, Samarcand, the Pamir states, and various parts of Turkestan; but in the main Chinese influence in Tibet and all places west of it and of the Yellow River was fitful and feeble. In spite of the vigour of the founder of the Ming dynasty and of his warlike son, who finally transferred the capital from Nanking to his own appanage Peking, on the whole no impression of affection or respect has been left upon the Chinese mind by this ruling house, the emperors of which soon dropped into the hands of eunuchs and favourites; and it perhaps ended as

CHINESE DYNASTIES WHOSE GENERAL RULING PRINCIPLES CORRESPOND WITH
THOSE NOW IN VOGUE.

NAME OF DYNASTY OR PERIOD.	DURATION.	NUMBER OF RULERS.	REMARKS.
Sui	580-618	Four	{ Two effective rulers only. A wonderfully active dynasty.
T'ang	618-907	Twenty-two	
Five Dynasties	907-960	Average two each	{ Three of the five were of Turkish origin. The Kitans ruled to the north of them all. South and West China was nearly independent of them all, and under separate rulers known as the "Sixteen States."
Sung	960-1260	Eighteen	{ There is no such name as "North and South Dynasties," but there ought to be. The Chinese affect to regard Sung alone as historical China; but from 1127 the Sung had to abandon all China north of the Yang-tsze, and for 300 years the Peking plain was in Tartar hands.
Kitans, 912-1117 Nuchéns, 1117-1232 Mongols, 1229-1260	960-1260	Twenty-two	
Yüan	1260-1368	Nine	{ Kublai and his successors first occupied the Peking throne.
Ming	1368-1643	Seventeen	{ The first native dynasty to rule the north since 450 years.
Tsing	1644-1900	Nine	{ As with the Mongol Khans previous to Kublai, so with the Manchu Khans previous to 1644—they do not count.

pitifully and contemptibly as any Chinese dynasty ever did.

The way the Manchu dynasty came into being was this. During the Mongol times (1260-1360) the warlike spirit of the Tungusic hunting tribes had been kept up to the mark by employment on a large scale in the expeditions against Quelpaert and Japan. As we have seen, the Ming dynasty left the whole region of what we now call Manchuria very much to itself; as it bore the Mongol name Uriangkha, it seems likely that when the Mongols were driven out of China they, and more especially the Uriangkha tribe, retained political influence in Nayan's old appanage, which had in Kublai's time been practically modern Manchuria. The name of the celebrated Mongol general, Uriangkhadai, simply means "man of Uriangkha." The only occasions on which the people in these parts seem to have had friendly intercourse with the Ming power was when they took advantage of frontier fairs to bring down horses, furs, and skins for sale or barter to the Chinese. During this obscure period of imperial inaction, the tribes now grouped together as the Manchu race must have had ample opportunity to develop; but the Manchus themselves are not able to tell us much of their own origin and doings previous to the time when their chief Nurhachi conceived and carried out the bold idea of welding all the Tunguses into one nation. Some of the southern chiefs, tinged with Mongol blood, objected to this fusion, and either took refuge in or intrigued with China. This led to frontier wars and recriminations, and finally to the conquest of the Chinese borderlands by Nurhachi's son, Abkhai. Meanwhile a great rebellion broke out in degenerate China, and the Ming general, Wu San-kwei, who had been sent against the Manchus,

was recalled to quell it. Peking fell into rebel hands, and Manchu assistance was foolishly sought by Wu San-kwei. The Chinese Emperor having meanwhile committed suicide, and there being no proper heirs, the Manchus saw their opportunity, and promptly took it. Abkhai's son and successor became the first Manchu Emperor of China in 1644. Previous to this Corea and Eastern Mongolia had been reduced to submission, and special measures were now taken to draft the capable Mongol troops into the Manchu military organisation. The Coreans were allowed to govern themselves on the tacit condition of furnishing troops when called for. China was soon conquered, and then came the turn of the overweening Wu San-kwei and other revolted Chinese satraps, the Western Mongols, the Kalkhas and Eleuths, Kokonor, and Tibet. By the time of the Emperor K'ien-lung (1736-1795) the Chinese Empire had reached its climax. The necessity of completely subduing the Eleuths and Dzungarian Kalmucks led to the conquest of Ili and Kashgaria. The wars with Tibet similarly led up to the conquest or pacification of Nepaul. There were also long wars with Annam and Burma, in which the Manchus often came off second best, but which resulted in a more or less genuine recognition of Chinese suzerainty; an authoritative tone was assumed even over Siam when that country became involved in the peninsular question. Of course these southern nations knew next to nothing of Manchu-Chinese distinctions. The Manchus have always left Japan severely alone, but in Loochoo they found a faithful vassal (equally complaisant to Japan) until about twenty-five years ago, when Japan, in consequence of Formosa disputes, unceremoniously gave the Chinese notice to quit. The Sultans of Sulu have also been respectfully disposed towards the Manchus.

With these exceptions, the reigning dynasty, which has no real aptitude for the ocean, has, following the example of its kinsmen, the Kitans and Nüchêns, cut itself off entirely from political relations with the Southern Seas. As a land power, however, it has been even more solidly established than the Mongols were; for although the immediate successors of Genghiz commanded the personal attendance before their desert throne of Russian, Armenian, and Persian princes, the most powerful Mongol Emperor, Kublai, really ruled in an effective sense over the Eighteen Provinces alone, and was at perpetual loggerheads with his vassal relatives of Mongolia and Manchuria; moreover, the Mongols were not the intellectual or literary equals of the Manchus, and never had either the same prudence or the same financial grasp of the country's resources. As to the relations of Europe with the Manchu Empire, that subject requires a special chapter. It only needs to be remembered at this point that Chinese struggles with the nomads and Tartars begin with the dawn of history, and are carried down to our own day, when the "Boxers" and reformers have one more chance to secure what the Taipings just missed—the regaining of China for the Chinese. The Taiping rebellion began at a place called Kin-t'ien (Sun-chou Fu) in Kwang Si, and is considered by the Chinese to have been owing, like the earlier "Boxer" revolt of 1808-16, to the influence of foreign religion.

CHAPTER III.

EARLY TRADE NOTIONS

THE history of Chinese trade, like their general history, only becomes really interesting to most of us in its relation to foreign countries. From the very first the trader seems to have taken rank with our conventional usurer, and to have been regarded as a mischievous person whose main object in life was, not to increase the public wealth, but to corner supplies; nor does the abstract idea of more legitimate trade appear ever to have been conceived in the sense of "mutual exchange for the furtherance of comfort and luxury," but rather in that of "steps to keep the needy from starving, and the armies supplied with food and weapons." The *Book of History* says: "Do not overvalue strange commodities, and then foreigners will be only too glad to bring them." In purely mythical and semi-historical times there are traditions of islanders bringing tribute from the south, and of tattooed tribes from part of Yüeh (modern Wênchow) carrying swords, shields, and fish-skin boxes for sale or barter. The so-called "tribute" of ancient times seems to have practically meant "trade," for each province was supposed to bring to the metropolis the superfluity of that which it produced easiest and best, receiving bounties or presents in return. Swords, gold and silver, piece-goods, tortoise shells, and, later, copper coins were used as currency, the chief preoccupation of

the Government apparently being to keep the people supplied with a sufficiency of this primitive money. The swords seem to have become gradually symbolical in the shape of "knife coins." To this very day the majority of the Burmese are as indifferent to wealth as we are led to believe the Chinese once were. It was only in Confucius' time—the period of the Rival States under the nominal hegemony of the Kings—that the idea of accumulating profit seems to have energetically possessed men's minds. One statesman (Kwan Chung) invented a kind of *lupanar* where trading visitors from neighbouring states were encouraged by "Babylonian women" to leave their gains behind them; thus this enterprising state sold its goods at a profit, and got the money back in part. As the historian says: "Roguery and violence now began to take precedence of right and justice: greed for the possession of riches replaced modesty and humility in men's minds: huge fortunes were made by some callous ones, whilst others were starving before their eyes."

When the great Ts'in conqueror, the self-styled "First" Emperor (B.C. 221–209), united the empire into one whole, the currency is stated to have consisted in pounds of unminted gold, and half-ounces of some kind of copper coinage. Silver, pewter, jewels, cowries, and tortoise-shell all had their fluctuating market values, but were not legal currency. The long-continued efforts made to repel the northern nomads had greatly exhausted the Empire; and when, in addition to all this, the struggle of competing generals for the succession had ended in the triumph of the Han house, the price of grain and of horses had become fabulously high. The founder of this active dynasty may have been a great man, but he was certainly not a refined one. In order to show his

contempt as a sovereign for "writing fellows," he more than once deliberately used the hat of a literary man for the basest of purposes; and to evince his hatred as a legislator for huckstering, he "forbade merchants to wear silk or ride in carriages, piling upon them taxes and charges of all kinds, in order to humiliate and make them miserable." His wife and son after his death somewhat alleviated these burdens as the Empire gradually settled down into a better financial condition; but the sons of "merchants were still unable to occupy any official post,"—an incidental statement of the historian which leads us to infer that traders were under a social tabu.

The chief subject for commercial speculation was grain for the armies, and the trader of the period appears to have been the same objectionable kind of person as the ubiquitous army purveyor and commissary so detested by Napoleon during his Italian campaigns. Other fortunes were made by "melting iron and evaporating salt"; the rich so manipulated their wealth that they got the poor into their power as serfs. Later on, provincial satraps and wily officials exploited "copper mountains" for their own profit; clandestine coinage reduced the value of the standard currency; and so on. The famous Emperor Wu Ti, of the early Han dynasty (B.C. 140–86), whose military activity first opened the West to China, and in whose time the prestige of China was at its climax, adopted the arbitrary methods of some of our English kings: he sent commissioners round to levy fines and benevolences upon the rich, even to confiscate fortunes which were shamefully large. An officer was established at the capital whose functions were to "prevent traders and shopkeepers from making huge profits, to take charge of all transport and delivery,

to place artisans under official control, and to keep all prices of commodities steady."


These are only a few of the devices employed by the early Chinese legislators to evince their suspicion of and contempt for traders, and it is evident from even the meagre details which go to make up the above account that merchants in those days were viewed much as Jews were regarded by King Edward I. It does not give us much insight into the methods of early trade, nor is there a word said about organised foreign commerce. But, as hundredweights of grain and pieces of silk goods are counted by the five or six million in prosperous years, we may assume that the backbone of revenue and also of internal trade consisted in grain for armies and poor districts; salt to make the grain palatable as food; iron to make pans for boiling the brine, and to manufacture weapons for the soldiers; horses, provender, and carts for military transport; silk for clothing and wadding (no cotton in those days); and copper for common currency. Gems of all kinds were purely articles of luxury, used then, as now, for hoarding purposes. There is nothing extraordinary in all this. Even now the only wealth in many prosperous Chinese villages consists in a woman, a "water buffalo," a pig, and a few fowls; iron pans for cooking, a rough spinning machine, a few strings of cash, and suits of silk or cotton clothes; with lumps of salt or ounces of opium for barter. The up-to-date novelties are cotton, kerosene, opium, tobacco, spirits, and tea. This being the condition of Chinese wealth as I have myself seen it in half a dozen provinces, it may be easily imagined what the different degrees of poverty must be.

So soon as ever foreign nations are mentioned in Chinese history, we hear first of exchange presents

between equals, or tribute from inferiors, both of which are merely trade in its earliest form. In offering his hand and heart to the Chinese Empress-Dowager, the poetical if not Rabelaisian Hiung-nu Khan Mehteh (B.C. 209-173) said: "I should like to exchange what I have for what I have not." He probably hinted at trade, though the Empress, womanlike, construing the offer in a more personal sense, protested that her bodily charms—more especially her hair and her teeth—were inadequate. He himself sent camels, horses, and carts, receiving as an equal in return wadded and silk clothes, buckles, hair-pins, embroidery, etc. Sometimes the Hiung-nu were able to insist on regular subsidies of grain and yeast besides these complimentary presents; for even then the Tartars were drunkards, and loved to vary their native kumiss with Chinese samshu. But frontier "fairs" and even clandestine trade are also specifically mentioned as early as B.C. 140. The nomads used to bring horses and beasts for sale; more especially the "300 mile a day" or "blood-sweating" horses of Kokand were highly prized. Horses, pearls, sables, and excellent wood for making arms are mentioned amongst the earliest products of North Corea, which then extended far into Manchuria; the same thing, *plus* flax or hemp, of the Tunguses bordering thereon; the buckthorn arrows with petrified resin or lapis-lazuli tips brought by the latter were known by report even in Confucius' time (B.C. 550-480). In the eastern part of the Korean peninsula iron was the sole currency: both the Japanese and the other Korean states used to purchase their iron there. When the Emperor of China was engaged in turning the flank of the Hiung-nu, he sent the now celebrated traveller Chang K'ien (B.C. 160-110) on a mission to some of their enemies whom they had driven

to modern Ili. Before the envoy got there, these nomads had been driven by the occupiers of Ili to Græco-Bactria, and after driving over the Oxus the people of that state, already enfeebled by Parthian attacks, had possessed themselves of the country: thence they crossed the Oxus, and subsequently formed (B.C. 150–A.D. 50) the Indo-Scythian empire. But Chang K'ien, taken prisoner by the Hiung-nu, escaped after ten years' captivity to modern Kokand, whence he found his way into Græco-Bactria. On his return to China he brought a report upon West Asia from Mesopotamia to the Pamirs. He narrated his having seen Chinese goods in Bactria, and having ascertained that they came through India. This led to his being sent on a second mission to Ili and Kokand, which country was at last conquered and forced to accept suzerainty. Attention was also given to Yün Nan and Canton, the first because it was expected to lead to India, the second because it was found that Yün Nan produce came to Canton by river: this led by degrees to the conquest of both regions, and to the better knowledge of several new trade routes; but to this day the hoped-for southern line of posts extending from Canton to Bactria has never been achieved. In the negotiations which preceded the conquest of Canton (B.C. 110), the King of South Yüeh complained that he was not allowed to import iron, agricultural implements, or female animals. His return presents include such things as rhinoceros horns and peacocks, which probably came to Canton by sea in the way of trade. From all this we may gather a tolerably accurate notion of what the ancient land commerce of China must have been. For clearness sake I use the modern names of some places.


The Phœnicians, Carthaginians, and Syrians were already old hands at conducting sea trade when China



under the Han dynasty first found herself with an unbroken line of coast, and it is abundantly clear from the works of Pliny and Ptolemy that an active trade between Alexandria and the Far East had already been in existence for some centuries before our era. Kattigara was the extreme point known to the Red Sea navigators, and of course each specialist has his own theory as to whether Rangoon, Singapore, Canton, or some other modern mart is meant. It is also a knotty point to decide whether "King Antun's" messengers already mentioned reached China by way of Rangoon or by way of "Faifo" in Annam. I have wandered on foot over and examined both these places, and also inspected nearly every business port of importance on the coasts of Burma, Siam, the Malay Peninsula, and Indo-China, besides reading up the special ancient lore of each place. Conditions of tide, sandbanks, current, alluvion, etc., change with each generation, just as do the vicissitudes of government. All trade ports become so because the embouchure of some great river facilitates distribution, because the anchorage is spacious and safe, or for other similar reasons; and the number of such desirable sites must then, as now, have been limited to a narrow choice. I am disposed to think that trade went on between the Syrian merchants and the natives exactly as it does now, and probably at most of the same places, between Canton and the coasts of India; but as the Burmese, Annamese, and Siamese as we now know them had not then reached the countries in which we at present find them; the Arabs had not yet displaced the Hindoos, nor the Europeans the Arabs; as, moreover, the Chinese had not yet moved outwards or down to the south on a wholesale scale as far as the sea coasts, it is futile to waste labour over unessential discussions as to detail, and better to content

ourselves, at least in an outline work of this kind, with what we know for a certainty. It is quite incontestable that the Roman Empire is stated by Pliny to have obtained from China silk, iron, and furs or skins: it is also distinctly stated by native historians that the Chinese obtained from Ta-ts'in glassware of all kinds, asbestos, woven fabrics, and embroideries, drugs, dyes, metals, and gems. So far as the northern parts of China, and therefore the Government and the historians, were concerned, this important trade was chiefly known of as a land trade by way of Parthia (which, it is interesting to note, the Chinese always call Arsac, from the generic name of the Parthian kings); and if small stress is laid upon the part which came by sea, this is easily to be explained by the special circumstances I have already touched upon: (1) the lateness of China's appearance on the coast; (2) the fact that during half of her historical existence China has been divided into two empires; and (3) the failure in even modern times to realise the true position of the West, and to identify persons coming from the south-west by sea with the same persons coming from the north-west by land.

In A.D. 98 a Chinese agent, sent by a general in the field on a voyage of exploration in order to learn more about the mysterious Ta-ts'in, arrived on the western confines of the Parthian Empire, and endeavoured to take passage to the countries beyond in a local ship,—the only possible direction in which this ship could have sailed was down the Persian Gulf or westwards from Gujerat to Aden;—but the skippers at the port, which was no other than the port of ancient Babylon, or that landing-place contiguous to it up to which the sea is then known to have reached, successfully endeavoured to dissuade him. The key to their motives is found in the same history that



narrates the above incident: "The Ta-ts'in merchants traffic by sea with Parthia and India: their kings always desired to send missions to China, but the Parthians wished to carry on the trade with them in Chinese silks, and it is for this reason that they were cut off from communication. This went on until the King Antun," etc. All this is perfectly plain; in the first century of our era, at least, a brisk trade in silk had already grown up between China and Rome. The Parthians tried to monopolise it, and the Romans, in order to escape Parthian cupidity, had recourse to the sea route, with which official China had no opportunity of acquainting herself before the second century. The one link, and that an important one, between the land and the sea routes was forged by such travellers as the Buddhist priest Fah Hien, who reached Turkestan by way of the Pamirs, and groped their way home through India, and thence by sea along the Java and Malay coasts.

Shortly after this, it will be remembered from our slight historical sketch, North China was politically cut off from the southern coasts for four centuries. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the northern Tobas have nothing new to say about the South Seas, whilst the southern dynasties at Nanking are correspondingly ignorant of events along the desert routes. But these southern dynasties kept up their relations with Ceylon, India, and Indo-China, and there is every reason to believe that a brisk trade went on without interruption as before. Up to the time of Mahomet, it seems that colonies sent out from India had managed or financed the entire ocean trade with the Far East, if they did not also in most cases directly rule the coast peoples of Java, the Malay Peninsula, and Indo-China. Profound international peace appears to have reigned, so

far as Chinese trade was concerned. There were no attempts made by junk-masters to conquer the natives, nor by dark-skinned rulers to harass or practise extortion upon the traders. There is one specific mention in A.D. 226 of a Ta-ts'in merchant coming to the court of the Emperor of Wu (at Nanking, but later at Wu-ch'ang opposite Hankow), who gave him some black dwarfs to take back as curiosities; otherwise nothing new is said of that country except in connection with the trade of India. The history of the Toba dynasty, in adding a few new details about Ta-ts'in, says that the capital is called Antu (Antioch). The early histories, in describing the capital, do not give it this name. Curiously enough, this northern account goes on to describe "another way to Ta-ts'in by water *via* Yung-ch'ang"; this (practically the head waters of the Irrawaddy) evidently has reference to the old story about An-tun, for it is almost certain that nothing fresh had occurred in connection with the Roman Empire. These various historical accounts, however, though manifestly often copies from one another, or from one common original document stowed away in the imperial archives, are often important as supplementing details omitted by other copyists as being unessential. The single important point, and that upon which to lay stress, is this: both Roman and Chinese accounts make it perfectly clear that land and sea trade in silk, iron, glass, textile fabrics, and many other articles existed between the Red Sea ports (Petra, etc.) and the Indo-Chinese ports (Rangoon, etc.), and also between Mesopotamia and Si-an Fu, during the first five or six centuries of the Christian era; but so far it does not appear that the question of customs duties, transit charges, or tonnage dues ever came to the front prominently, if at all, in China.

The Arabs are first heard of by the Chinese in A.D. 628, under the name of Tajik, or Tazi, and in connection with a revolt of Persia against her overbearing task-masters the Turks. As Mahomet was not yet dead, and means of communication were not more rapid then than they had been 600 years earlier, we have here a good instance of the speed at which news of political changes in Europe might reach China. The name Fu-lin now also appears for the first time, and the people of that country (which I take to be Fereng, or "Frank") are baldly stated to be "also called Ta-ts'in." The energetic but crazy Emperor of the Sui dynasty, whom I have already characterised as a sort of Caligula, is stated to have unsuccessfully attempted to open communications with Fu-lin. As this monarch sent an envoy by sea to Siam, personally visited the Turkish Khan in his own tent, and was present at the capture of the Korean capital (Mukden), it is evident that he had both energy and curiosity enough to solve the European mystery if he could. There have been interminable learned discussions as to what Tazi and Fu-lin really mean etymologically, but there is scarcely any doubt that the Arabs of Bagdad and the Nestorian Christians of Syria are at least sometimes intended. We have much the same anachronism, confusion, or extension of ideas in the Far East in connection with the Russian word Kitat (Mongol plural Kitan), applied by them to all Chinese, though only a small portion of China was ever governed by Kitans, and none of them were so governed when the Russians first picked up the word.

It needs not to be told again how Arab traders and missionaries spread themselves along the African and Arabian coasts, boldly navigated the Indian Ocean, established factories on the Gujerat and Malabar coasts,

in Ceylon, Sumatra, and Java, and then in Canton and other Chinese ports. In 658 the Chinese established a mathematical college. In the middle of the seventh century we also first hear of tithes being levied in kind, upon imports of spices, camphor, and precious woods, by an officer appointed specially to oversee the foreign trade: one of these functionaries is stated to have been on duty at Canton in A.D. 763, just five years after the Arabs and Persians had made a filibustering attack upon and then pillaged and burnt some warehouses in that city, as recounted in the history of the T'ang dynasty. The reports of the Arab merchant Suleiman upon the condition of trade in the Far East during the ninth century, and the comments of the Arab geographer Abu Seïd, who wrote about one century after this again, confirm what the Chinese say, and make it quite certain that a lively international traffic then pervaded the whole of the Indian Ocean. Even the Chinese accounts speak of foreign ships at Canton having a capacity of 1,000 *bharams*,—an Indian word having the meaning of “a quarter of a ton.”

Towards the end of the fifth century the Turks appear on the Chinese frontiers, in order to purchase silk and wadding in exchange for articles of their own production. The Turks were workers in iron, and the district of Liang Chou, in or near which they are first heard of, was, as we have seen, precisely the most ancient iron-producing place mentioned in Chinese history. Tea now appears for the first time as an article of commerce, and from that day to this Turkestan, Siberia, Tibet, and finally Europe, have regarded this as the main staple of their trade with China. The Nestorian stone with Syriac and Chinese inscriptions, dated A.D. 781, to which allusion has also been made in other chapters, gratefully acknow-

ledges the toleration shown to Christian travellers by the monarchs of the T'ang dynasty. At this time there were over 4,000 foreign families in Si-an Fu, and owing to the Tibetans having just then occupied Turkestan, most of them were obliged to settle in China for good.


During the period of anarchy which intervened between the collapse of the T'ang dynasty and the rise of the Sung, that is—during the greater part of the tenth century—Canton seems to have lost its place as the main centre of foreign trade. In 985 the sea traders were prohibited from exercising their calling. The explanation probably is that petty local dynasties ruled all over South China, at Canton amongst other places; and until the Sung dynasty had settled the question of respective political spheres with the Kitans in the north, it could not give attention to such remote districts as Canton. Hence there are more frequent allusions to the land trade between Tangut and Corea than to the junk-borne commerce of the South Seas. The result was a partial transfer of sea trade to Hangchow and (modern) Ningpo, to which places customs inspectors were, at the request of the foreign spokesmen, appointed in A.D. 1000; efforts were also made to obtain a similar appointment for Ts'üan-chow (Marco Polo's Zaitun), and this was granted in A.D. 1087; but I observe in the Sung history a statement in the year 1114 to the effect that the Hoppo of Canton was then still obliged to send to Court annual presents of pearls and ivory. The learned German sinologist, my friend Dr. Frederick Hirth, succeeded a few years ago in obtaining a very rare Chinese work, *Upon Foreigners*, composed by an imperial scion of the ruling Sung house, who actually occupied this last post towards the end of the twelfth century. As piracies at Swatow, off Fuh Kien, Canton, and the Lei-chow peninsula are frequently

noticed in the standard histories, it is probable that the whole coast was in a disturbed state at this time; but in the year 1141 it is recorded that "rules governing sea-going junks" were drawn up. In 1132 the Fuh Kien customs officer was abolished. In 1156 the taxing stations in all the provinces were closed up, in order to facilitate trade. In 1157 the Hoppo of Canton was directed to scrutinise the doings of foreign traders pretending to bring tribute. In 1166 the two maritime customs stations of Chêh Kiang were closed. In 1173 and 1182 foreign traders were restricted in their dealings with bullion; and in 1199 Japanese and Korean traders were limited in some way in their copper "cash" operations. In 1204 Canfu was first garrisoned with marines; and in 1205 eighty-one Cantonese sub-stations (? *likin*) were abolished. In 1211 Kwang Si cattle taxes were stopped. And so on. The space at our disposal only permits of it being stated here that the Chinese had then acquired a knowledge of the African coast down to Zanzibar, the Red Sea, and even (to a limited hearsay extent) of Egypt and Sicily. The great centre of Arab trade in the Far East was Sarbaza, or the modern Palembang in Sumatra, between which place and the coasts of Fuh Kien Chinese junks plied regularly with the two monsoons, carrying their cargoes of porcelain, silk, camphor, rhubarb, iron, sugar, and precious metals to barter at Palembang for scents, gems, ivory, coral, fine swords, prints, textile fabrics, and other objects from Syria, Arabia, and India. Cochin-China—probably "Faifo," near the modern Tourane—joined in this trade as a sort of half-way house, but levied the heavy charge of 20 per cent. upon all imports. It is specifically stated that there was no foreign trade with the northern part of the peninsula, *i.e.* what we now call Tonquin.

After Palembang the most important trade centres were Lambri (Acheen), and ports in Java, Borneo, and perhaps Manila. That there was an active trade with North China is also evident, for in 1130, when the Nüchên Tartars had driven the native Chinese Sung dynasty across the Yang-tsze, "Fuh Kien, Canton, and Chê Kiang trading junks were forbidden to go to Shan Tung lest the Nüchêns might make use of them as guides." In 1173 the export of silver and silk "to the north" was forbidden, and in 1178 it was made a capital offence to export tea thither "on ox or horse back." In 1192 the Ya-chou custom-house was abolished—evidently referring to Tibetan teas.

The accounts given by Marco Polo of this same ocean trade, as it existed when he visited the South Seas, were at first received in Europe with incredulity, but almost every place named by him, whether it be in Africa, Arabia, India, Sumatra, or Java, can be identified with trade marts mentioned either in Mongol history or in the above-cited work of the Sung dynasty, or else in the history of the Ming dynasty which succeeded the Mongols. The late Colonel Yule has treated this subject so exhaustively in his immortal work on *Ser Marco Polo* that it is quite superfluous to cite further evidence, unless it be to demonstrate the accuracy or inaccuracy of insignificant points in detail. Full accounts have also been published, by various gentlemen competent to examine the Chinese originals, of the voyages of Chêng Ho and other Chinese eunuchs, despatched early in the fifteenth century by the emperors reigning at Nanking and Peking upon various diplomatic and commercial missions to most of the countries in the Indian Ocean between the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Singapore.

The above historical sketch of early trade, imperfect and superficial though it necessarily is, will perhaps suffice, when read in connection with the preceding chapters, to prepare the way for an account of the great turning point in the annals of the Far Eastern trade—the arrival of Europeans in the China seas.



CHAPTER IV.

TRADE ROUTES

AFTER the first land discoveries of Han Wu Ti's generals, the Chinese laid it down quite clearly that there were two main roads to the West, and to this day they are still known by their old names of North and South roads—*i.e.* of the T'ien Shan (Celestial Mountains) which divide off the two. In the Han times the "six states north of the mountains" were nomad, and the "thirty-six town-states" were settled in their habits. The North, or Sungaria Road, or Great Road, is the one which leads from Si-an Fu, north of Kokonor, past Kan-chou, Suh-chou, and the Purun-ki River at Ansi Chou to Hami, Barkul, Manas, Urumtsi, and Ili. The T'ien Shan "must be crossed" at either Hami or Turfan, which last place, under various names, has always been a pivot of Chinese power—*i.e.* whenever it reached so far. In other words, on leaving Barkul for Urumtsi you can go by Turfan if you like. The South, or Kashgaria Road, or Short Road, branches off from the North Road, either at Turfan for Harashar, or at the Purun-ki River for Lob Nor; there it again divides into two:—you can either go past Korla north of the Gobi steppe and of the Tarim or Yarkand River; or you can go south of the Gobi steppe past Khoten and Yarkand, passing to the north of the Karakoram Pass which leads into Kashmir, and of the watershed of the

Kunlun Range which shuts off both Tibet and Kashmir. This Karakoram Pass must not be confused with Karakoram city in Mongolia; nor must it be forgotten that names of places frequently change, and that I ignore many of these changes in order not to crowd my book with ungainly sounds. From Kashgar it is clear the earliest Chinese travellers passed over the Pamirs to Badakshan and Kandahar or Kabul.


There is an old Chinese legend about foreign envoys having been sent back to Annam in "south-pointing carriages," from which story some persons have rashly inferred that in B.C. 110 the use of the magnetic compass was known. What we may fairly conclude is that in those times there was already an overland commerce with the South. When, in or about B.C. 134, a Chinese agent was visiting the modern Canton, he noticed some strange produce which was stated to have come from modern Yün Nan. On his way back to the imperial capital the agent questioned some traders in modern Sz Ch'wan about this produce, and discovered that there was a regular junk trade between Yün Nan, Kwei Chou, and Canton. When in B.C. 112 the generals of the Emperor marched upon Southern Yüeh in several columns by way of Hu Nan and Kiang Si, they took advantage of this discovery to ship troops also from Sz Ch'wan and Kwei Chou, in both cases by means of the divergent headwaters of the Western River, which will be further referred to in the chapter on "Salt." In B.C. 196 the King of South Yüeh had already complained to the Emperor that his trade in cattle, iron, and utensils was being interfered with by the King of Ch'ang-sha (Hu Nan); so that it is evident the trade route by the Canton North River and the Hu Nan Siang River had also been used long before this.

The Chinese record that the Parthians carried on a land trade in waggons and a sea trade in boats. The distances along the road are given in such a way that it seems plain a Persian *farsang* (ten miles) was used as the measure of stages. The Chinese pilgrims two centuries later measured by Indian *yodjanas*, which are perhaps the same thing. This matter of Parthian distances has been thoroughly worked out by my learned and painstaking friend Frederick Hirth, who shows that from the Parthian capital (at first on the Oxus, but later much farther west) a road led for 1,600 English miles eastwards to the frontier at Antiochia Margiana (near Margilan or Kokand), which place the Chinese historians of that period called Mulu—conjectured to be the Mûru of the Zend-Avesta. Westwards from the Parthian capital a second road ran 1,200 miles across the Zagros chain to Ktesiphon, whence 320 more to Hira (port of Babylon). We need not trouble ourselves much about this western part of the trade, which was monopolised by Parthians and Persians, and in which in any case no Chinese trading caravans ever engaged; but it is evident that Margiana brings us back to some place very near the Chinese frontier, or at least to the region under Chinese influence, visited first 2,000 years ago by Chang K'ien, and last contested fifty years ago by the Manchus. There is another point to be remembered: even some of the river routes to Canton had only been discovered a century before our era; so that no silk could have been sent from North or West China by sea, nor had the imperial Chinese any properly controlled territory or any accumulations of silk south of the Yang-tsze. Pliny (23-79) mentions iron as one of the commodities coming from China; and at the time (B.C. 200) when, as explained above, no silk could possibly have gone direct from China

to Rome by sea, the Chinese specially mention a people enriched by commerce in salt and iron in the region of modern Liang-chou, and a heavy excise was laid upon iron by the First Emperor, who himself came from Shen Si. Thus it seems plain that all silk and iron went by land, until the Parthian cupidity, two centuries later, drove it to the sea route. The Chinese enumerate over fifty kinds of produce imported by them from Ta Ts'in.

Ptolemy and Arrian (second century) speak of Sina, Thin, the Seres, and the "Stone Tower" (some such place as Tashkend or Tashkurgan, *i.e.* "Stone City" or "Stone Fort," near Yarkand). In the chapter on "Early Trade Notions" I have already shown how the overland route from Rangoon and one of the three Burma roads to China by the Irrawaddy, Mekong, or Salween (*viâ* Bhamo, Esmok, Kiang-hung, or the Kunlôn Ferry), was open to the "tribute" of Antoninus.

The routes followed by the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims are not to be ignored when we attempt to decide what the ancient sea and land trade routes were. At the beginning of the fifth century of our era the most celebrated monk of all (Fah-hien), starting from modern Si-an Fu, passed through modern Lan-chou (the iron region of B.C. 200), the modern Kan-chou (long the Ouigour capital), Tun-hwang (still so called), the modern Lob Nor, the modern Harashar, Khotan (still so called), the modern Kugiar, and Tashkurgan; then from the left bank to the right of the Indus by a circuitous road it is impossible to identify, but which was probably the same route as that followed by Chinese and Hindoo merchants at this day, not to mention our own travellers, sportsmen, and explorers—*i.e. viâ* Shahidula, the Karakoram Pass, Srinagar, over the Indus to Dir. Thence he went to modern Peshawur and Kabul, recrossed the Indus at Bannu,



whence he travelled straight across India, down the Ganges Valley, to a place near modern Calcutta; took ship for Ceylon, Java, and on to Kiao Chou in Shan Tung (German sphere). It appears the junkmen first tried to make Canton, but were carried by the wind much farther up north: thence he returned to Si-an Fu (A.D. 414).

It is stated that Alexander Cosmas, himself a trader in Arabia and India (530-50), says in his *Topography* that there was a maritime trade thence with Tzinistan, a place bordered by the Eastern Ocean. He also mentions Christianity as having existed in Merv and Samarcand a century earlier, and as having spread to the Bactrians and Huns.

The next Chinese pilgrim in date and importance was Hsüan-chwang. Starting also from modern Si-an Fu in A.D. 629, he reached (presumably by the same route as Fah-hien) the region of modern Turfan and Harashar, which he found then in the hands of the Türgiis branch of Western Turks; thence past Kuche (still so called) along the southern or Aksu road over one of the passes of the T'ien Shan Range to modern Issyk Kul and Tokmak. Near the "Thousand Springs" he met the Western Turkish Jabgu Khan, who gave him an interpreter to take him to Kapisa. As had happened only a generation earlier with the Greek envoy Zemarchus, no idea of the distinction between Western Turks and Original Central Turks seems to have entered the pilgrim's head. Thence he went on to Talas (modern Aulie-ata), White-water City (Ak-su, or "white water," near Tchinkend), to modern Nudjkend and Tashkend, Samarcand, Kesch, the Iron Gates (Derbend), Tokhara, Balkh, Bamian, and on to Kapisa. Here he not only brings us to the region discovered by Chang K'ien in his search for the Yüeh-chi or Indo-Scythian nomads driven away by the Hiung-nu,

and which is also near the old Greek and Parthian frontier of Margiana, but he tells us stories of Kanishka, King of Gandhara, A.D. 40, who was himself one of the Kushan or Indo-Scythian monarchs; their appearance, as judged from the coins of their ruler Kadphises, is distinctly Turkish. When he passed through, the old Tokhara or "Haiathala" empire of the Oxus had already been shattered by the Turks. He gives us quite a long account of his travels and experiences in both North and South India, whence, after innumerable interesting experiences, he returns, *via* Taxila, Kapisa, the Hindu Kush, and Andrab, to the Oxus; whence again through Shignan and the Pamirs, past Lake Victoria, over the mountains to Khavanda, an old state which cannot be far from modern Kashgar. This voyage occupied seventeen years, and it is interesting to note that about ten years after that (655-60) the capital of Tokhara was made by the Chinese Emperor, Yüe-chi Fu, or "the city of the Yüe-chi" nomads, who had been driven thither 800 years earlier. The King of Tokhara, as friend of the Nestorians and head of the anti-Arab party, about this time sent a map to China, with a request that the Arab conquests between Khotan and Persia might be taken under Chinese protection.

These two are by no means the only priests who made important journeys. A work by the bonze I-tsing (643-713), who had himself wandered to Sumatra, "Malayu," the Nicobars, the mouths of the Hoogly, and modern Behar, returned the same way to Canton, and thence to Ho-nan Fu where the Court then was. My excellent friend Edouard Chavannes has translated the whole of this work, which, however, touches only casually on geographical points, and aims chiefly at the encouragement of Buddhism. It gives a list of sixty priests who

made the *grand tour*, some by land and others by sea, all moved by a purely literary and charitable enthusiasm in the shape of an eager desire to learn at the fountain head all about the Buddhist rites: at that time these ruled supreme, and had a strong civilising influence all the way from Affghanistan to Japan: they had not yet felt the shock of fanatical Islam, either along the seaboard or along the land chain of states. The fact that hundreds of Nestorian, Hindoo, and Chinese priests and bonzes were able to move freely, by land and by sea, all over Asia proves, though it may not throw specific light upon commerce, that trade routes were frequented then along exactly the same lines as they had been before, and as they are now. So far as I can see, the Mongol generals of the thirteenth century, who generally used the northernmost road, past Issyk Kul, as being in a most suitable climate for their men and beasts, never travelled by any of the more southerly roads, except on one or two occasions over parts of those traversed by Fah-hien and Huan-chwang. The reason is plain: there was no pasture for the animals, and no sufficient space for their huge waggons.

The road followed in 569 by the Byzantine return mission, under Zemarchus and Maniach the Sogdian, sent by Justin II. to the Turks, as mentioned above, actually passed through Tokhara or Sogdiana, where the first Turks were encountered, offering or selling iron. The Khan was found in the "Ektag" or "Ektel" (Turkish Ak-tagh or "White Mountains"), whence Zemarchus, who had meanwhile been presented with a Kirghis concubine, accompanied him to Persia, stopping on the way at a place called Talas. I am disposed to think that the Khan "Dizabul" was not the Great Turk at all, but the Western Khan, whose ordo was

somewhere between Issyk Kul and Lake Balkash. On his way back Zemarchus crossed the "Oech" (Oxus), and, after a long journey, reached a large lake, which he skirted for twelve days. Then he crossed four rivers, all running into the north side of the Caspian, traversed the Alan country and the Caucasus, and took ship at Trebizond for Constantinople. A few years previous to this the Turks had allowed Maniach, as a Sogdian subject of theirs, to go to Persia in order to arrange for a less obstructed silk trade with China; but an Indo-Scythian envoy there named Catulphus thwarted the project, and therefore Persia, fearing Turkish resentment, sent envoys to North China. Consequently the Turks sent Maniach by way of the Caucasus to Constantinople, and the envoy was able to state that the Indo-Scythians ("Haiathala," Epthalites, or Chinese Eptat) had been annexed. It was now that Justin sent him back with Zemarchus to act as guide as above related. All this gives us a wonderfully clear confirmation upon numerous points, such as the ancient iron and silk trade, the West Turk encampment at Talas, the road later followed by Rubruquis, and so on.

In the early part of the T'ang dynasty (seventh century) large numbers of Persian traders are stated to have come by sea and spread themselves over the Empire. Owing to the anarchy which ushered out the ruling house (end of the ninth century), they and other foreigners at last confined their trading operations to Canton. Besides the accounts already mentioned in the chapter on "Early Trade Notions," there are the often-quoted narratives of the Arabs Wahab and Abu Seïd (850-77), which testify once more to an active sea trade all along the Indian Ocean, the Persians being apparently ahead of the Arabs in numbers and energy.

It has already been mentioned that in A.D. 628, after a century of tyranny, the Persians threw off the Turkish yoke. Pirouz, the son of Yezdedgerd, escaped from their vengeance to Tokhara, and appealed to the Emperor of China, who sent a mission to expostulate with the Arabs in 651. The Persian King Yezdedgerd had been killed by the Arabs as he was flying to Tokhara, and the victory of Kadesieh, in 636, put an end to the Sassanides altogether. When in 661 China took over the administration of all the states between Khotan and Persia, Pirouz was appointed Chinese Viceroy. Again attacked by the Arabs, he fled in 670 to Si-an Fu, where he died. The Chinese Mussulmans have in some way confused the victorious Arab general Sadi Wakas with the first Arabs who came by sea to Canton, and have always had a legend that the famous Arab pagoda built in 751, which still stands there, is his tomb. In other Mussulman temples at Canton there are yet to be found trilingual inscriptions in Arabic, Persian, and Chinese. It appears from Arab sources that their General Kotaiba between 705 and 707 subdued Balkh, Merv, and Bokhara, on his return from which last-named place he was attacked by the Turks, Sogds (Tokhara), and Ferghana people (Kokand). They defeated the Turks in 709, and set up a King of Sogd in 710. No mention is made of any Epthalite dominion, the very shadow of which must now have totally disappeared. All this is in accord with Chinese history. The Greek authors, in mentioning these "Abdeli" or Epthalites, also allude to the "Taugas," a name stated by the Chinese themselves in the form *Tau-hwa-sh* to be applied by the people of High Asia to the Chinese. During the eighth century several Arab missions came to China by way of Tokhara, the north branch of the South

Road, the Purun-ki River, Si-ning, and Liang-chou. At that time the Chinese employed large numbers of foreigners in the army, and both Arabs and Ouigours (who therefore must have some of them already become Mussulmans) assisted China in recovering Si-an Fu and Ho-nan Fu from the rebels. These or other Arabs would seem to have worked their way from Si-ning down to the head waters of the Yang-tsze, for in 801 both they and the Samarcandians or Tokharans (K'ang state) were found taking part in the struggle between the Tibetans and Siamese (Chao confederacy) on the head waters of the Kin-sha (Yang-tsze) River. It is interesting to note in this connection that, during the Nepaul war of 1788, a Manchu general made a very bold march from Si-ning across the Murui-usu and Tibet direct to Nepaul. Probably it will be found that both he and the Arabs took the same route as far as Charing Nor (near the Yellow River's source), where the road branches.

There is no mention of the Arabs during the Five Dynasty anarchy, between the fall of the house of T'ang and the rise of Sung (say 900-960); but there is evidence of friendliness between Khotan and the Ouigours, and of a brisk trade along the southern branch of the South Road. During the whole period of the Tungusic Kitan and Nüchên reigns in North China (900-1200), the Arabs only found their way once or twice to the north. In 924 the founder of the Kitan dynasty was on the Orkhon, trying to persuade the Kan-chou Ouigours to come back to their old *habitat* there. An Arab mission promptly turned up on the Orkhon, and applied to him for a marriage alliance. It is not likely that it arrived from the north-west by the Uliassutai Road; probably it came by way of the Great High Road to the West from Si-an Fu, which then ran through Ouigour territory. In

1120 another Arab mission, bent on a similar quest, actually obtained a Kitan princess.

On the other hand, nearly thirty Arab missions are mentioned between 968 and 1116 as arriving by sea. Previously to all this, in 966, a priest who had made a tour through the West by land, had taken presents to and "summoned" the King to do homage to China. In one case the King is called *K'o-li-foh* (Caliph), and in another the envoy comes along in company with a mission from Pin-t'ung (Binhthuan) in Cochin China. In 1017 half the duties "charged on foreign trades" were specially remitted as a favour to the Arabs, and these people are afterwards spoken of at Canton as belonging to a country over 40 days sail north-west of Ts'üan-chou to Lan-li (?Lar), whence the next year 60 more days." Later on we shall see that this wintering of Chinese junks in the South Seas was quite habitual.

During the northern Sung dynasty (from 960 to its flight south in 1127) there was a "barbarian hotel" or caravanserai at Si-an Fu, inside of the south gate of the city. Nothing whatever of the Nestorians is heard during this period; but there are still existing some records at K'ai-fêng Fu of the Jews there, who, in the opinion of Father Tobar, used probably to come to China as merchants.

The best authority on the sea trade during the Sung dynasty is Frederick Hirth, who has succeeded in discovering several very valuable and rare Chinese works on the subject. As we have seen, Canton lost its monopoly in A.D. 999, when customs officers were appointed to modern Ningpo and Hangchow: Kan-p'u, Marco Polo's Canfu, was made a military or naval station in 1205, and lay opposite, between the two. The Ming history specially states that in Mongol times

Canfu was a great trading centre, and that it had for that reason been walled in and created a municipal town: the place still exists under the old name of Kan-p'u, but is now quite insignificant and almost forgotten. However, in 1087, long before Kan-p'u became a famous port, the merchants of Zaitun (Ts'üan-chou Fu) had obtained the coveted official recognition. Trade between Loochoo and Japan clearly went on, and there are full descriptions of Sumatra, Java, and Borneo, which places the Zaitun junks reached with the north-east monsoon in six weeks. But I see no real evidence that Manila had yet been discovered, as suggested by Hirth. The junks usually waited until the following spring for a favourable breeze to take them on to Ceylon, the Malabar coast, and the Arabian and African ports, amongst which Berbera, Shehr or Shaher, and Djafar can be specifically identified from the Chinese characters used. There is ample evidence from standard Chinese history, as well as from Dr. Hirth's rare book, that Zanzibar was included in the usual voyages, and there are also descriptions of Cambay, Guzerat, Malwa, Bagdad, Basra, and other places in the Persian Gulf. It is to be noticed that one Chinese author (A.D. 1000) identifies the "sea-trading barbarians" at Canton with the "*Hien* sectarians" of the Ta-ts'in monastery at Si-an Fu. At one time it was thought that Nestorians were referred to when these two words were used; but quite recently my regretted friend, the late Gabriel Devéria, has proved them to have been Persian Mazdeans and Manichæans. As an instance of the slowness of the Chinese in identifying members of groups of the same nation coming by land or sea, I may mention that during the Nepaul war of a hundred and twenty years ago certain diplomatic representations were made

by Nepaul with a view to assisting China in her action against the "Franks" of Calcutta trading "at Canton." It was only when, during the Yarkand War, the Resident there sent some mysterious information to Peking about the "Franks" having taken the Pānjāb, that the Emperor awoke to the startling fact that in both cases these *feringhi* or *p'iling* were simply his old and very objectionable friends the *Inghili* (English).

The conquests of Genghiz Khan once more opened freely the great trade routes of the West. The immediate cause of the conqueror's first bellicose rage was the treacherous behaviour of the frontier officials at Otrar, on or near the Jaxartes, near the Fort Perovsky of our day. He left his native place on the Onon near the close of 1218, and made straight for the Irtish; then he was joined by various allies, and proceeded by the road north of Issyk Kul to Otrar, which was captured and looted towards the end of 1219. He then marched across the Jaxartes upon Samarcand and Bokhara. Whilst at Samarcand he took it into his head to send post-haste back to Shan Tung for an old Chinese Taoist philosopher, who at once set off with his Mongol guide, *viâ* Peking and Kalgan, to the Kerulon River; whence along the banks of the Tola, past Karakoram, to Urumtsi; then through the Ouigour country to Almalik (Ili), by the road north of Issyk Kul to Sairam, Khodjend, and Samarcand. There some messengers from Genghiz Khan met him, and escorted him through Kesch, Derbend, over the Oxus, to Balkh. This most northerly road must not be mistaken for the "North (Celestial Mountain) Road" above first described, which runs from Hami and Urumtsi to Ili, and thence over the passes to Kashgar.

In 1254-5 the King of Little Armenia sent his brother to Gayuk Khan with presents. This prince first of all

visited Batu and Sartak, as Rubruquis did; then he passed through the steppe country, and travelled to the north of Issyk Kul by way of modern Cobdo and Uliassutai to Karakoram. In returning, he took the most southerly road by way of modern Urumtsi and the south side of Issyk Kul; whence, through Tashkend and Otrar, to Samarcand, Bokhara, Tehran, and Tabriz. Rubruquis took nearly two months to get from the Volga to Talas; thence along the road running south of Lake Balkash, from which place he reached Karakoram in a month.

I shall have to mention Ogdai's great Kitan minister in the discussion of the "Calendar": his great-grandson Yelü Hiliang subsequently travelled on foot from Tunhwang to Urumtsi, Manas, and Emil (near Tarbagatai). On the whole, therefore, the Great Northern High Road, which may be called the main road, manifestly seems preferable to those running both north and south of it, for waggon, cattle, and foot travellers alike.

Marco Polo himself seems to have followed the usual main road from Balkh through Dogana (Tokhara), Kunduz, Talecan, Badakshan, Shignan, Tagarma or Tashkurgan, Kashgar, Yarkand, Harashar, Lob Nor, Sha-chou (Tunhwang), Camul (Hami, or Hamil), the *Talas* or "plain" of Chikin (the Chikin Ouigours, not the same as the Talas, near Lake Balkash), Sukchur (Suh-chou), Campichu (Kan-chou), Etzina, and Karakoram. I should mention that the Mongol history makes specific mention of the Etzina road and of many other High Asian branch roads which Kublai either improved or opened. All places I name appear upon one or the other of the accompanying sketch maps. Marco Polo's description of Yün Nan and Burma is simply that of the chief trading road of to-day by way of Momein and Bhamo (the Irrawaddy). He never went to the

more southerly Shan states, nor to Siam; and consequently he does not mention the only two other peninsular trade routes, one by way of the Kunlôn Ferry (Salween), and the other *via* Keng-hung (Mekong). Nothing has essentially changed from that day to this, and as many as 5,000 Chinese mules from Yün Nan may be seen any day during the autumn trading season picketed amongst their burdens in the vacant fields around Bhamo. The other two routes are also in full vogue for the Maulmein and Siamese trade.

There is no doubt that Marco Polo's Zaitun was to all intents one of the places immediately north or south of Amoy, and it almost certainly included, in a trader's sense, both Chang-chou and Ts'üan-chou. These are still the great emigration and trade ports for the southern ocean, and both of them lie near the European "open port" in Amoy Bay. Learned men have long disputed what "Zaitun" specifically means, but I think it almost certainly stands for the coast town of Haitêng, which, though not made an official "city" until 1564, must have long borne that name; just as Shanghai was not made an official city till 1291, Kan-p'u not until the Ming dynasty, and Hankow not until 1899 (last year).


Marco Polo describes the voyage thence to Ciampa (Faifo), Java, Lochac (Siam), Pentam (Bantam, or Batavia); Little Java, Ferlech, Basman, Samara, Dagroian, Lambri, Fansur (all in Sumatra Island); Necuveran (Nicobar), Andaman, Seilan, Maabar, Masulipatam (? Chinese "Soli"), Madras, Lar, Caïl, Cailon, Comari, Delly, Melibar, Gozurat, Tana (near Bombay), Cambaia, Semenat, Scotra, "Madagascar" (Magadoxa), Zanghibar, Abascia (Abyssinia), Escier (Shaher), Dufar (Djafar), Calatu (Kalhat), and Cormos (Hormuz). Almost every single one of these names is mentioned either in the

Chinese history of Kublai's relations with the Indian Ocean, or in the Ming history of the eunuchs' voyages to the West two centuries later. Where the names are not specifically mentioned by the Chinese, it is generally because they had apparently changed, or for other sufficient reasons; in most cases discrepancies are satisfactorily explained.

Now, the Arab traveller Ibn Batuta sailed from Aden to Magadoxa in 1339, just between the Mongol and the Ming times. He went to Zanūj (Zanzibar), thence to "Zafār" (Djafar), Hormuz, Lār, Bengal, Jāva (Sumatra), "Mul Jāva" (Java), and El Zaitūn in China; whence again to El Khansā (Marco Polo's Kinsai, *i.e.* Hangchow). Here he heard of the Mongol dynasty being on the point of collapse, and he returned to Zaitun, where he took a Sumatra junk for Java and Sumatra, sailed thence to Kawlam (Quilon) and Kālikūt, and got home to Zafār and other places in Arabia in 1347.

The celebrated Si-an Fu tablet discovered by a Chinese Christian, and reported on by Father Semedo in 1625, is further testimony to the fact that Syrians, if not also Europeans, had for many centuries followed the great road from Mesopotamia to China. This inscription was the work in 781 of a bonze of the Ta-ts'in monastery, and gives a full account of Christianity. There are many evidences that the Chinese confused Nestorians with Mazdeans and with Persians generally. The brilliant Jesuit priest, my respected correspondent Father Havret, even expresses his conviction that we may yet discover on the banks of the River Wei (Si-an Fu) proofs of a Christian mission contemporary with the apostolic era; but this hope I cannot help thinking too sanguine. The Nestorian stone, inscribed with perfectly legible Chinese and Syriac characters, mentions an imperial edict, dated

MAP TO SHEW CHINESE KNOWLEDGE OF AFRICA



A.D. 638, according to the Christian religion, and specifically to the priest Olopen of Ta Ts'in. The original edict was long unsuccessfully searched for by sinologists, and was at last unearthed in 1855 by the indefatigable Alexander Wylie, the only difference in the wording of his copy being that Olopen is described as a Persian instead of a Ta-ts'in man. The reason for this discrepancy has already twice been explained. In the trilingual stone inscription (Ouigour, Turkish, Chinese) discovered a few years ago by Russian travellers at the old Ouigour capital on the River Orkhon, and dating from about A.D. 830, mention is made of a western religion, either Manichæism or Nestorianism, which fact again tends to connect Syria and Persia once more, through Tokhara, with China and Mongolia.

Then we have the mission of John of Piano Carpini, sent by Innocent IV. to Gayuk Khan in 1245-7 (he passed through the country of the Naimans and Kara-Kitans; thence along the Sungarian lakes to near the Orkhon); Rubruquis' mission of 1254 already mentioned, also through the Kara-Kitan country, near Lake Balkash; letters from Nicholas III. to Kublai Khan, sent by Franciscan friars in 1277-80; and the arrival at Peking in 1293 in order to found churches there of John of Monte-Corvino, belonging to the society of the Friars Minor. The account of his journey says the Florentine trade route lay through Azov, Astrakhan, Khiva, Otrar, Almalik (Ili), and Kanchou. In 1286-1331 Friar Odoric in his own person travelled over parts of both the land and the sea roads to China: Trebizond, Tabriz, Shirāz, Bagdad, Hormuz, India (Tana), Malabar, Quilon, Ceylon, Mailapur (Madras); thence by Chinese junk to Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Ciampa, Canton, Zaitun, over the mountains to "Cansay" (Hangchow). This last stretch of country I

have been over twice myself, crossing two sets of passes. In 1336 the last Mongol emperor sent letters by a "Frank" named Andrea to Benedict XII., who replied in the following year to the Khan's message. In 1340 the Franciscan priest John of Marignoli built a new church at Jagatai's capital of Almalik (Ili), where in 1339 Pascal's Spanish mission had been massacred. In 1342 this fresh mission was once more destroyed; and in that same year Nicolas de Bonnet arrived in Peking as successor to Monte-Corvino. We have already seen in the chapter on "History" how a "Fulang" man brought a wonderful horse to China in 1342, and how the founder of the Ming dynasty in 1371 sent a message to Europe by one "Niekulun," a "Fulin" man, who had come to trade at Peking in 1367. In 1375 another Fulin man came with the Sumatra mission to China.

The Ming envoy sent to demand tribute from Tamerlane in 1395 travelled *viâ* the Kia-yüeh Pass, Hami, Turfan, Ili, and Samarcand, whence he was taken on to Shiraz and Ispahan, staying some years in the country. Owing to some dispute, probably about tribute, in 1401, the envoy was forcibly detained; and in 1405 Tamerlane, for reasons not given, but evidently incensed at the demand for tribute, crossed the Jaxartes with an immense host in order to invade China. As he died at Otrar, he evidently followed so far, and intended to follow farther, but in a reverse direction, the footsteps of Genghiz Khan. The Castilian envoy, Clavijo, who was then at Samarcand, has left it on record that a caravan of 800 camels, laden with silk, musk, rhubarb, and gems, came from "Cambalu in Cathay" in 1404. The son of Tamerlane sent numerous missions to China, as recorded in the Ming annals, and amongst the many return Chinese envoys there was one who visited Hami,

Turfan, Sairam, Otrar, Tashkend, Samarcand, Kesch, Bokhara, Herat, Termed, and Badakshan.

A Persian trader in a work cited by Dr. Bretschneider upon *Tchin* or *Khata* trading, and dated about 1500, mentions a mission to China sent by Tamerlane's grandson about the year 1449, but the Turkish translation of this Persian work does not enable us to identify the names of places along his route. The Ming history says that missions came from Samarcand in 1430, 1437, 1445, 1446, and 1449. It is interesting to note how long the word Kitan (Khata) and Cambalu (Peking) survive, together with the older word Thin, Tzin, or Tchin. It was reserved for Benedict Goes (1602-7), who travelled from Kabul, Yarkand, and the Upper Oxus to Suh-chou, to first prove that "Cathay" and "China" were one and the same place.

The trade routes followed by the eunuchs of the Ming dynasty are perfectly clear. And after all it is only in petty matters of shifting banks, shifting bars, and consequently shifting *emporia*, that we can possibly go wrong; for a junk which leaves its anchorage must either go back or go on, in either of which cases it calls at fixed places. The chief one of these leaders was the Chinese Narses named Chêng Ho. In 1405 he took sixty-two junks and 27,800 men from Shanghai to Amoy, Faifo, Binh-thuan, Pulo-Condor (island), and Kampot (Cambodgia), to all which places I went myself in 1888, and in the same order, so that I can personally vouch for the reasonableness of the eunuch's stages. Either on this or the next occasion he took Kilung (Formosa) on his way, but failed to induce the savages of those parts to bring tribute; but he left presents, and describes them, and also mentions the origin of the name Tamsui (Fresh Water), which is still that of a treaty port. In 1407-9

the same eunuch went to Palembang, Lambri, Malacca, Siam, Caïl, and Ceylon, fighting several considerable battles near Acheen and Kandy, and asserting China's over-sovereignty in a very decided way. In 1412-16 he visited Pahang, Lambri, Aru, Kelantan, the Andaman Islands, Cochin, Quilon, Calicut, Hormuz, Aden, Magadoda, Jubba, and Brava. In 1430-1 he found it necessary to go the round of most of the above places again. He himself never actually went up the Persian Gulf, nor up the Red Sea; but he sent lieutenants, who seem to have penetrated to Jeddah, as they brought back detailed accounts of the land of Mahomet. Nor does he seem to have ever gone personally to Java or Borneo, which islands, however, were both repeatedly visited by other eunuchs; as also Madras, Bengal, and (by land) Nepaul and Tibet.

The present Manchu dynasty had to begin afresh and feel its way overland along new or forgotten ground, just as its predecessors had done. The first distant discoveries were made towards the end of the seventeenth century, when the Emperor K'anghi found it advisable to march as far as the Kerulon and the Tola in order to drive back a Kalmuck invasion; his historian truly boasts that no previous emperor occupying the Chinese throne and no Chinese army ever went so far west, or numbered so many as 30,000 men conveyed across the desert. The son and grandson of this excellent monarch saw that it was indispensable to crush the Kalmuck power: they proceeded to attack them first at Kokonor and Lob Nor; then to advance along the North Road to the Purun-ki river and the Tsaidam; and finally to utterly annihilate the whole Kalmuck state, to annex Cobdo, Sungaria, and in the end even the Mahometan states of Little Bokhara (*i.e.* Kashgaria).

The Kalmucks retreated on one occasion from Kokonor by a road running west of the Kia-yuh Pass to Hami, and not marked on most maps. They were granted trade privileges with China in 1739, and also had the privilege of going to Tibet to "boil tea"; but of course that was before their power was broken. At present there seems to be no long-distance caravan trade along the direct roads between Tibet and Lob Nor across the Kunlun Mountains. During all these conquests the Chinese armies always kept either to the northernmost road by Uliassutai, or to the North (Sungaria) Road, or the two branches of the South (Kashgaria) Road, *i.e.* to the main roads; and the same thing may be said of Tso Tsung-t'ang's reconquest from Yakub Beg in 1877, except that he never used the Uliassutai road at all: by-roads and cuts across the desert were only occasionally made use of for military surprises. The southern branch of the South Road has always been used for the Khotan jadestone import trade, which is a very ancient one. After the subjection of Kashgaria the Manchus for a few years extended their influence over Kokand, Bokhara, Shignan, and Badakshan; but their armies never penetrated even temporarily far beyond the Pamirs. There were continuous disputes with Kokand as to the right of the latter to tax the Kashmir trade crossing the Sarikol region; but China supplied Kokand with tea and drugs, and was thus always able to put pressure upon the Usbeg power by stopping this important trade.

The ordinary Tibetan tribute route, over which thousands of men and animals habitually travel to Peking in huge caravans, was that taken by the Abbé Huc in 1834-5. He followed the high-road from Dolon Nor to Chagan Kuren, near Baotu; cut across the Yellow River and a corner of the Ordos Desert; and recrossed it at Karahoto.

Thence he followed the left bank and the Great Wall to Sayang, Nien-po, and the Kumbum Monastery, near Si-ning. From that resting-place he started once more along the road running south of Kokonor to the sources of the Yellow River; crossed the Shuga and Bayen-kara ranges, then the Murui-Usu, and on to Lhassa, apparently by the same road the Manchu Nepaul army took, as already related.

The Nepaul "tribute" (trading) mission, which still periodically visits China, invariably takes the post road, *viâ* Shigatsz and Lhassa, to Ta-tsien Lu. The road from Yün Nan to Tibet, though practicable, is too rough for troops, and is therefore deliberately abandoned by the Manchus, as it was 2,000 years ago by Han Wu Ti: still, Prince Henry of Orleans has recently managed to cross the extreme head waters of the Irrawaddy. Westward from Lhassa to Lari there is a post road; but the Chinese Resident is practically a political prisoner at Lhassa: *à fortiori* no Chinese trader can do much in the way of exploration farther west.

It is interesting to notice what route is usually followed by modern Chinese Mussulmans on their way to Mecca. In 1893 I met one of these pilgrims at Bhamo; he had come all the way from Ho Nan province, and was going by steamer to Rangoon. In 1841 a Yün Nan Mussulman, who afterwards became prominent in the Panthay rebellion as "Old Papa," went by way of Esmok to Kiang Tung, Legya, and Ava (Mandalay); thence in a junk laden with Yün Nan copper to Rangoon. From this port he travelled by steamer to Calcutta, Ceylon, Malabar, Socotra, Aden, and Mocha; thence to Jeddah. The route he took back by sailing vessel was ultimately by way of Acheen; but he was wrecked on the way, and most of the places he called at are not at all identifiable to the un-

initiated. Then he went to Penang, Malacca, Singapore, Canton (where he stayed in the old mosque), up the West River to Nan-ning and Peh-seh. Peh-seh is now the great trading centre for the foot traffic between Pakhoi, Kwei Chou, and Yun Nan. But he also gives us a land route, which is exactly that of 2,000 years ago, and is evidently so described by him with the intention of encouraging the Kan Suh Mussulmans to do their religious duty. The Kia-yüh Pass to Hami, Turfan, Aksu, Ush, Kashgar, Andijan, Kokand, Kodjend, Samarcand, Bokhara, Bagdad, Aintab, Aleppo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Cairo. Or, as an alternative, Aintab, Antioch, Jaffa. Instead of going from Bokhara to Bagdad (he names eight stations), you can go from Bokhara to Balkh, Kabul, Kandahar, Kelat, and Beyla, taking ship at Beyla. The late Gabriel Devéria has collected these and many other interesting details concerning the Chinese Mussulmans.

If we now pass on to Mongolia, we shall find that the trade of the north-west concentrates at or near Baotu, at the north-east corner of the Yellow River bend, whence the ancient high-road through Kwei-hwa Ch'êng (Tenduc) permits of easy travel to Dolonor (Lama Miao) and Kalgan. From Kwei-hwa runs also the high-road to Uliassutai and the northernmost route to the Far West. These roads are of great commercial importance in connection with the foreign trade of Tientsin.

As to the roads into Manchuria, recent researches prove absolutely that the mediæval Chinese envoys to the Nüchêns followed the present high-road round from Peking, through Shan-hai Kwan, Mukden, Kirin or Changchun, to Alchuk and Sansing. So with the modern Corean road from Sôul, or P'ing-yang, by way of I-chou, whence either *viâ* Mukden and the Manchu road, or *viâ* the Fêng-hwang road and Kin-chou, where

the latter joins the former: these were the roads of ancient times. The Kitan roads I have been over, for the most part, myself; they are simply the high-roads from Peking through the various passes of the Great Wall, and to this day the caravans of laden camels or mules, the droves of horses, the herds and flocks driven in for sale may be seen coming through in the winter season exactly as they came 2,000 years ago. The present Kalgan and Kiachta road used by the Russians was not the one preferred by them in the seventeenth century. They used to go from Tsuruhaitu on the River Argun, across the River Hailar and the Hingan Range, down the Yall Valley to the Nonni; whence south-west through the steppes and mountainous borderland of south-east Mongolia to the Hi-fêng K'ou (pass) in the Great Wall. Between Tsitsihar on the Nonni and Peking, travellers crossed Cholin-u-ye and Mokhoi to the rivers Toro and Shara Muren, with its tributary the Loha.

The same thing may be said of the Tonquin frontier; the roads have always been the present ones; the only novelty being that the Red River route from Yün Nan past Lao-kai to Hanoi never existed in practice, even if known in theory, as a continuous road, until twenty-five years ago, when Jean Dupuis effectively discovered it. Even Haiphong had no existence as a port. The Annamese formerly discouraged trade with China, when and for the same reasons the Japanese did: first, on account of pirate complications; secondly, from the dread of opium importations.

The total result of these laborious inquiries into trade routes is, after all, a simple conclusion. With one or two exceptions, the beaten tracks are exactly the same now as they were 2,000 years ago, both by land and by sea. The marts, with similar rare exceptions, are

either the old marts, or are near them, or have a special traceable reason for their modified existence. Even the peoples are the same peoples, mixed or displaced here and there by conquests, famines, or other cataclysms. Tea became a new export when cotton became a new import: it was first taxed in the eighth century. Cheap freights for heavy commodities in huge ships have displaced certain exchanges; as, for instance, iron, which from being an export is now an import: thousands of tons of old horseshoes go out as ballast, at low freights. The great novelty and the great economic curse to China has been opium, which now works its evil course from within as well as from without; but it is not fair to charge upon ourselves the whole blame for this, nor do the Chinese historians attempt to do so.

The way a man walks from one village to another is a road; if the walk extends to fifty villages, and a pack-mule accompanies the man, it becomes a great road; if supplied with post-stations for man and caravan, it is a high-road. People follow their noses by land, the compass by sea (or headlands if they do not understand the compass), and bones in the desert, now in 1900 exactly as they did B.C. 200. In other words, commercial history shows us nothing more than that with the same old materials we adapt ourselves to ancillary circumstances exactly as our ancestors did before us. During the past fifty years those ancillary circumstances have been of unusual gravity, and for that reason have caused unusual commotion—they are steam, electricity, coal, petroleum; in a word, "progress." It appears to me doubtful if we Europeans are a whit happier for "progress"; it has certainly not had cheerful results so far for the Chinese.

CHAPTER V.

ARRIVAL OF EUROPEANS

THE first European missionary who attempted to reach China by sea was St. Francis Xavier, and the first great city the Portuguese had definitely heard of was Canton; but St. Francis died, in 1552, on his way thither, at the port of a small island called Shang-ch'uan, lying to the south-west of Macao. The name was soon corrupted into Sanciano, or Saint John, which it now bears: the Macao Portuguese still make an annual pilgrimage to this place. Macao was founded shortly afterwards, but it was not until 1582 that the Jesuits Ruggieri and Pasio actually succeeded in reaching Canton itself; and they subsequently went on to the then provincial capital of Chao-k'ing, locally pronounced Shiu-heng. Here they were joined in the following year by the Italian, Matthew Ricci, who after various vicissitudes reached Peking with one or two companions in 1601. Now it was that the Chinese had the opportunity for the first time of comparing notes upon the subject of the mysterious Franks and the semi-mythical country of Ta-ts'in, which up to that date had been as much a puzzle to them as Serica and the Seres had been to the denizens of the West. The condition of their own practical knowledge when Ricci arrived was as follows:—

In 1517 a "Fulangki" fleet had appeared at St. John's Island, which was then the entrepôt of trade between

Canton and Malacca. Why the Portuguese—for they it was, under Peres de Andrade's command—were introduced into China by this name we can only guess; probably because, as with the old Fulin, the already established Arabs had to explain to the Chinese who they were. They sent apparently to Canton or Chao-k'ing a *Ka-pi-tan Mo* (Capitão do Mar) with tribute in 1518, and then first was their name of "Frank" officially recorded: the word "Portugal" was afterwards used, but it never seems to have quite "caught on," though the "*Po-tu-ki* man" of Macao is now familiar to us all. Naturally the appearance of these strangers at Canton, to which place Andrade shortly afterwards forced his way, created great commotion in official circles, especially as other Portuguese ships had meanwhile visited Ts'uan-chow, and had exhibited considerable violence and asperity in their dealings with the various trading people along the coasts. However, a Portuguese mission, it is not quite clear under whom, got to Peking in 1520, and an attempt was then made by the Chinese Government to force the Envoy to restore Malacca to its rightful king, who was nominally a tributary of China. At least one of the members of the mission was executed at Peking, and the Envoy himself is supposed to have perished in prison at Canton, back to which place he was ignominiously escorted. This fiasco naturally led to hostilities, during which the large Portuguese cannon used in the sea-fights attracted considerable attention, and soon acquired the name of "Franks" too, which in some parts of China is still the case even to this day. The Chinese seem to have subsequently availed themselves of the assistance of the Portuguese, and of these wonderful guns, to punish their own pirates: trade had meanwhile been temporarily transferred to the coast town of Tien-

peh (Tín-pák, west of St. John's), but now (1534-7) the Portuguese were allowed by some official who had been judiciously bribed to occupy Macao as a commercial depôt; and from that day to this they have never been ousted from it, though their right to possess it was never put on a legal footing until a very few years ago (1887). But they had also for a time other settlements at Ningpo and Ts'üan-chow, the former of which was destroyed in 1549, probably at the time the piratical Mendez Pinto was there. Pinto had just escaped from captivity in Mongolia, and had returned to Ningpo from a visit to Japan, which country he was the first white man to see. There was also some fighting at and near Ts'üan-chow, but both the Chinese and the Portuguese accounts leave confused impressions, and it is probable that the Portuguese never had so much to do with that port as the Spaniards.

For some years after this the severest possible restrictions were placed upon Chinese leaving their country for purposes of trade, but in 1567 the Governor of Fuh Kien obtained their removal: in any case trade at Macao went on without a break. In the main it appears the Chinese were unable or unwilling to prevent the fortification of Macao: moreover the Dutch and the Japanese were beginning to give serious trouble, and it was therefore thought prudent to conciliate the Portuguese. Their trade was limited to twenty-five ships a year. In 1667 a mission was sent from Goa to complain about obstructions to trade, and in 1710-27 the King of Portugal took prominent part in the Emperor's academic dispute with the Popes; but since the last mission to Peking in 1753 the Portuguese have until our own days had very little intercourse with official China. Up to the time of Ricci's arrival it was not quite understood

what country Portugal really was; the very name was not heard in China till 1564; and even now the vague name of "Western Ocean" men is usually employed by old popular habit to specially designate the Portuguese,—except, as explained, in "pidjin English" conversation. The physique as well as the *morale* of the mixed race now in occupation of Macao is considerably below that of pure Portuguese, and even below that of the pure Chinese. The trade of the place has dwindled into insignificance.

From the Portuguese we pass to the Spaniards. In the year 1576 the Chinese, in their pursuit of certain Japanese and Chinese pirates who had been hovering about Formosa, came across some more Franks in Manila, where there had already been large settlements of Fuh Kien traders long before the Spaniards ever appeared in those seas. A Mexican priest who had lived there, writing in 1638, said their junks came from Ocho (Foochow), Chincheo (Ts'üan-chow), and Amoy, and always went back in ballast, carrying only silver. They paid a duty of 3 per cent. upon all imports, and there were no exports: the group was nominally annexed in 1565. In 1575 two Spanish Augustines had visited Foochow and Canton on a political mission from Manila. The Chinese may well be excused for having confused the Portuguese with the Spaniards during the negotiations which took place at Manila relative to the treatment of Fuh Kien merchants there, for in 1580 Philip II. annexed Portugal, which remained for over half a century one realm with Spain. Manila, so called from a river in Luzon, was taken in 1571, and the whole group of islands was styled "The Philippines" in honour of the Spanish king. The Chinese then used no other word than the old native name of Luzon; nor do they now. It appears that some

of the speculative Chinese, evidently misled by the enormous importation of silver from Mexico, and the fact that the Spaniards never gave anything but silver in exchange for the multifarious Chinese produce imported, got into their heads a notion that gold and silver might be obtained in Manila for the mere picking of it up. Official personages were despatched at their instigation from China to make inquiry: the Spaniards grew suspicious that ideas of conquest were being entertained, and considerable ill-feeling was thus engendered, which culminated in a fearful unreasoning massacre. This seems to have been in 1603; nearly the whole of the Chinese were put to the sword, and even those who escaped death were sent to the galleys. Both Chinese and Spanish accounts agree, however, in stating that junks and traders soon began to arrive again, as if nothing had happened. But a limit was thereafter placed upon their numbers by the Spaniards, and each man had to pay a poll-tax of eight dollars. Another massacre took place in 1662, when the Chinese pirate Koxinga, who had just ejected the Dutch from Formosa, threatened to come over and also take Manila. Since then the Chinese Government, until quite recent years, seems to have almost entirely ignored the place; and their subjects, chiefly from the Amoy region, have thriven fairly well under the strict but narrow Spanish rule. The total population of the whole group does not fall far short of 8,000,000, and, as everyone knows, the Americans are now in possession. The main exports are sugar, tobacco, and hemp. It should perhaps be mentioned that in 1762 Manila was occupied by the English, but soon surrendered on payment of a ransom.


The Dutch first opened commercial relations with the Spice Islands, Bantam (near Batavia) and Acheen in

1598–1600. Coffee was first brought into Europe from Arabia in 1580: being now in great demand, the Dutch sent an agent to Mocha with a view to cultivating coffee in Java. In 1610 they extended their trading relations to Hirado, in Japan: but in 1640 they were compelled to retire, and were confined to the tiny island of Decima—a mere quay—in Nagasaki Bay. It was about this period that the Chinese first heard of the existence of the Dutch: “Sailing in great ships and carrying huge guns, they went straight for Luzon (1601), but the Luzon men repelled them, on which they turned for Macao.” Just after the Japanese and Chinese pirates had been driven out of Kilung (whence the latter fled to Borneo), some Chinese fishing boats drifted to Formosa, and then traders began to settle there. The Dutch were not long in discovering this promising commerce. In 1603–4 they succeeded, with the connivance of certain Chinese traders, in effecting a landing in the Pescadores, whence they were ejected in 1624: a number of them were carried captive to Peking. In consequence of these events, the Chinese Government encouraged their people to emigrate to Formosa, and the Dutch, in 1634, also went on to found settlements in Taiwan (South Formosa). The oldest name for that island seems to be “Mount Kilung,” from a headland on the north promontory, and Kilung is still the name of a port in the extreme north; but no serious attention appears to have been paid to it by junkmasters until the fifteenth century, when Chinese traders began to establish their stations at various suitable spots in the island. Shortly after their exploit with the King of Loochoo, as above narrated, the Japanese endeavoured to form a colony in Formosa, and had to contest possession with the Dutch; but the Dutch were ultimately driven out in 1662 by Kox-

inga, who was himself half a Japanese: his father, a baptised Christian named Nicholas, had visited both Manila and Japan, where he had married a native woman, Koxinga's mother. It may be explained that Koxinga is merely the Portuguese form of the Chinese words *Kwok-sing-ya*, or "the gentleman with a reigning surname," because a Chinese prince, then a fugitive in the south from the triumphant arms of the Manchus, had had conferred on him, in consideration of his heroic patriotism, the family name of the Ming dynasty. In 1665 a Dutch mission under Van Hoorn visited Peking, and the local government of Fuh Kien seems to have sought Dutch assistance about this time in connection with Formosa affairs. It was not until 1683 that the Manchus succeeded in obtaining from the Koxinga family, with Dutch assistance, a renunciation of their hereditary rights in Formosa; and since this date (until its loss in 1895) the island has been incorporated in the empire as part of Fuh Kien.

Chinese history gives a fairly intelligible and accurate account of the struggle between Japanese, Franks, and Red Hairs, but after their expulsion from Formosa the Dutch are not so much heard of in the China seas as other European nations. According to the arrangement which the Chinese say was made by a Dutch mission to Peking in 1656, Holland had to send tribute to the Manchu court once every eight years. A mission under Titsingh and Van Braam visited the Chinese capital in 1793, and since then Holland appears to have gone quietly about her own business in the Southern Archipelago, without troubling herself with Manchu official relations; Chinese traders meanwhile managed to thrive under the strict and discriminating rule of the Hollanders. And so things went on, their Canton factory

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE EASTERN ISLAND TRADE SPHERE



of course in full swing, until the Dutch treaty of 1863 was concluded: this was after the second Chinese war, and the occupation of Peking by the English and French. But even after this the Dutch held aloof, and probably they would never have sent a minister to Peking at all, had they not desired to obtain a liberal supply of coolies for Sumatra. The Chinese in Java and other Dutch colonies have not quite so much freedom as in Hongkong or Singapore; but they are treated with sagacity as well as firmness, and the Dutch, who watch them carefully, and nip any nascent rising or independent action in the early bud, know well how to utilise to their own advantage the capacity of the Chinese for self-government and commercial organisation.

All this, however, relates to the Dutch of to-day, from whom we must now turn to pick up the thread of our narrative of the earlier arrivals in China. Ricci died in 1610, and was therefore not called on to explain to the Chinese the concrete existence of any European nations except the Franks, the Italians, and the Dutch. But there is a chapter in the Ming history which states that, according to the Western men who arrived between 1573 and 1617, their “Lord of Heaven” was born in Judæa, or the ancient Ta-ts’in. Ricci is also specifically said to have made for the Chinese a map of Europe, and to have explained to them the division of the world into five great continents. His statements were received with considerable incredulity, but he was, notwithstanding, kindly treated by the Emperor. After Ricci’s death, Pantoja, Rho, Schaal, and other distinguished Jesuits succeeded to his influence; they rendered considerable service to the Chinese in the manufacture of guns, the calculations of eclipses, and matters of science generally. Adam

Schaal was in Peking shortly after the Manchus took possession; his appeal to their clemency was well received, and he was appointed President of the Astronomical Board by the prudent Manchus, who were only too anxious to avail themselves of talent, wherever found. His successor, Verbiest, assisted the Manchu commanders during the Chinese satrap rebellions to make large cannon for use in the field, and the Emperor K'ang-hi even showed himself personally very well disposed towards Christianity. Unfortunately, disputes between rival missionary societies led to an untimely difference of opinion upon the subject of ancestor worship between the Emperor and the Pope, since which time politics have been inextricably mixed up with Western religion in China, and persecutions have never entirely ceased.

The first English arrivals came shortly after the Dutch. According to one account cited by Chinese writers, Queen Elizabeth of England sent a letter and presents to China in 1596, but the ships of the mission were wrecked in a storm. In 1637 five English ships are stated to have come from Sumatra to Canton, and to have commenced hostilities there, owing to the Portuguese having intrigued so as indirectly to force the local authorities to obstruct the new-comers' trade; but, it is added, they surrendered the fort they had taken, on being allowed to dispose of their cargoes. However, in both cases the strangers were, if they really did come, mistaken for Dutchmen, whose own origin again was only imperfectly understood at that period. In Koxinga's time the English are believed to have had dealings at Amoy; this is not unlikely, for they were certainly there in 1730, when their trade was stopped; at all events, the East India Company established, and for a few years kept up a factory at the Chusan Islands near Ningpo somewhere

towards the end of the seventeenth century.* It is certain that already some time before that, in 1684, a foothold had been obtained at Canton; indeed, the Chinese state that in 1685 foreign commerce had been officially authorised at Macao, Chang-chou (Zaitun), Ningpo, and some place near Shanghai. There were several other attempts made during the eighteenth century to trade at Ningpo and Tientsin; but practically all legitimate foreign commerce, English and otherwise, was confined to Canton, until the first war with England broke out in 1840, in consequence of a misunderstanding in connection with the opium trade, and about the price to be paid for opium surrendered by us. Up to the year 1765 the import of opium, which was at first regarded in the light of a medicinal drug, had never exceeded 200 chests; but in 1796 it was entirely prohibited, on account of the rapidly increasing number of smokers. In 1793 Lord Macartney had audiences with the Emperor at Jêhol, but opium was apparently not one of the subjects specially discussed.† It seems the British Superintendent in 1795 offered China some assistance against revolted Nepaul.‡ By 1820 the import of opium had steadily risen to 4,000 chests, and the Chinese Government began to feel justly alarmed, both at the enormous drain of silver from the country, and at the prospect of debauching the population. In 1821 the opium hulks were driven away to the Ling-ting Islands, and in 1838 severely repressive measures were begun. The whole melancholy story of the so-called "Opium

* The correspondence of Catchpoole, who was there in 1701-2, was recently published by M. Henri Cordier in the *Revue de l'Extrême Orient*.

† I published the Emperor's amusing letters to King George III. in the *Nineteenth Century* for July, 1896.

‡ An official account of Lord Amherst's abortive mission in 1816 appears in the *Chinese Recorder* for 1898.

War" has been frequently told, and I have myself published a *précis* translation of the best connected Chinese account of it. It is distinctly admitted that it was the stoppage of trade, and not the destruction of opium, which caused the war; also that the Emperor when the war was over voluntarily conceded the right of all but officials to smoke the drug. It is unquestionable that the smoking of opium does a great deal of physical harm, and causes a vast waste of money and energy; but even the Chinese admit that the initial responsibility for its use by smokers was as much theirs as ours; and in any case they have during recent years deliberately extended the evil by allowing the undisguised cultivation of the poppy on a wholesale scale in China itself. Indian opium does not now represent one quarter of the total consumption.

After the first war, which secured, in addition to Canton, the further opening to trade of Shanghai, Ningpo, Foochow, and Amoy as treaty ports to all the world, besides the cession of Hongkong to Great Britain, the chief points of international friction were usually found to be in connection with the contested claim of British traders to reside within the walls of Canton. In 1856 the Viceroy Yeh categorically refused to admit the English, on the pretext that Governor Bonham had formally abandoned the claim in 1849. These strained relations led gradually and indirectly up to the burning of the "Thirteen Hongs," and to the second war, in which the French also took part, and which culminated in the destruction of the Emperor's Summer Palace beyond the city, and the opening of Peking itself to the diplomatic representatives of European powers generally. The Treaty of Tientsin and the Peking Convention which followed it opened a number of new coast ports (Newchwang,

Tientsin, Chefoo, Swatow) to foreign trade, besides certain places on the River Yang-tsze (Hankow, Kewkiang, Chinkiang), two markets in the islands of Formosa (T'aiwan, Tamsui), and Hainan (Hoihow): this last, however, was not actually opened until 1876. Russia took advantage of the occasion to extend her Ussuri territory at the expense of Manchuria, and most of the other European powers hastened to secure to themselves by separate treaty the same commercial and religious advantages as those obtained by England and France, as will be recorded in detail under separate heads. Missionary enterprise was placed by these treaties upon an entirely new footing, and instead of being a dangerous occupation, in which the unprotected priest carried his life in his hands as a guarantee for his own prudence and moderation, it became a comparatively comfortable and safe distraction, combining the charm of agreeable travel in new lands with a reasonable certainty of consular protection. It is only fair, however, to add that some societies, as, for instance, the Jesuits and the China Inland Mission, have consistently done their best to avoid the doubtful advantage of consular interference.

We shall take up each nation in turn as affected by modern treaties towards the end of the chapter. Meantime we may remark that from 1860 to 1870 England was unmistakably the sole influential power at Peking,—perhaps with Russia, on account of her land frontiers and her consequent proximity, as a good second; but now Japan began to work her way ominously to the front, whilst, after the Franco-German War, the inoffensive Prussia blossomed into a threatening state called "*Tê-i-ch*" (*Deutsch*, or Germany) and proportionately increased the scale and pretensions of her commercial and diplomatic

representation in the Far East, culminating in her direction of the Great Powers in the summer of 1900. On the other hand, the defeat of France deprived her of the opportunity of avenging in an adequate manner the massacre of French officials and other subjects at Tientsin in 1870; and thus the influence of France fell almost to zero for some years. Then came the suspicious murder of Mr. Margary, a British consular officer conducting an Anglo-Indian expedition over the Burmese frontier into Yün Nan; the futile mission of inquiry under Mr. Grosvenor; and the prolonged diplomatic discussion which led to the Chefoo Convention of 1876. The immediate results were the opening to trade of more ports (Wênchow, Pakhoi) on the coast, and more places on the Yang-tsze (Ichang, Wuhu), together with certain stipulations concerning the opium trade, and the establishment of permanent Chinese Legations in Europe, America, and Japan. In 1886 these stipulations ripened into what is called the Opium Convention, practically arranging, on the one hand, for the checking of a further increase in the Indian import, and on the other for the assistance of the Hongkong Government in securing to China, under cheap conditions, an enhanced import duty on that article, but on the understanding that there was to be no further charge of any kind in the interior of China. Another open clause in the Chefoo Convention took the ultimate form of the Chungking Agreement of 1890, by which foreign commerce obtained direct admission into the heart of Sz Ch'wan. The Sikkim Convention of the same year recognised in principle the right of British India to trade with Tibet, provided for by a separate article in the Chefoo Convention.

When Upper Burma was taken, the British Government in its haste to get rid of Chinese objections had, or

rather its representative had, somewhat weakly accepted a stipulation about a mission from Burma being sent with presents at fixed intervals under British supervision; this was by way of recognition of China's *de jure* suzerainty. The stipulation was contained in Article I. of the Convention of July, 1886; and, as at the same time some preliminary steps had already been taken towards opening up trade from British India with Tibet, by Article IV. it was agreed to stay further action in this sense, and not "press the matter unduly";—in other words, to drop it, as another sop to China for holding her tongue about Burma. The Convention of March, 1894, "gave effect" to the third article of this Convention of 1886 by dealing with the Burma frontier and its trade questions alone, but of course it omitted all allusion to Tibet. The Chinese, meanwhile, having made an imprudent treaty with France touching the cession to her of certain Shan states, which had been quite as much Burmese as Chinese, were compelled by Great Britain further to modify the Convention of 1894 by another one dated February, 1897, which rectified the frontier in other directions less clearly savouring of Burmese "rights," and therefore much to the advantage of Burma: it further provided for the establishment of British consuls at Es-mok and Momein. By a special additional article, the coveted West River above Canton was at last opened to trade, together with the ports of Wu-chou and Sam-shui. Thus, after an interval of 2,000 years, we obtained the rights forcibly taken by China from the King of Yüeh. Finally, by the Kowloong Extension and the Wei-hai Wei Agreements of 1898, we enlarged our hold over the mainland opposite Hongkong, and acquired a new naval base in Shan Tung, which was situated right between the spheres of Russia and Germany. In view

of all this no one will say—however much in matters of detail we may have erred in judgment—that Great Britain has failed to secure for herself, on the whole, a considerable number of miscellaneous commercial and political advantages from the *fâcheuse situation* arising out of an attitude on the part of China so hostile to progress.

The Russians were the first Europeans to hold relations on a national scale with China, though it is highly improbable that at first the Chinese had the faintest idea of connecting them either with the ancient Ta-ts'in people, or with any other hazily conceived "tribes" of the West Ocean, or Europe. They were rather grouped, in the Chinese mind, with the Kirghis and Kipchaks as a Western Asiatic race of hyperboreans. The story of the Mongol conquests of 1240 and onwards has often been told, but it is not so generally known that Russian imperial guards are frequently mentioned at the Mongol Court of Peking at intervals up to a century later than that date, and this at a time when the Mongol dynasty at Peking was tottering to its fall, and had no more political hold of any kind upon Russia. Not one single word touching Russia appears in Chinese history during the whole interval between the disappearance of the Mongols (1368) and the rise of the Manchus (1644); but, according to Russian accounts, an unsuccessful attempt to induce the Chinese Emperor to open relations was made in 1567. It seems to be certain that there were some Russians found in Shan Si twenty years before this, but it does not appear very clearly what they were doing there: they seem to have been ultimately rescued from danger by some friendly Mongols. The authority for this strange incident, cited to me by Bretschneider, is the adventurous Portuguese traveller Mendez Pinto, already mentioned, who was taken prisoner by the Chinese, and put to work on the Great Wall repairs. Two

but, after Yakub Beg's power had been broken in 1876, energetic steps were taken by China to recover from Russia this important region, and these efforts proved successful in 1880-1. At one time the Manchu envoy Ch'unghou had nearly been cajoled, amid the Capuan delights of Livadia, into abandoning the territory, and it was largely owing to the patriotic denunciations of (the now Viceroy) Chang Chi-tung that his timorous action was repudiated by China. During all this long period of time the Russians had been carefully kept by the Chinese as far away as possible from Manchuria, the whole of which region it has always, since the Albazin affair, been Manchu policy to maintain as nearly as might be practicable in the condition of an unoccupied desert. It was only in 1888, after British consular and military officers had visited and reported on that fertile region, that China awoke to the fallacy of this timid policy. Since then the three Manchurian provinces have been civilly organised, cultivated, and populated as quickly as possible, and have thus been prepared to resist Russian aggression by the development of their own economic strength. But the utter collapse of the Chinese and Manchu military power during the Japanese war gave Russia another opportunity, which she was not slow to take, in the way only too well known to us all. Moreover, the Russian idea, first conceived at the time of the Crimean War, of constructing a Siberian railway, had come to sudden ripeness in March, 1891, when the Czar Alexander III., differing from his ministers, took a peremptory resolution in favour of one uninterrupted line; and the time was now thought favourable for diverting this line, as originally planned under Alexander's ukase, from Nerchinsk through Manchuria. The Cassini Convention of September, 1896, secured this power, and thus

gave to Russia an overwhelming predominancy in the north of the Chinese Empire, as far down as the Liao Tung peninsula. As a direct consequence of the unexpected seizure of Kiao-chou by Germany, towards the end of 1897, the Russians actually occupied Port Arthur and Ta-lien Wan, as the Cassini Convention seems to have loosely stipulated,—under certain undefined conditions. Events have since so shaped themselves that Russia is now in quasi-possession of all Manchuria, or was so until the "Boxers" began to move.

The French until very recently did not make much history in China. Lewis IX. sent the Franciscan friar Ruysbroek (Rubruquis) to Mangu Khan in 1254, but the name of France does not appear in the numerous Mongol allusions to Christians. Between 1289 and 1305 there was some correspondence between the Mongol khans of Persia and Philip the Fair, and in 1342 a native of "Fulang" State is recorded in Mongol history to have brought a present to Peking of a very fine black horse with white "stockings." The same history had already recorded the death, in about 1312, of a "Fulin" man from the West who had served Gayuk and Kublai Khans as physician, astronomer, and historian. Amongst this man Aisie's (? Isaiah's) sons were Elias, Georgius, and Luke; so that he was probably at least a Syrian, if not a Frank. In 1367 and 1375 Fulin men are heard of at the Court of the new Ming dynasty. But the name of France never appears for certain in Chinese history until the year 1718, when, in enumerating the Holan (Dutch) and other strange Western nations, the Manchu Emperor observes the "unusual ferocity" of the Holansi, who are "of the same race as the Macanese." True, Lewis XIV. had sent a letter to the Chinese Emperor in 1688, recommending to him some French Jesuits; but no mention

whatever is made of this event in the Manchu history. There was, apparently, a certain amount of French trade at Canton, as is evident from the fact that the United States received French assistance there in 1785; but French interests in China up to the date of the Second War were almost exclusively religious, and her missionaries during all this long period of self-effacement suffered great persecution. In spite of the noble services done by Bouvet, Regis, Jartoux, and other Jesuits in mapping out the empire, Christianity was prohibited, and many missionaries were martyred in the provinces. But the limited toleration of Christianity secured by the Treaty of Nanking encouraged Louis Philippe to obtain in 1847 a similar treaty (Whampoa) for France, whose missionaries were thenceforward allowed to settle in the five treaty ports.

The great Taiping rebellion of 1850, to which I recur in a later chapter, had for one of its ostensible objects the establishment of Christianity in China. This incongruous mixture of rebellion and religion naturally led to fresh persecutions, for the rebel leader claimed a kind of personal relationship with Jesus Christ. The torture and judicial murder of Father Chappedelaine in 1856 gave Napoleon III. a welcome justification for joining the British in the Second War, as a result of which further advantages were secured, in a rather underhand way, to the missionaries, and the old cathedral at Peking was solemnly reopened. On their way back from China, the commanders of the French fleet, in conjunction with the Spaniards, who also had unredressed grievances against Annam, conquered part of Cochin China, and by the treaty of 1862 Saigon and the surrounding province was made over to the French. This led to further conquests and cessions in 1867, partly as a sequel to the explorations

of Garnier and others in the Shan states and Yün Nan. Whilst the Chinese were engaged about this time in quelling the Mussulman revolt in Yün Nan, a speculative Frenchman named Dupuis conceived the idea of supplying them with arms by way of Tonquin. This led again to further activity on the part of Garnier, who had now been to Peking and visited the Yang-tsze ports; his career, however, was cut short by the border bandit Lao Vinh-phuc and his "Black Flags" in 1873. The same thing happened ten years later to the adventurous Rivière, and almost on the same spot. A rebellion in Tonquin, led by a discontented Chinese general named Li Yang-ts'ai, placed China in rather a false position with the Black Flag leader, and also with the Annamese, who were thus uncomfortably placed between three fires. But meanwhile the French had been steadily tightening their hold upon Annam and Tonquin, and all this naturally made the Chinese authorities in the Two Kwang provinces feel very uneasy, not only because Annam was a tributary, but because their own frontier was placed in danger. Finally hostilities broke out; the Chinese fleet was destroyed at Pagoda Anchorage; an attempt was made by the French to occupy parts of the Pescadores and Formosa; and at last, by the Fournier Treaty of May, 1884, and its sequel of June, 1885, China agreed to recognise the validity of the treaties entered into between France and Annam, securing to the former the protectorate of Tonquin. Haiphong now became an important centre of trade, and economical development quickly followed all over Tonquin. A delimitation of land frontiers was arranged, and one of the political results has been that several new treaty "ports" have opened to the French the inland trade of Kwang Si and Yün Nan. Lungchow (now being connected with Langson, in

Tonquin, by railway) was opened to trade on the 1st June, 1889; Mêngtsz was also thrown open in August of the same year; and Hokow (opposite Lao-kai on the Franco-Chinese frontier) in June, 1895. Of course France alone of Treaty Powers is the one that nominally benefits by all this; but although it was intended primarily to serve the interests of Franco-Annamese traders, as a matter of fact the trade,—so far as it is not throttled by unwise fiscal measures,—is chiefly between the Chinese of Yun Nan and the merchants of Hongkong.

By the Gérard Convention of 1895 Esmok was opened to Tonquin trade, and a like privilege was secured to the British-protected Shan states by the Burma Convention of 1896. Thus this last place (Esmok) is the spot where British and French interests unite. The French took advantage of the novel situation created in the first instance by Germany at Kiao-chou to claim "compensation" in the shape of the old pirate haunt of Kwang-chou Wan (Bay) and proceeded to add to it *in petto* an as yet undefined *Hinterland*: a dispute as to boundaries soon provoked hostilities, and in consequence of this the French have recently pushed their way up to and established a political influence at Yün-nan Fu, whence, however, they had to retire precipitately on the breaking out of "Boxer" troubles.

Germany was not even known to China by name previous to the Second War: even in Ricci's time some of the Jesuits were known to hail from "Germania," but where that place was no one either knew or cared. After the British and French had got their treaties finally settled in 1860, "various smaller states," amongst which Prussia, applied for similar privileges. The Prussian treaty was signed at Tientsin in September, 1861, but for five years after that no Prussian envoy was allowed to reside at

Peking. For some time after their arrival the Germans occupied a rather humble position in an insignificant tenement, which now forms a small part of the British Legation precincts; and, politically speaking, they were simply makeweights to Great Britain's general policy. But after the successful Franco-German War they began to assume a considerably higher tone, which sometimes became aggressively haughty when the Chinese local officials ventured to question the justice of their claims. On one occasion at Swatow (I think in 1882) they landed marines and took forcible possession of a contested piece of ground; but this violent action was at once sensibly repudiated by Prince Bismarck. Notwithstanding all this, even so late as 1890 the Viceroy at Canton publicly announced that the Germans were more submissive than the English, and therefore preferable as military instructors. In consequence of these views, the military education of the Chinese has been largely in the hands of Germans, who have also taken the opportunity to "unload" arms and ammunition. The Germans obtained some credit as joint-deliverers with France and Russia when the Chinese were helpless at the feet of Japan, and when those three Powers with scant chivalry thought fit to unite in depriving Japan of the fruits of her hard-fought victories. But the culminating point in Germany's diplomatic influence was reached when, in piping times of peace, Kiao-chou and the surrounding territories were taken by force in ostensible satisfaction for some injuries done to missionaries, but manifestly also because China had not showed sufficiently tangible gratitude for favours received. This act, unprecedented in the annals of diplomacy and international comity, undoubtedly set the evil ball a-rolling which led to the occupation of Port Arthur and Ta-lien Wan by Russia,

Wei-hai Wei by England, and Kwang-chou Wan by France: but in all three cases these Powers at least went through the form of asking before taking, and exhibited some small consideration for China's "face." In the long run, perhaps this aggressiveness may redound to the advantage of the Chinese people, but there is rather an unsavoury smell about it all, and possibly we should do better for our descendants if we agreed to put things back upon their former honest basis. In any case, the propinquity of the Germans to Confucius' sacred district is maddening to the Chinese literary mind, and is of itself enough to account for at least one of the massacres at Peking, and, unfortunately, elsewhere: at the best this aggressiveness is still very like hitting a man when he is down.

The United States sent their pioneer trading ship to China in 1785; they were first introduced by the French into the mysteries of the co-hong or "joint-stock" system at Canton; but in those days foreign traders were only allowed to reside there during the trading season. For some reason this rule was not enforced so strictly with the Americans, probably because they had just emerged from a war with the aggressive English, and were regarded in the light of possible allies. The Chinese at first styled them "New People," not being able at once to differentiate them from the English. Then the name "flowery-flag" was invented, and this continues in popular use to our own day. In 1821 the honour of the flag was somewhat compromised by the surrender to the Chinese for execution of one Terranuova, a European who had been inscribed on the articles of an American ship. By the treaties of Wanghia of July, 1844, and Whampoa of October in the same year, the United States secured the privileges obtained

by England for her subjects after the first Chinese war. During the progress of the second war, the Chinese neglected no effort to use the United States as a catspaw, and indeed the Americans, who perhaps assisted us by putting moral pressure upon China, had a considerable amount of influence in arranging the final settlement at Tientsin: consequently they obtained their treaty in 1858 a week earlier than did either the British or the French, who had done all the fighting. There is, however, a tradition that a small American force gave us active assistance at Taku, when the celebrated "blood is thicker than water" episode took place. The real ground for hostilities furnished by the Chinese to the Americans was the firing into two of their vessels by the forts of the Bogue on the 17th November, 1856. By the Treaty of Washington of 1868 the United States disclaimed all desire to interfere in Chinese affairs, and arranged for the admission of immigrants into the United States. The hostile feeling engendered in the western territories and states by the overflow of undesirable Chinese led to a compromise in the shape of the Commercial Treaty of 1880, and finally to the Immigration Prohibition Treaty of 1894. The United States have always been somewhat prone to pose as the good and disinterested friend of China, who does not sell opium or exercise any undue political influence. These claims to the exceptional status of an honest broker have been a little shaken by the sharp treatment of Chinese in the United States, Honolulu, and Manila; but perhaps the Central Government at Washington has not always the power to make its just wishes prevail over the biased decisions of state legislatures, and is not therefore to be blamed too severely. American policy in Corea has been very creditable, and has also had a decidedly favourable effect at Peking, where for many

years the United States influence was weak. On the other hand, their policy in Manila is both ungenerous and suicidal: no Chinese except those who left during the war are allowed to immigrate, although Chinese labour alone has developed and can develop the resources of the islands.

Belgium appeared amongst the minor claimants for a treaty after the second war, and one was finally concluded in 1865. She has not been much heard of in China until the past two years, when her name has come prominently forward in connection with railway and other concessions.

In 1862 the Portuguese unsuccessfully endeavoured, with the assistance of the French, to obtain a formal treaty with China, but it was not until 1887 that they were officially recognised as possessors of Macao. From 1582 to 1849 they had regularly paid a rental of 500 taels a year, and the Manchu Government naturally declined to recognise the declaration of independence which followed upon the assassination, on the 22nd August, 1849, of Governor do Amaral. I possess a Chinese copy of a draft treaty dated 1862, but I do not think it was ever signed: certainly it was never ratified, nor was any Portuguese treaty right conceded. It was to the interest of both parties that this haphazard state of affairs should be rectified. China required the co-operation of Macao in order to obtain the full advantages conceded by Great Britain in connection with the opium revenue; and in view of what had happened in Formosa during the hostilities with France, both China and Portugal felt nervous lest any other power—especially France—should appropriate Macao. Portugal therefore undertook never to alienate it without China's consent, and on these conditions she drags out an uninteresting existence there.

The Japanese, who are now fairly entitled by right of conquest to rank amongst "Europeans," had always been utterly ignored by the Manchus up to the date of the second war with Great Britain, and this feeling of aloofness was heartily reciprocated. In 1853 the United States expedition, under Commodore Perry, led to the circumscribed Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854. Similar treaties were concluded with Great Britain and Russia in 1855; and, after the Anglo-French War of 1858, Lord Elgin, by the Treaty of Yeddo, obtained the opening of Japan to British commerce. In 1868-9 took place the great Japanese revolution, the abolition of the second king, or Shōgūn, with the whole superstructure of feudalism, and the restoration to real power of the Mikado, or true Emperor. The Japanese now lost no time in preparing themselves as quickly as possible for a suitable place in the world's councils, and never in the history of the universe has a national transformation been so rapid or complete. In 1871 they succeeded in concluding their first treaty with China, which was signed by Li Hung-chang in the autumn of that year. The Chinese did not at first take the Japanese very seriously, feeling rather a contempt for a nation, of small physique, which so readily threw off its veneer of Chinese civilisation in favour of new-fangled European notions; but the Formosa dispute of 1874 soon awoke them to the fact that the despised islanders were not to be trifled with. That same year Japan, by a stroke of the pen, placed China's old tributary Loochoo under the control of the Tōkyō Home Office, and all China's expostulations were ignored, as well as the piteous entreaties of Loochoo itself. When, in 1883, the Powers began to conclude treaties with Corea, it was found that Japan had ancient vested rights of an

unmistakably historical nature at Fusan, and it was soon evident to all concerned that she was bent on developing them in other parts of Corea. China, as Corea's suzerain, was somewhat puzzled what to do when Japan in 1876 signed a treaty with the "independent sovereign state" of Chosen; the matter became more complicated when the United States and England did the same thing in 1882-3. The negotiators of the American treaty admitted to a share of privileges obtained China also, who thus proceeded to conclude a treaty with her own vassal, and then immediately set to work to intrigue with a view to substituting her own active influence in lieu of that of Japan. This led to sundry revolutions, murders, kidnappings, and hostilities, which lasted over a period of ten years, and finally culminated in the war of 1894-5, when China received a thorough thrashing, and lost both Corea and Formosa: since then her interests in Corea have until quite recently been looked after by the British. In December, 1899, China concluded another treaty with Corea, foolishly neglecting, however, to insert a most-favoured-nation clause. The Shimonoseki Treaty and Liao Tung Convention of 1895 at once raised Japan to the status of a *Weltmacht*, and brought her into diplomatic collision with European powers as above described. The Commercial Treaty of 1896 somewhat unexpectedly placed in the hands of Europeans many of the advantages Japan had hoped to secure for herself, and the new ports of Soochow and Hangchow were as a sequel opened to the world. *Sic vos, non vobis* is the motto applicable to Japan's action; but she took her rebuff with great dignity, and now that the declaration by China of hostilities against the whole world has given brave little Japan her next great opportunity, we may be

sure that she will not allow herself to be dished by any jealous combination again. Whatever Japanese faults may be, a courageous fighting race will always appeal to the sporting sense of fairness which has in most circumstances our sympathies.

The Danes had a "hong" in the old factory days at Canton: they, the French, and the Swedes depended for their profits largely upon their success in smuggling tea about the English coasts. The Danes, through the good offices of Sir Thomas (then Mr.) Wade, concluded a treaty with China in 1863, and until 1893 their interests were usually looked after by the British authorities: in that year they were placed in Russian hands. Danish interests lie chiefly in the direction of Telegraph Conventions, and they have a large staff at Shanghai in connection with the Great Northern and Eastern Extension Companies. It need hardly be said that without the countenance and support of Russia Denmark would not count for much in the Far East.

The Spaniards concluded a treaty with China in 1864, but it does not appear to have been ratified until 1867. Until about 1880 the Spaniards do not seem to have had any minister in China. The Chinese traders who went to Manila were always kept under in rather an uncompromising way, and it was manifestly the policy of Spain, since the events described at the beginning of this chapter, to have as little to do with official China as possible. But in 1874 the new question of the ill-treatment of Chinese in Cuba came under discussion, and a Chinese mission was sent to Cuba to inquire; the result was the treaty of December, 1878. When a permanent Chinese minister was sent to the United States in 1879, Spain and Cuba were included in his mission; and so it came about that the Spaniards had

to despatch to China an envoy in return. His influence at Peking has never been great, and now, since the loss of the Philippines, it may be said to have disappeared altogether, except in an academic sense.

Italy is recorded to have sent tribute in 1670, and the Pope in 1723; but both these alleged events are connected with the Jesuit-Dominican dispute, the stormy conference at Macao, and the unsuccessful missions of Tournon and Mezzobarba. The Italians, not having come to trade, are stated by Chinese authors to be the most cultured and respectable of the barbarians, who would never have "rebelled" but for England and France. The words of the Chinese historian are almost prophetic, in view of recent Italian action in Chêh Kiang: "Even Italy, the most famous and civilised of European countries, was moved by the same prospect of greed, and in 1861 an application was made by the Italian Consul for a share in trade privileges." The first Italian treaty was concluded in 1866, but the Italians did not put in an official appearance until 1877, when a man-of-war visited the coasts of Corea. The Italian minister has usually resided in Shanghai, in order the better to push the commercial interests of his countrymen. It was not till 1899, in connection with expected concessions on the Chêh Kiang coasts, that Italy first showed signs of a forward policy. Her expectations were, however, nipped in the bud by an unexpected display of energy on the part of the Chinese. The success which followed this effort of resistance probably inspired the vacillating Chinese rulers with a part of the courage necessary in order to brace themselves up for the recent crazy action against foreigners in general, as ably set forth by Sir Robert Hart in the *Fortnightly Review* for November, 1900.

The Austrians did not draw up a treaty until 1869,

and they have usually since then left their interests in British hands. Their minister has ordinarily resided in Japan, to which country he is also accredited.

The Swiss have no treaty, and their interests are commonly entrusted to French hands.

Peru drew up a treaty with China in 1875, the interests of the latter country having special reference to the alleged ill-treatment of coolies, whilst the former's interest lay in procuring them as cheaply, and with as few restrictions as possible. The war with Chili practically snuffed out Peru, at all events so far as any influence in China was concerned, and she may be regarded for the present as non-existent in Peking councils.

Brazil (about 1880), Mexico, and the Congo State (1898) have treaties with China, but, so far, nothing has occurred to bring any of these states prominently forward; in each case coolies were wanted by the one party, and it was desired by the other to secure for them decent treatment.

The Swedes established an East India Company in 1627, but their nationals who visited China came on board vessels belonging to other countries. A Swedish vessel reached Canton in 1731, and fifty years later others are mentioned. There is a Swedo-Norwegian treaty with China; but the Scandinavian interests, chiefly shipping, are sufficiently watched over by a consul-general at Shanghai; there has never been a minister at Peking.

There was some flutter when in 1889 the Sultán decided to send a frigate and a mission to Japan. The reappearance on the high seas and in Chinese waters of the Turks so dreaded of old was a highly interesting development. They put in at Pagoda I. for refreshments, and there I endeavoured to prove to the gallant com-

mander that he was a Hiung-nu in disguise; but the luckless *Ertogrul* came to grief on the rocks in the Inland Sea, and the fierce Turks had to be sent home as "distressed mariners." To add local colour to an amusing *dénouement*, the Japanese man-of-war which took the men home was refused free admittance through the Dardanelles, and had to "get ready for action."

LIST OF TREATIES CONNECTED WITH THE CHINA QUESTION, 1689-1898.

TREATY, AGREEMENT, OR CONVENTION.	BETWEEN.	DATE.	REMARKS.
Nerchinsk	Russia and China	27 Aug., 1689	Russians abandon the Amur.
Peking	do.	Winter 1720-1	Ismaïloff's Agreement.
Kiaclita	do.	20 Aug., 1727	Signed on the River Boro.
Nanking	England and China	29 Aug., 1842	Five ports open to trade.
do.	do.	8 Oct., 1843	Supplementary (abrogated).
Wang-hia	U.S. and China	3 July, 1844	} Following up Great Britain.
Whampoa	France and China	24 Oct., 1844	
Canton	Sweden and China	March, 1847 (4 d. 2 moon).	
Aigun	Russia and China	16 May, 1858	Russians regain the Amur.
Tientsin	do.	13 June, 1858	do.
do.	U.S. and China	18 June, 1858	Gets ahead of us as a "peacemaker."
do.	England and China	26 June, 1858	With a supplementary article.
do.	France and China	27 June, 1858	With six secret clauses.
Shanghai	England and China	8 Nov., 1858	Arranging for Customs tariff.
Peking	do.	24 Oct., 1860	Supplementary and tariff.
do.	France and China	25 Oct., 1860	Further cession of Ussuri.
Tientsin	Russia and China	14 Nov., 1860 (2 Nov. O.S.)	With separate article.
Peking	Prussia and China	2 Sept., 1861	Land trade (obsolete).
Tientsin	Russia and China	20 Feb., 1862 (O.S.)	China refused to ratify.
Peking and Tientsin	Portugal and China	13 Aug., 1862	
Tientsin	Denmark and China	13 July, 1863	
do.	Holland and China	6 Oct., 1863	
do.	Spain and China	10 Oct., 1864	
do.	Belgium and China	2 Nov., 1865	
Peking	England and China	31 May, 1868	Joint Investigation Rules.
Washington	U.S. and China	28 July, 1868	Virtuous disclaimer.
Peking	Russia and China	15 April, 1869 (? O.S.)	Revised Land Trade Rules.

LIST OF TREATIES CONNECTED WITH THE CHINA QUESTION, 1689-1898 (*continued*).

TREATY, AGREEMENT, OR CONVENTION.	BETWEEN.	DATE.	REMARKS.
Tientsin	Austria and China	2 Sept., 1869	
do.	Japan and China	Autumn 1871 (29 d. 7 m.)	With trade regulations.
do.	Peru and China	26 June, 1874	
do.	do.	7 Aug., 1875	Special clauses.
Kang-wa	Japan and Corea	26 Feb., 1876	
Séoul	do.	24 Aug., 1876	
Chefoo	England and China	13 Sept., 1876	
Peking	Spain and China	17 Nov., 1877	Ratified 6 May, 1886.
do.	do.	6 Dec., 1878	Cuba affairs.
? Tientsin	Brazil and China	? 1880	(No record).
Peking	Germany and China	31 March, 1880	With special stipulations.
do.	U.S. and China	17 Nov., 1880	Immigration and commercial.
St. Petersburg	Russia and China	12 Feb., 1881	Li; with rules for land trade.
Chemulpho	U.S. and Corea	22 May, 1882	
do.	China and Corea	do.	
	{ Germany and Corea }		
? Chemulpho.	{ France and Corea }	June, 1882	Both secured by Admiral Shufeldt.
	{ England and Corea }		
Tientsin	China and Corea	Autumn 1882 (8 m.)	The three Admirals seem to have hastily concluded treaties (not on record) subsequently made formal.
? Séul	Japan and Corea	25 July, 1883	Corea accepting vassal status.
do.	England and Corea	26 Nov., 1883	Fisheries.
Tientsin	Japan and China	Spring 1885 (4 d. 3 m.)	With regulations and tariff.
do.	France and China	9 June, 1885	Relations with Corea.
London	England and China	18 July, 1885	Tonquin.
? Séul	Italy and Corea	? 1887	Opium arrangements.
			{ Three extra articles beyond English and German. }

LIST OF TREATIES CONNECTED WITH THE CHINA QUESTION, 1889-1898 (*continued*).

TREATY, AGREEMENT, OR CONVENTION.	BETWEEN.	DATE.	REMARKS.
Peking	France and China	25 April, 1886	Trade regulations.
Hongkong	England and China	11 Sept., 1886	Opium Convention.
Peking	France and China	26 June, 1887	Additional convention.
do.	Portugal and China	1 Dec., 1887	With Opium Convention.
Calcutta	England and China	17 March, 1890.	Sikkim Convention.
Peking	do.	31 March, 1890.	Chungking Convention.
? Tientsin	Mexico and China	? 1893	(No record).
Washington	U.S. and China	17 March, 1894.	Immigration Prohibition.
Shimonoseki	Japan and China	17 April, 1895	Peace and cessions.
Peking	France and China	20 June, 1895	Opening Esnok, etc.
do.	Japan and China	8 Nov., 1895	Retrocession of Liao Tung.
London	England and France	15 Jan., 1896	Chinese "spheres."
Seul	Japan and Russia	14 May, 1896	Corean affairs.
Peking	Japan and China	21 July, 1896	Commerce and navigation.
do.	do.	19 Oct., 1896	Touching new ports.
do.	Russia and China	9th moon, 1896	Gassini Convention.
do.	England and China	4 Feb., 1897	Penalties for cessions to France.
do.	Germany and China	6 March, 1898	Cession of Kiao Chou, and mining rights.
do.	Russia and China	27 March, 1898.	Cession of Port Arthur, etc.
do.	France and China	? April, 1898	Cession of Kwang-chou Wan.
Tokyo	Japan and Russia	25 April, 1898	Corean affairs.
St. Petersburg	England and Russia	28 April, 1898	Chinese railway interests.
Peking	England and China	9 June, 1898	Kowloong Extension.
do.	do.	1 July, 1898	Wei-hai Wei transfer.
do.	Congo State and China	7 July, 1898	(Date of ratification by Emperor).

CHAPTER VI.

SIBERIA, ETC.

A HISTORY of China's foreign relations of the most sketchy description would not be complete without some separate and connected account of the Tartars who have always harassed her from the north. Just as the hyperborean regions of Europe have only become a cognate part of El Room, or the Roman Empire system (for that is really in a civilising sense what modern Europe still is) since Russia took them vigorously in hand, so the hyperborean regions of Asia have only become a cognate part of *Hwa-hia*, or the Chinese Empire system, since Russia gave them their bearings. But Russia is in possession of the whole, and straddles both systems by what Roman lawyers called *occupatio*, or the right of first occupant. If we omit the tropics and South Seas, we may say the old northern hemisphere consists of two groups of 400,000,000 souls each, the one being Chinese or Yellow Man civilisation, the other European or White Man civilisation. Russia now caps and threatens the pair, and is the first great instance in the world's history of a powerful empire north of the temperate zone. In fact, the Asiatic conceptions of White Czar and Yellow Czar, or of Chagan Khan and Bogdo Khan, express the same idea in Tartar minds; all the rest is Feringhi, or "Frank," somewhere beyond the White Czar's domain. The Arabs call Europeans

Afranghi, or Beni Asfar,—“Sons of Yellow,” *i.e.* “not dark,” and the island Greeks still have an adjective *φράγκικος*, meaning “continental.” Europe, previously to the blossoming forth of Russia, knew practically nothing north of the menacing hordes which emerged from the east along beaten lines, and gradually became her rulers,—in parts at least. China, previously to the same event, knew practically nothing north of the hordes which moved restlessly east and west along beaten lines, and also gradually became her rulers,—in parts at least. The historical analogy between the Chinese and Roman Empires is nearly complete throughout the whole gamut of history.

First in date there was on the Chinese side the Empire of the Hiung-nu, which embraced all of the modern realm of China, from Corea to the Pamir, except Tibet and the Eighteen Provinces. No doubt these Hiung-nu nomads knew something of the petty hunting tribes in occupation of what we now call Siberia; but the Chinese knew nothing whatever of them; unless it was in a very vague way, and by name only, of the Kirghis to the west and the coast Tunguses and Ainos to the east. On the Western side we knew nothing of anyone but “Scythians,” and in the East the Chinese knew nothing of anyone but Hiung-nu. It is very unlikely that we shall ever know more of either than we do now, namely, that the manners of the two as described to us were nearly identical. The Hiung-nu seem to have swept to and fro then, just as the roads run now, by the northern route from Tsitsihar, Urga, Uliassutai, Ili, and Tashkend; or from the Yellow River bend north and north-west to Urga and Uliassutai. They were driven away by the Chinese from the southern group of roads, *via* Hami, at a comparatively early date; but, during the greater

part of the time—to use the words of Chinese historians —“the Han dynasty had the sagacity to keep them in good temper by permitting a regular border trade.” The total duration of their empire, whether in a united or divided condition, was, roughly speaking, 400 years, from B.C. 200 to A.D. 200 ; but although the greater part of the ruling caste and the fighting men went permanently West, where some of them were to re-appear as Avars, Huns, etc., in Europe, they did not expire in China without a final struggle ; indeed, they ruled as Chinese “Emperors” of limited portions of China, after most of their race had gone West, and in any case they founded principalities in western parts subject to Chinese influence, thus enabling us to connect their ruling families with the Turks without a serious break. My friend Hirth even thinks he has unearthed Attila’s son Hernax from the Chinese records of Sogd:—but I am not convinced.

Then comes the empire of the more westerly Tunguses, who were only known to China previously to A.D. 45 as vassals of the Hiung-nu. As the power of the latter was broken up by China, so were the opportunities for development improved by these vassals of the declining Khans. The new empire of the Tunguses thus formed was at its zenith just as the last of the genuine uncivilised Hiung-nu disappeared (in an independent political sense) for ever. This disappearance from China is coincident (allowing them time to travel) with the sudden appearance of the Avars and Huns in Europe ; it is only reasonable to conclude, therefore, that these strangers, who pushed on Goths, Vandals, and other tribes before them, were the identical people who, as we know for a certainty, had gone from China somewhere West. But these Tungusic Tartars, although their domination oc-

casionally extended as far as Ili, never had, like the Hiung-nu, any real hold on Turkestan; they are specially remarkable for having settled a number of Japanese prisoners in Eastern Mongolia, where their power was most in evidence. The Hiung-nu probably never heard of the Japanese. On the other hand, the Toba clan of the same Tunguses was more successful than the Hiung-nu had ever been as a sedentary and a civilised ruling house, and its princes administered North China as emperors on a footing of perfect equality with the genuine Chinese emperors of the south for 200 years (380-580). But this preoccupation with Chinese affairs left the other and wilder Tartars time to develop once more; and although the Toba dynasty of North China conducted several successful campaigns against both their own less civilised kinsmen and the remains of the Hiung-nu tribes, they were never able to assert themselves as an effective nomad horseback power, and at the same time to sit comfortably on an imperial throne. The Mongols previous to Kublai (Genghiz, Ogdoi, Kayuk, and Mangu) were the only ones that ever succeeded in this double task; and so, even with the powerful Mongols, a double *rôle* did not last very long, for Kublai was, after his return from Yün Nan and his accession to the throne, simply the sedentary and personally unwarlike Emperor of China; the Tartars, if not independent, were all more or less rebellious vassals under disloyal relatives of his. It is not surprising, therefore, that when the Toba Tunguses eight centuries before Kublai took to the comforts of civilisation, a mixed nomad empire developed itself once more out of the leavings of the Hiung-nu and Tungusic "horseback dominations."

The very name of this third great ruling caste of nomads is exceedingly unsatisfactory; the words Juju,

Jwe-jwe, or Jeujen convey to us no hint whatever such as we can gain, or at least imagine, from the earlier words Hiung-nu (Huns, or Hun slaves) and Tung-hu (Tunguz, or East Tartars). Following a Chinese practice which prevails to this day, the Toba Emperor thought he would improve this apparently native word into the bastard sound Jwan-jwan, which means "wrigglers." There is no evidence to show that the units of their fighting power were more Hiung-nu than Tunguz, and such evidence as there is of the ruling caste is decidedly in favour of a Hiung-nu rather than a Tungusic origin; there are even very faint indications that they might have been Suomi, or Finns. At any rate, there seems to be no justification whatever for concluding, as European writers have done, that the Jeujen were the Avars: it is almost impossible that they can have been so. What is quite certain is that they had amongst their vassals, quite close to the Chinese frontier, in or near the region where money was made from the iron trade in B.C. 220, a Hiung-nu tribe called "Türk." These Turks worked as ironmasters for the Jeujen, and subsequently, when they had generated strength sufficient to assist themselves, rose against and annihilated the power of their suzerains. There is nothing to show that the dominion of these Jeujen ever extended even so far as Ili, then occupied by a race called "Yüeban," who, indeed (if we accept the evidence of etymology at all), may well be the "Eban," or "Evar,"—in other words, a branch of the Epthalites, as the Chinese seem to make out.* The chief struggles of the Jeujen were with the

* It would be well for students who take a scientific interest in etymology to note that in an improved Chinese dictionary partly based upon Dr. S. W. Williams' earlier work, and published by my former colleague, H. S. Giles, I have given the actual sounds in eight dialects of

“High Carts,” or the later Ouigours, of the Lake Baikal region.

After the crushing of the Jeujen came the empire of the Turks, touching which we not only have the most precise Chinese accounts, but also a number of important Turkish and Ouigour inscriptions, discovered within the past dozen years in the Irtish, Orkhon, and Tola valleys, which confirm the Chinese accounts. The first stage of Turkish rule lasted from about the year 560 to 630, when the Chinese, after incessant warring, succeeded in taking the Supreme Khan captive. For fifty years after that event, Chinese political influence was dominant all the way from Corea to the frontiers of Persia; but still there is not in the whole of Chinese history one trace of a single definite name to show that they had any knowledge of what we call Siberia. There are vague indications in the far north of savage tribes using snow-shoes, deer-carts, dog-carts, and of other matters connected with them, suggestive of Samoyedes, Ostiaks, and Chukchis; but if the Turks then under more or less direct Chinese rule had any knowledge of insignificant peoples north of what are at this day the boundaries of the Chinese Empire, they kept that knowledge to themselves, or never told the Chinese enough to make it worth while recording anything. In connection with the western branch of the Turks, and especially the Türgäs, the Chinese histories make numerous allusions to Persians, Syrians, Epthalites, Kirghis, and other Western peoples, about whom they had very scant information; but there is

every important word in the language: besides the Corean, Annamese, and Japanese sounds. I have also contributed thereto a philological essay explaining the “Grimm’s Laws” of the Far East, and the construction of Chinese. This knowledge is indispensable to anyone who ventures an opinion upon points connected with Chinese etymology.

never anything to show that organised states existed in Siberia beyond the Amur, Baikal, or Balkash. Probably the Chinese never pushed up thither because the length of the nights was so alarming and it was so cold: several times the Chinese mention with astonishment the long days of a northern summer. The accounts given of the second Turkish Empire, founded by Kutlug Khan, are even more interesting and precise than those of the first. It endured from about 680 to 743, when it was replaced by the domination of a kindred race called the Ouigours. These people, however, never exercised anything like the same effective dominion that their kinsmen the Hiung-nu and the Turks had done before them, and they decidedly showed more settled inclinations, and more of a taste for science, art, and religion: by degrees they seem to have voluntarily abandoned the Urga region north of the Desert altogether, and to have settled in what are now the western parts of Kan Suh province.

Meanwhile the Tunguses, corresponding to the ancient Toba rulers, and also perhaps to the later Mongols (before they became imbued with a strong Turkish admixture), or to the modern Solons, found opportunity to develop a great political power in the Far East. There is reason to believe that their rule included, at least for tribute purposes, a great many tribes beyond the Amur, as also all the Fish-skin Tartars, Goldi, Manchus, and other unmistakable peoples of Tungusic race, right up to the Pacific Ocean and the mountains of Corea: but we cannot yet identify some, if any, of the tribal names by the light of any ethnological indications now surviving. We are therefore, so far as our inquiry is concerned, still left in the same historical position: by the light of anything that can be discovered in Chinese history, the Ouigours ruled the west whilst the Cathayans or Kitans ruled the

east of what is now Chinese Mongolia; the first never pushing their knowledge, not to say their influence, beyond the Kirghis, the second never hearing of much beyond the Amur and Lake Baikal. Then come the Nüchêns, or genuine eastern Tunguses totally unaffected by Mongol or Turkish admixtures. They also co-existed as a political power along with the Ouigours, and with the so-called Kara-Kitans who fled west when the Nüchêns broke up the original Cathayan power. And so on until we come to Genghiz Khan, no part of whose tribal *habitat* was much farther north than the River Shilka, if indeed so far. Genghiz, as we know, swept the whole zone between Siberia (as we now understand the word), Tibet, and China.

It is in the thirteenth century that we hear for the first time in the Chinese records intelligible accounts of Kipchaks, Alans or Azes, Bulgars, and Russians. A great deal of interest attaches, in connection with the Mongol inroads, to the Hungarians, who belong to the same *souche* as the Finns: so, at least, Professor Nördenskjöld told me when he visited Canton in 1879. The Bulgars of Genghiz' time were also partly Finnish, at least so Bretschneider thinks. One extensive race, called the Wusun, disappeared utterly from the Ili region shortly after the Yue-chi, driven west by the Hiung-nu, gave way before these same Wusun, and, turning south to Bactria, founded the "Indo-Scythian" or Epthalite dominions in the Pānjāb and Persian regions. Some modern Chinese writers have endeavoured to identify these missing Wusun with the Russians; but this is not likely, for the Russian language appears to be pure Aryan; that I can see for myself. There is no evidence to connect the Wusun with the Hungarians; but the possibility of it must not be ignored;—in fact, Csoma the Hungarian,

about seventy years ago, went on a hunt all over High Asia in search of the original Madjar language. I cannot recall any other instance of the utter disappearance of a considerable nation from Chinese ken, unless it be that of the Yüeban (also from Ili). The dominion of the Mongols over Russia, and to a certain extent Hungary, seems to be the first connecting link forged in the chain which was ultimately to join Western Europe with Kamchatka. The hold of the Mongols over Europe and over Asia weakened simultaneously. In the West the Novgorod Republic had opportunity to develop, and in the East China was able to shake herself free. The Ostiak tribes of the Obi (Beresof and Tobolsk) had paid tribute to Novgorod before Novgorod paid it to the Mongols; but if the Mongols ever heard of the Ostiaks, they do not seem to have thought it worth while to interfere in a question of such jejune importance to themselves. The brother of Haithon of Armenia, besides Rubruquis, and some of the other European pilgrims to the Mongol Court, would seem to have first suggested to Europeans the existence of a farther or Northern Siberia. The Mongols of China kept up relations with the Kipchaks, Russians, and Azes almost until their fall (1368); but the Ming dynasty had little to do even with Manchuria or Mongolia so near, let alone with the tribes of the western steppes. The Eleuth or Kalmuck power now developed, and Chinese history totally ceases to be authoritative on northern nations from that day to this. The Manchus knew of no people farther north than the Kazaks, or Turkified Kirghis. The former Mongol influence over the Kipchaks now, therefore, passed from China to Tamerlane, who was treating with Kipchak envoys at Otrar, and even contemplating an attack upon China, when he died there in 1406. The word "Sibir" is about this time mentioned

for the first time as part of the realm of Toctamish the Kipchak. Dr. Albert Wirth, who has collected and spontaneously sent to me many valuable data touching this period, says that a Bavarian named Schiltberger, who was there as a prisoner amongst the Tartars at the time Tamerlane died, speaks of "Issibur, where carts and sledges are harnessed to large dogs."

In 1465-9 Ivan the Great annexed Novgorod, and threw off the Kipchak yoke; so that the country of Sibir, practically the modern Tobolsk, became almost independent. But by the time of Ivan the Terrible (1557) the Sibir people, or "Yugurs," had been compelled to send him their usual tribute of minivers and sables. The Chinese, in referring to these events, say (but do not explain at what date or on what authority) that the Russians had four great provinces—Ki-yu (Kiev), the "old tribe"; Moskwa, the "new tribe"; K'a-shan (Kazan); and Si-pi-r (Siberia), which last was subdivided into four. At present, according to Russian official documents, there are 2,000 or so of "Turalinians" between the Tobol and the Irtish, and there are 26,000 Ostiaks in Tobolsk, Tomsk, and the Yenissei. There are also Chuvashes and Voguls in Tobolsk, but which of these tribes represents the "Yugurs" of their sixteenth-century "Sibir" I cannot say. Any way, Ivan and his son Theodore went on with their eastern advance until they had conquered the Bashkirs and Tobol-Tartars. The Chinese record that between 1522 and 1567 the Russians conquered the Khan of "K'u-ch'êng," and removed him to the north of the Altai Mountains, thus bringing themselves into contact with the Tata (Mongols) and Wala (Eleuth).

It was just at this time (1579) that the "Strogonoff," or half-Tartar merchant guilds of East Russia, engaged

the services of Yarmak and 7,000 of his Cossacks to further their interests in Tartar regions; but after three or four years of skirmishing and scuffling with the troops of "Közüm Kan," Yarmak perished by drowning, either in the River Irtysh or in one of its tributaries (1584). In 1591 "Közüm Kan" was defeated, and again in 1598, when he fled for refuge to the Kalmucks' camp near Lake Dzaisang (north of the Altai); but the Kalmucks in turn chased him away to the Kirghis. Here, manifestly, the Chinese and Russian accounts agree fairly well in the main facts. The doings described thus brought the Russians into contact with a branch of the Mongols called the Kalmucks—styled by the Chinese Eleuths—who had meanwhile had time to gather strength and found a dominion in the region of Uliassutai, Ili, and Tarbagatai, which dominion included many Kirghis and Turkish tribes. The predatory Cossacks sent missions to the ruler of this powerful state in the name of the Russian Czar, who, like a wise man, took all he could get for nothing, and ran no risks.


It so happens that there is a hiatus in Chinese history at this time, and the Manchu Emperor Kienlung himself admits that between 1450 and 1650 the Chinese knew little more of the Eleuths than that they often joined other Mongols in raiding the frontiers: they do not even know the names of the khans. However, in 1616 the Ataman Wassili relates what happened to his mission sent in the name of the Czar to the Altyn-Kan (Golden Khan), at whose Court he met also an envoy from the Yellow Czar (Emperor of China)—probably the chief of as "bogus" a mission as his own. The Khan was then encamped on the Kem-chik, or "Little Kem," *i.e.* on the present Russo-Chinese frontier, due north of Cobdo. The Russians say that the Altyn Khan promised to get their

trading missions through to China, and that the Chinese even sent a mission to them in 1619; but, if so, the Chinese are quite unaware of it, and the very name of Russia was to all appearances totally unknown in Peking at that time. The Russians or Cossacks pushed on to Lake Baikal, and received in 1638 their first tea through the agency of this Altyn Khan, the history of whose successors, until they were destroyed by the Chinese, I have already published from Manchu history.* By 1643 the Russians had already reached the Sea of Okhotsk. After all, they had only to follow the compass, so far as North Siberia was concerned; for there was not, and there scarcely is even now, a genuine town in the place; nor had the scant population of trappers, fishers, and hunters any desire or motive to resist their advance, which therefore required little courage. The true interest lies in the story of their pushing their way down the Shilka and the Amur. These adventures have been related over and over again, and there is very little new for me to say here. In 1654 they attempted to explore the Sungari, but the Cossack Stepanhoff was killed by the Manchu troops in 1658; and this event is also recorded by the Chinese. Then there was a long conflict for the possession of Yaksa, or Albazin; but in 1689 the Russians, by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, agreed to abandon it, and also both banks of the Amur. From that time to 1855, when Muravieff "Amurski" obtained the Czar's permission to annex the Amur, the Russians remained on very quiet and inoffensive terms with China, trading only at Kiachta and Tarbagatai. In 1858 the Aigun Treaty, necessitated by these new acquisitions, loosely defined the Ussuri boundaries; but in 1860, by

* "The Kalmucks," *China Review*, vol. xxiii. "The Eleuths," *China Review*, vols. xv. xvi.

the Peking Treaty, Ignatieff secured the doubtful part east of the Ussuri; and now Russia, biding her time, has slipped quietly in and taken all Manchuria.

The early history of Tibet (700-900) is bound up with that of the early Siamese empire of Nan-chao. For a time the Gialbos threatened the existence of China, and, as it was, asserted their equality, obtained princesses, and made treaties of reciprocity; they also forcibly occupied Kan Suh and Chinese Turkestan for a number of years, right up to Lake Balkash. During the Five Dynasty, or Anarchy Period (904-960), there were a few missions to China, but practically Tibet was an unknown quantity; and throughout the Sung dynasty (960-1200) the diplomatic relations were only fitful. During Mongol and Ming times Tibet was under military supervision, but enjoyed internal independence. Since the Manchus came to power their Resident, except on one or two occasions when China had to assert herself, has occupied a position in Tibet as modest and retiring, but as influential, as that of our Resident in Nepaul. Nepaul is tributary to China, and sends trading missions; but she prudently avoids raising questions, and meanwhile supplies us with some of our best mercenary troops. Manipur, or Kasé as the Chinese call it, was only known to the Manchus for a short time during the wars with Alompra's successors: there is no mention of such a place in the records of any previous dynasty. China has never had the faintest political influence in India, though all five kings of the Hindoo states sent missions to China 1,000 years ago. The Mongols, Mings, and Manchus have each in turn sent expeditions to Burma, but China's political influence there has never continued long. Siam has never been invaded either by land or sea, but from the date of her moving down definitely to Ayuthia—say A.D. 1200—



from the Shan states (Old Thai*), south of Yün Nan, until 1853, she always recognised China as a nominal suzerain, for reasons of trade policy. The Shan states—those not belonging to Burma—and also Annam, have nearly always been either ruled indirectly by the Chinese or have been nominally tributary to them. The same thing may be said of Corea. Japan has never been in any way conquered by any Chinese or Tartars, or forced to do anything; she has occasionally sent polite missions, but it is only the Chinese who call them “tributary” ones. I just mention these points in order to complete the circuit of the Eighteen Provinces, and to bring the reader back to the other side of Siberia.

* See p. 29. The Old and New Tai or Thai (=free) races differ in using or in omitting the aspirate, as I ascertained on the spot, in 1888, from Mr. Cushing and other Shan scholars.

CHAPTER VII.

MODERN TRADE

IT is not necessary to dwell upon the old co-hong trade at Canton. The former Factory site of the "Thirteen Hongs" is now principally occupied by a large foreign "hong" about two furlongs below the island settlement of Shamien. Trade with the East India Company nominally began in 1680, and all privileges continued until 1783, when there were certain modifications. In 1834 exclusive rights entirely ceased. Life and trade at Canton a century ago have been vividly described* by Dr. S. W. Williams, who resided there before the Factory was destroyed in 1856, and was frequently U.S. Chargé d'Affaires at Peking after the second war. The merchants passed a confined, ceremonious, and reserved existence, entirely in the hands of their *factors* and *compradores* on the one hand, and of the Chinese co-hong on the other. No wives were allowed, and even burials had to take place at Whampoa, twelve miles down the river. It was only in 1828 that the British Superintendent first succeeded in getting his wife up. British trade was, of course, the largest of all; lead (for packing tea) and woollens were the chief imports (no specie, no cotton fabrics) from England, opium from India, and the usual "Straits" produce picked up from the Dutch colonies visited by our ships *en route*. Tea and silk were the main exports then as now. The British

* *China Review*, 1876-7.

tea consumption in 1795 was 14,000,000 lbs. a year, more than one half of which total was smuggled by foreign ships from Canton, operating in the English Channel.

The Treaty of Nanking (1842) opened four new ports, and abrogated all these restrictive rules about residence. Then, as has been explained under the heading of "Europeans," by the Tientsin treaties nine, and by the Chefoo Convention again four, additional ports were thrown open to foreign trade. In the year 1864 the British or direct trade had already reached 101,000,000 taels, and the total, including other countries and coast trade, was 260,000,000 taels: at that date the whole trade of Japan, America, and other foreign countries only amounted in all to 10 per cent. of the British trade, including, of course, British colonies. I propose to take the year 1880, as a central point, between the period when legations were first established at Peking in 1861 and 1900 (that is, the trade of 1899), in order to survey rapidly the condition of foreign commerce in China. As the gold value of the silver tael is now only about half what it was in 1880, I think it better to give the totals in silver; for, although this plan may suggest to us a false idea of the gold cost of produce to England and Europe, it is the only true way to form a notion of the actual wealth, measured by the standards of silver and copper, which is taken out of China.

Direct Trade, excluding Coast Trade and Foreign Trade in Chinese Junks; also excluding Re-exports Abroad.

	Nineteen Ports. 1880.	Thirty-two Ports. 1899.
British Empire .	122,600,000	286,200,000
Russian Empire .	4,500,000	22,100,000
Japanese Empire .	5,700,000	53,100,000
United States .	10,300,000	44,000,000
The "Continent"	15,200,000	46,900,000
	158,300,000	452,300,000

From the above summary, which in both cases excludes fractions of 100,000 taels, and which also excludes the comparatively insignificant trade (8,000,000 taels) with such places as the Sandwich Islands, Egypt, Java, and Siam, it will be seen that, if 20,000,000 taels, or $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., were added to the total for 1899, the whole trade would have trebled itself; whilst if 80,000,000 taels, or 30 per cent., were added to the British total, that part of the trade would have trebled itself too: as it is, the British increase is somewhere between double and treble. The total trade carried on with the continent of Europe has only a little more than trebled itself; that of the United States has a little more than quadrupled itself; that of the Russian Empire has nearly quintupled itself; and Japanese trade is nearly ten times as great as it was in 1880. Non-British trade (excluding Chinese) has gone up from 35,700,000 to 166,100,000 taels; or, say, it has quintupled itself; but the volume of its combined increase (130,400,000 taels) is not so great as the volume of our single increase (163,600,000 taels). Look at it which way we will, there is no reason to fear that Great Britain is going to the wall. It must further be remembered that England no longer takes the larger half of China tea, as she did in 1880; hence 22,000,000 taels worth of trade lost in China are more than compensated for by much greater cargoes of tea brought from India, the paid value of which remains in our own empire instead of going to that of China.

Out of the above trade, and of the home or coast trade in foreign or Chinese steamers, which is equal in volume to over once and a half the total of the foreign trade, the Chinese Government in 1880 derived a revenue of 14,250,000 taels, against 26,660,000 taels in 1899. Out of duties on cargoes alone, Great Britain in 1880 con-

tributed 70 per cent., and foreigners (not Chinese) 5 per cent. In 1899 the figures were 60 per cent. and 20 per cent. It will be noticed that, whilst trade has trebled, the revenue on that trade has not even doubled: the reason is not very obvious; but as (excluding from imports opium, which is highly taxed) the charges on imports only average 3 per cent., instead of the 5 per cent. average usually supposed to be levied, that fact (which itself requires further explanation) may partly account for it. Probably a further reason is that the specific duties on the high-paying articles such as tea and opium have for many years steadily declined with the trade in those staples; whilst the specific duties on various cheap export commodities (formerly neglected, but now aggregating huge totals) are very low, and therefore do not advance pace by pace with the volume of the trade. Rice, for instance, is sometimes "exported" by the million hundredweight from one port to the other at a very low *likin* charge, or even free altogether.

The trade in cotton goods is the one which most interests the Englishman at home: in 1880 it amounted to 23,400,000 taels, against 103,500,000 in 1899—that is, it more than quadrupled itself. But there was a sudden increase in 1899 over the previous year (1898) of 25 per cent.; and for some years before that, again, the value had been nearly stationary at 76,000,000 taels: moreover, the Americans and Japanese, especially the latter, are forging ahead much more rapidly than we are, especially in the north of China; and even the Chinese mills are turning out vast quantities of yarn and piece-goods, both in their own country and in Hongkong. This displacement of commerce is especially noticeable in the yarn trade. In 1880 it was thought that 151,500 Chinese cwt. (each of 133½ lbs.) was an extraordinarily high figure

to have been reached over the then usual annual average of 70,000; but, whilst Great Britain only imported 58,700 cwt. in 1899, Japan imported 780,000, or fourteen times as much. It is, however, some compensation for us to know that British India sent 1,906,000 cwt., and that Japan also imported vast quantities from her; so that even though Japan and China may undersell English home manufactures, British India, which supplies them both with yarn, partly redresses the balance. But China is now beginning to import large quantities of yarn from Japan too. There is an immense import of native raw cotton, native yarn, and native coarse cloth into Sz Ch'wan, and much cotton also comes into Yün Nan from the Shan states and Burmah; of course in 1880 nothing was said of all this.

Opium naturally interests our Indian Empire the most. In 1880 there were consumed at the treaty ports 71,654 Chinese cwt. (this, however, being a very large decrease on the then "record" year 1879), against 59,100 in 1899 (this, however, being a large increase over 1898, which again was higher than 1897); but the high quantity figure for 1880 was only worth 20,700,000 taels, or 300 taels per cwt., against 28,000,000 taels for 49,200 cwt. in 1897: in 1899 the prices were even still higher, say 550 taels per cwt. The minimum estimate for native opium is 200,000 cwt., more than half which quantity is believed to come from Shan Si and Ho Nan, and the price has gradually risen in many provinces to over half that of the foreign: it is therefore plain that China must spend at the very least 100,000,000 taels a year, or more than her whole gross revenue from all sources, on this almost useless and certainly enervating drug. After cotton goods and opium, woollens and metals are still the chief imports of the old-fashioned regulation type,

just as they were in 1880; but they have not undergone such striking development as to necessitate further mention here.

In 1880 over two-thirds of Chinese exports (value 81,600,000 taels) were represented by 2,100,000 cwt. of tea, valued at 35,700,000 taels; and 114,700 cwt. of silk, valued at 29,800,000 taels. It is as sad to find that in 1899 the exports of tea only amounted to 1,631,000 cwt., valued at about 30,000,000 taels, as it is agreeable to notice the total 281,000 cwt. of silk, valued at 90,000,000 taels. India and Ceylon have done irreparable damage to the tea trade of China with Great Britain, who now ranks positively after Russia, instead of being six or eight times ahead of her. At present Russia takes tea, in preference by the sea route, in ever-increasing quantities, and sends in return chiefly cloth from her home looms and edible seaweed from Vladivostock; but both in comparatively insignificant quantities. France continues to take most of the silk.

It will thus be seen that the main staples of trade remain very much what they were before what may be called the Treaty-port period. But it must be noted that an enormous business is now done in many new commodities of which scarcely anything was heard in 1880, still less in pre-legation times; for instance, a gigantic and ever-increasing importation of kerosene oil from America, Russia, and Sumatra, which in 1897 had already exceeded 100,000,000 gallons; and cheap flour for South China from America. These two imports alone have created as great a social revolution in China as did the advent of tea and the introduction of gas into England. Mules may be seen by the thousand in distant Bhamo carrying kerosene oil through the passes into Yün Nan; peasants may be met every evening in

Arcadian Hainan carrying home a neat pound-bag of beautiful white flour, together with the farthing's-worth of periwinkles their ancestors have always brought home in the evening as a relish for the rice. An immense trade is done in old English horseshoes, which are considered the best iron in the world for making small household articles, such as brackets, hooks, and bolts. I have seen steamer after steamer disgorge this paying and useful "ballast" at Shanghai. Another revelation is the commercial capacity of the Bombay yarn, already mentioned, of which Japan also, who now sends her own yarn and piece-goods to China, for some years imported annually one million sterling's worth. The trade in arms and ammunition has enormously expanded, chiefly in the hands of the Germans, who are now receiving an unpleasant reminder that this particular activity is apt to cut both ways.

The importation of miscellaneous articles of luxury has of late years increased to such an extent as to vie in aggregate amount with the totals of "regulation" staples. Thus all Chinamen who can afford it now like to have tumblers and bottles, foreign stockings, soap, lamps, cigars, preserved milk, sweets, and umbrellas; not to mention watches, musical-boxes, and toys. The women are fond of American and European scents, good mirrors, fine white sugar for powdering the face, needles, and finger-rings. Then there is a curious though weighty import which is also an export. It actually pays better to export enormous quantities of coarse Chinese sugar to the "foreign country" of Hongkong, and re-import it thence, after refinement, as "foreign sugar," paying one export, one import, and one half or coast duty, plus two freights, than to refine it in China where labour is cheapest, or to import real foreign sugar. No more

eloquent comment on the suicidal and imbecile financial policy of the mandarins could be made.

But besides new-fangled imports, properly so called, and this hermaphrodite sugar, many new exports have either shifted bearings, or have started into prominence since the year 1880. In that year, after deducting the values of tea and silk, the total exports from China in foreign bottoms were only 12,300,000 taels, against 75,000,000 in 1899. Thus, the beancake (manure) which used to go from Chefoo and Newchwang to South China for sugar cultivation in 1880, now mostly goes to Japan, and no longer exclusively to Amoy, Swatow, and such places. The export of straw-braid from Chefoo and Tientsin has doubled, though in 1880, when it first began to attract serious notice, it had already nearly trebled itself in five years; it was never heard of in the five-port days. Feathers of all kinds may be described as an entirely new export, which is now assuming really great and alarming dimensions owing to the organised hunt for birds other than domestic fowl. The albumen export is also quite new. The quantity of hides and skins exported had in 1898 trebled itself during six years—in 1880 the export was hardly worth special mention. The same with tobacco; but in 1899 nearly 8,000,000 taels worth of hides and skins and 2,310,000 worth of tobacco were exported. The trade in mats and matting, hemp, leather, native spirit, wine, and oils has been advancing in a most extraordinarily rapid fashion; and as we get to understand better some more of the unfamiliar, ingenious uses to which the long-experienced Chinese put their numerous oils, barks, and fibres, we shall undoubtedly before long create similar large exports in other directions. There are many openings in China for the mercantile man with ideas.

In the above remarks no account has been taken of coast trade (730,000,000 taels), which, added to the foreign and the occasional (Corean, Brazilian, Peruvian, and treatyless country) trade, amounted in 1899 to 1,210,490,632 taels, of which the ships of Great Britain account for 613,000,000 taels.

As to foreign shipping, in 1880 there were, excluding junks, 22,970 entrances and clearances of 15,874,352 tons, 60 per cent. being British; in 1899 the figures were 56,957 entrances and clearances of 38,863,902 tons, of which, again, 60 per cent. were British—at least so far as tonnage goes; but 25,350 British ships, averaging over 900 tons each, carried 23,338,230 tons, whilst it took 22,548 Chinese ships, averaging over 400 tons each, to carry 8,944,819 tons. Other countries are still so far behind that I need not mention them.

The comparative number of foreign firms doing business in China is thus given for the two years 1880 and 1899; the figures for the latter year are taken from Mr. Commissioner Taylor's Customs Report:—

NATIONALITY.	1880.	1899.
British	236	401
German	65	115
American.	31	70
French	16	76
Russian	16	19
Japanese	21	195
Portuguese		10
Dutch		47
Danish		
Spanish		
Swedish		
Foreign Firms in China .	385	933

The Germans and Americans, it will be observed, have increased nearly proportionately with the British. The Russians have made no attempt to go beyond the bounds of their old tea trade, and their firms are all at Hankow, Foochow, and Tientsin. It is presumed that the numerous forwarding houses at Kalgan (Great Wall) are not included in the above number of firms. The French and Japanese increase is extraordinary in numbers, but it does not in either case bulk largely in reference to the volume of trade done; the French are especially active in silk filatures. In 1880 the total number of foreigners in China, including missionaries and other non-traders, was just over 4,000; in 1899 it had gone up to about 17,000, the 2,500 missionaries being, I presume, included in this figure. Of course all this has nothing to do with Hongkong, which is no longer a political part of "China."

Let us now take the ports one by one, glance comparatively at the years 1880 and 1899, and see what prospects they give for the enterprising trader of the future.

(1) Pakhoi is the *Ultima Thule* of coast ports, as viewed from a Chinese standpoint. In 1880 the boycotting of steamers by native junk owners and monopolists had only just recently been broken up; opium was the chief import; cassia and aniseed the leading exports. In 1899 Indian cotton yarn alone represented three-sevenths in value of all imports; opium was quite insignificant. Aniseed stands for one quarter of the exports; cassia is not even mentioned. Sugar, hides, and indigo stand for over half the remaining exports.

(2) Hoihow in 1880 sent nothing abroad, and chiefly imported foreign opium. The native opium, which now passes through the Native Customs, is half the value of the foreign opium imported through the Maritime

Customs. Cottons, principally Indian yarn, are now far ahead of opium, and kerosene has shot up to nearly half the value of that drug. At most of the ports south of Shanghai, American flour (for cakes and sweetmeats) has become extraordinarily popular. The sometimes enormous rice import varies with the state of the local crops. Pigs and sugar have always been the chief exports; but now a new trade in eggs and poultry has sprung up, and both the raw hide and the leather trades are assuming importance. The export of "pine-apple" hemp and its grass-cloth is also considerable.

(3) Samshui (including the subsidiary ports of Kongmun and Kumchuk) was only opened in 1897: cotton goods stand for over half the total imports; sugar and tobacco are the most promising exports.

(4) Lappa (round Macao) and (5) Kowloong (round Hongkong). These stations were opened in order to check salt smuggling and to facilitate the working of the Opium Agreement of 1886. Their position is peculiar, as Maritime Customs officers are, practically speaking, in charge of a purely Chinese junk trade, which does not concern foreigners directly. In 1888 the total trade passing through the Lappa "points of observation" was less than 8,500,000 taels in value; in 1899 nearly 13,750,000. The figures for Kowloong are 35,250,000 for 1888 and 56,500,000 for 1899; in all cases ignoring fractions of a quarter of a million. The effects of the recent Kowloong extension are not yet fully apparent, and probably will not be apparent until long after the present hostilities are over.

(6) Canton. In 1880 the imports were only one-fifth of the exports; most of the opium was (and is still) imported in native junks. There had been singular neglect on the part of foreigners for twenty-five years past to

insist on transit-pass privileges for imports into Kwang Si and beyond. This was chiefly owing to the personal policy of my former respected chief, Sir Brooke Robertson, the British Consul, who took a sympathetic view of China's financial straits. The chief exports were silk, tea, sugar, tobacco, and matting. In 1899 the foreign imports alone were worth more than half the exports, of which silk (filature) is now practically the sole important one. Matting only stands for one-twentieth part of the value of silk, although compared with 1880 there is twice as much of it in 1899; sugar has by no means disappeared, and glass bangles are worth as much as tea and tobacco put together. Owing, however, to matting, tea, and other produce for Europe all going to Hongkong largely by junk, it is quite fallacious to take the Foreign Customs returns for Canton as a criterion of the prosperity in export business.

Li Hung-chang took a very important decision in this province before leaving for Shanghai in connection with the "Boxer" difficulties of the summer of 1900. He abolished all *likin* throughout Kwang Tung in consideration of 4,000,000 dollars a year to be paid by the seventy-two leading trades. If this new plan succeeds, it may revolutionise the commerce of the province or "hongs." To Li Hung-chang's intelligent initiative in 1870-90 may be fairly ascribed the present prosperous condition of the Mongolian-Tientsin trade.

(7) Wuchow, the gate to Kwang Si, had no existence as a foreign port in 1880. After two and a half years' of life, by the end of 1899 it was found that practically the whole trade was with Hongkong. More than half the imports are cotton goods; nothing else is as yet worth mentioning. One quarter of the exports during that year were sugar; one half consisted of oil, aniseed, silk,

leather, hides, and melon seeds combined. Practically the whole trade, both in imports and in exports, was carried on under transit pass, the greater part from or to Kwang Si; but a considerable share also with Yun Nan and Kwei Chou. Thus, by a strange caprice of Nemesis, the very place where once there was no transit trade at all is now the only one where there is nothing else.

(8) At Swatow in 1880 more than half the value of imports stood for opium, and sugar was the chief export. In 1889 opium represented only one-tenth, and cotton goods one-sixth; these two together just equal the value of the opium alone in 1880. Kerosene and flour are becoming important. Rice stood for one-fifth and beancake (including beans) nearly a quarter of the imports. Sugar remained the chief export, but tobacco had reached a high figure too; the value of the sugar exported about counterbalances that of imported opium and cotton goods combined.

(9) Formosa is now lost to China; but though politically Japanese, the island continues commercially Chinese, as 95 per cent. of the trade is either with the mainland or with Hongkong. In 1880 camphor, tea, and sugar were exchanged for opium and piece-goods. In 1899 camphor became a Government monopoly; the wide-awake Japanese are trying to divert the tea trade direct to America *via* Japan, instead of paying foreign freights and transshipping at Amoy. The exports of sugar have only half the (sterling) value of the 1880 exports: moreover, North Formosa actually imports large quantities of Hongkong refined sugar. At first the Japanese tried to prohibit the import of opium (February, 1895), and the Marquis Ito boasted to Li Hung-chang that they would gradually stop its consumption; but now the

Government has changed its mind, and seems to have imitated the Dutch practice in Batavia; it retails the drug itself to consumers, and employs a British and a Japanese firm to buy the necessary supplies for that purpose at Hongkong: its policy, however, is to check, not to develop, the smoking habit. At present about 5 per cent. of the Chinese in North Formosa are smokers. Cotton goods are in a poor way now, so far as British interests are concerned, the Japanese naturally doing all they can to encourage the exclusive use of their own manufactures in the island.

(10) Amoy still carries on the old native "Zaitun" trade with the "Straits," the Indo-Chinese peninsula, the Dutch and Spanish (now American) islands, and (now) Australia, to which places large numbers of emigrants proceed annually (when allowed). A great many Chinese firms now affect Japanese nationality through Formosa, in order to obtain consular and political interference, such as the French carry to the point of an abuse in Siam. Opium and cottons in exchange for tea and sugar were the chief items in the foreign trade of 1880. Opium and cottons still represent half the value of the foreign imports; American flour and kerosene are considerable new items: bean cake and beans account for half the native imports. Sugar is still the chief export, but the tea trade has been gradually almost annihilated, chiefly by the stupid financial arrangements of the mandarins: it now ranks below tobacco, and even below paper, in importance. There is a very large export of native stores for the use of Chinese emigrants living abroad. Most Formosa produce is transhipped at Amoy now, as in 1880, but the volume of this transit trade has also diminished by half, and the Japanese are attempting to further reduce it by imposing differential taxes in favour

of direct shipments to Japan. In no part of China is government more rotten than in the Fuh Kien province; possibly the reason is, in part, because all dialects spoken there are totally unintelligible to the mandarins.

(11) The new North Fuh Kien port of San-tu Ao (Samsah Inlet) was voluntarily opened in May, 1889, entirely as a political move. I visited it in 1884, and travelled through the *Hinterland*. I am, therefore, in a position to suggest that tea and native opium (possibly also alum) are likely to be the chief exports. No foreign business has, however, yet been reported.

(12) Foochow lies midway between the last two places. In 1880 it still possessed the largest tea export, and the memory of glorious old clipper days was yet green there. Tea still stands for four-fifths of the total exports, but the quantity is only half of that shipped in 1880. The other noticeable exports are poles, paper, mushrooms, and edible bamboo shoots. In 1880 the imports were only one-quarter of the exports in value, but, the former having remained about stationary, now equal the latter in their reduced volume. Opium is still, as it was then, one of the chief imports, but it amounts to barely one-third the then quantity. On the other hand, cotton goods both exceed the value of opium in 1899 and that of cotton goods in 1880. Flour and kerosene are notable new imports: it will be noticed that American flour is so far only wanted in South China, where there is no wheat to speak of.

(13) Wênchow has never been much of a port in our days, though it was once so in the olden times, and a good tea trade was expected from it when we went there in 1878. It is so insignificant now that the British consuls have ceased even to report upon it. It took eighteen years from its opening before (in 1895) the

total foreign trade reached 1,000,000 taels; in 1899 it was over 1,600,000 taels. Exports, chiefly tea; imports, chiefly opium and cotton, as before. There is a considerable and very ancient export of bitter oranges, destined entirely for the Mongol market by way of Tientsin; these oranges are mentioned at the "Manzi" or Sung dynasty's court of Hangchow in the year 1154. Between Wênchow and San-tu Ao is the celebrated Alum Mountain, the great export from which place ought to be brought under Foreign Customs control.

(14) Ningpo had degenerated in 1880 to a mere sleepy branch of Shanghai, to which place it shipped its tea and straw hats in those days by the daily steamer, taking chiefly opium, metals, and cotton goods in return. This is still the case, so far as the steamer is concerned, but tea has fallen off by half, and hats have nearly disappeared altogether, whilst opium has also fallen off one-half; but on the other hand cotton wares have doubled. Tin here, as in several other places, has come greatly to the fore, and of course kerosene oil is in evidence. Sugar has increased enormously, and at Ningpo tobacco figures as a large import instead of an export. The old raw cotton export, which had been gradually declining in 1880, and had dropped to almost nothing in 1883, has now not only revived, but has far exceeded its record figure of 65,600 cwt. for 1867, and its value is now three-fifths that of tea.

(15) Hangchow was only opened in 1896, and has already far exceeded the expectations formed of it, though it is a mere canal appendage of Shanghai, as Ningpo is a sea appendage. In 1899 its gross trade had already nearly reached 12,000,000 taels. The chief imports are opium, tobacco, kerosene, beans, and beancake; the exports consist principally of tea and silk, and these two

items alone exceed in value the total imports which (passing the Foreign Customs) count as foreign trade. There is an enormous importation of foreign piece-goods and yarns managed by a powerful guild in collusion with the *likin* office, the object being to keep all the good things resulting therefrom between them, and out of foreign hands altogether.

I have now worked all the way up to Shanghai from the south; but, before touching upon that great centre, I will bring down the river trade and the northern trade each to the same focus, and then collect our consideration of the whole three groups into one purview, together with that of the great depôt for them all.

(16) Chungking was opened in 1891, but I resided there for a twelvemonth ten years earlier than that. The foreign-managed trade has already (in 1899) reached 26,000,000 taels, imports and exports being equally divided: of course this total does not cover the vast commerce of the feeding rivers, nor that portion of the Yang-tsze trade which ignores the Foreign Customs. Here the tables are turned, and the conditions new; there is no import of Indian opium, but more than a third of the total exports consists of the native drug. White wax and silk between them make up another third, and there is a very large export of musk from Tibet, which takes in exchange 10,000 tons of coarse tea, by way of Ya-chou. All the trade, import and export, is done in chartered native junks, but during the past year small steamers and gunboats have at last found a way through the gorges, and may yet succeed in revolutionising transport. The imports have all to pass the gauntlet of either Shanghai, Hankow, or Ichang,—sometimes of all three. Five-sixths consist of cotton goods, or raw cotton and cotton yarn (native as well as foreign) to be locally spun or woven into yarn and cloth.

Though Chungking exports raw silk, it imports silk piece-goods, skilled local handiwork not yet being quite up to the mark. The large consumption of kerosene does not appear in the foreign returns of Chungking trade, because steamers decline to carry it, and it has therefore to travel under transit-pass by native junk from Hankow, whence it only appears in the returns of the latter place. Chungking, representing also Tibet, is the drug-exporting place *par excellence* of China; yet it is curious to observe that it imports at the high price of 15s. a pound American ginseng to within one-fifth of the total value of all its own exports of medicines.

(17) Ichang, at the mouth of the gorges, made a "port" in 1877, was considered a failure already in 1880, but the opening of Chungking, with its native opium trade, in 1891 somewhat changed the face of things, and the total amount of the trade for 1899 is about fourteen times as great as that for 1880; but only 12 per cent. of it is local (between the ports either up or down the river); the rest is all mere transshipment to or from Chungking; hence we find a doubling of Ichang trade in 1899 over that of 1898, owing to local rebellions having unduly checked Chungking trade in the latter year. As might be expected, the chief improvements are in cottons going up and in opium coming down. The neighbourhood is too mountainous and badly supplied with roads for local trade to develop rapidly; yet there are signs of considerable enterprise in tea and hides.

(18) Shashi is the port of King-chou, which was the ancient capital of Ch'u, always a great political centre in the past, and still the residence of a Tartar garrison. Its port was opened in 1895, and, so far, is a failure, sugar being the sole import, wax and silk the sole foreign exports worth mentioning: these three form together

one-third of a total trade of about 250,000 taels. But there is an enormous native cotton trade with Sz Ch'wan. I ought to repeat here, once for all, in connection with inter-port trade generally, that a total of nearly 820,000,000 taels would have to be added to the 460,000,000 taels of foreign trade, if the coast trade of each port (managed by the Foreign Customs) were in each case included.

(19) Yochou, the key to Hu Nan, was opened in November, 1899, but it has not yet properly "taken down its shutters" for business. It is not likely to succeed as a port unless the interior cities are opened too, along the magnificent waterways which practically lead to the Two Kwang. It is being fortified in view of political unrest.

(20) The great entrepôt of Hankow occupies one of the finest trade positions in the world. It is the only place in China where the Russians are in really strong force: the largest ocean steamers from Odessa and London can anchor opposite the Consulate doors. After flying off from each other thousands of miles, the one towards the desert and the other towards the south, the Yang-tsze and the Yellow River approach once more to within a distance of 300 miles: one of the Hankow rivers, the Han, taps the whole of the intervening space, and after a navigable course of 1,250 miles joins the Yang-tsze at Hankow, which is also exactly half-way between the two lake systems. Situated as it is in the centre of China, with cheap water communications in every possible direction, it naturally trades in everything; but such things as musk, safflower, and wax, which were prominent here exclusively in 1880, now have their due place also in the Chungking returns. In the same way native opium was scarcely heard of as an export in 1880, but

now the Sz Ch'wan drug is by far the most important staple after tea. The trade of Hankow must be studied in connection with that of the ports above and below it, otherwise the grand total of 67,000,000 taels for 1899 (or 85,000,000 taels if viewed from another standpoint) would be misleading; even the tea, which is of course a *bonâ fide* original cargo shipped direct for Europe, includes Kewkiang tea. It is found more paying to bring the leaf up river this way in native boats than to ship it on board chance steamers calling at Kewkiang simply to fill up there if they have space. The export of tea is now 50 per cent. greater than that of Foochow; but, although the total quantity exported does not diminish, the gold value is about 50 per cent. below that of 1880. About 3,000 tons of brick tea went to Siberia by way of the Han River in 1899, against 1,500 tons in 1880. I suppose it still travels overland from Fan-ch'eng by way of Si-an Fu and Kia-yüeh Pass (on the frontier between the "New Territory" and Kan Suh proper); thence along the Hami road to Ili—in other words, it finds its way the old road discovered 2,000 years ago by Han Wu Ti, and which sooner or later must be the line of China's chief trunk railway to the West. Tobacco has become a large export, and hides still greater. The import of kerosene is enormous; it is difficult to account for the alternate ups and downs of the American, Russian, and Sumatran varieties which take place so capriciously at this and every other port. The recklessness in the use of oil-lamps has in recent years been the cause of some very destructive fires in Hankow.

(21) Kewkiang was already a decadent port, and had been reduced to a British vice-consulate long before 1880, there being little in the way of either import or export,

beyond sugar, shipping agencies, and tea, to interest foreigners. On the whole tea is not declining. There is a large native trade in porcelain from the Kiang Si potteries, but not much of it is exported to foreign countries. Tobacco has lately assumed an importance second only to tea. There is also an important native export trade in paper and mats, most of which passes through the Foreign Customs. With cheap and comfortable daily, almost hourly, steamers up and down the river, native merchants naturally prefer to go to Shanghai or Hankow to make large purchases and contracts. Even in the cotton-goods trade native-made piece-goods from Hankow and native-spun yarn from the Shanghai mills have begun to compete with foreign wares. In 1880 the foreign yarn import scarcely existed: in 1899, 200,000 cwt., worth 3,250,000 taels, were sold, Indian taking the lead. In 1880 only 10,000 gallons of kerosene were imported: in 1899 nearly 2,000,000 gallons. Refined sugar is now largely imported from Hongkong by foreign firms, and there is a considerable import of American clarified ginseng, worth 30s. a pound. There is some prospect of a valuable trade in the grass-cloth plant (*Boehmeria nivea*), which has lately attracted attention both in England and Germany. Since the Inland Water Navigation rules were promulgated a couple of years ago, an active steam-launch traffic for passengers has sprung up on the Poyang Lake: there is no reason why this should not be extended to cargo "flats."

(22) Wuhu, like all the ports opened under the Chefoo Convention, was in 1880 considered to be a comparative failure, and for a long time no foreigners went there. The fact is, Chinamen are conservative, and do not want more points of contact than they are accustomed to use, or are gradually brought up to appreciate. But, after

all, 1899 proved its best year, more than doubling the average total annual trade for the ten previous years, and passing 20,000,000 taels. This unexpected general doubling operation was specifically marked in the leading imports—opium, and cotton goods. The imports of Chinese cotton goods, including yarns, are now very large—a quarter of the foreign. The only other large items are sugar and kerosene. The gigantic export of rice (4,000,000 cwt.), largely to Canton and Swatow, was the chief cause for the unlooked-for increase of 1899: a local *likin* of threepence the hundredweight brought in a revenue of 400,000 taels. A large quantity also went free of *likin* up north for the armies round Peking; and also to Chefoo, Ningpo, and Foochow, where there was a scarcity. No rice can ever be sent abroad, unless it be a limited quantity of glutinous rice from Canton, and this under very special arrangement. The only other considerable exports from Wuhu are silk, feathers, beans, and wheat; but all these together for 1899 only amounted to one-tenth of the value of the rice. Rice, however, is quite an uncertain commodity, and depends entirely upon the weather.

(23) Nanking, though nominally available under the earlier treaties, was not really made an open port until May, 1899: its powers have still to be tested.

(24) Chinkiang was in so poor a way in 1880 that it had only three years previously earned its right to be restored to its position as an independent consulate; when I was there in 1878, the officer-in-charge had to submit matters involving important changes to the Consul at Shanghai. Opium was the chief import; donkey-skins and tobacco the chief export; but in 1899 the import of Bombay yarn alone far exceeded in value the total import of opium, which still represents one-fifth of the whole

import trade in foreign goods; whilst the value of the whole foreign cotton goods trade was two and a half times that of the opium. Sugar appears both as a native (unrefined) and a "foreign" (refined) import for nearly half a million sterling—again more than the total value of the opium. The import of native tobacco is considerable, and of course kerosene oil looms large. Situated as it is, close to the Canal junctions, Chinkiang is certain of a great future. But at present it is rather startling to see it rank in trade volume below Chefoo, which only serves the trade requirements of one tiny corner of Shan Tung.

Having now exhausted the riverine line of ports, I pass to the extreme north.

(25) Newchwang is the most northerly port of all. Although it is said to be in "Manchuria," the province of Shêng King had really no civilised Manchu population to speak of before A.D. 1600; the inhabitants are a mixed Chinese-Tungusic race, who have been as often governed by Corea and by Tunguses of various kinds as by Chinese. In 1880 all the foreign imports from abroad came *via* Shanghai or direct from Hongkong. Russia and Japan had not yet put in an appearance, nor had a pound of yarn been imported. In 1899 the trade was double that of 1898, and Newchwang ranks now about fifth amongst the ports, along with Swatow. At present the Japanese shipping equals the British, which in turn is more than that of all other nations put together. Japan takes half the total exports. Russia had thirteen steamers in 1899, and 320,000 cwt. of yarn, chiefly Indian and Japanese, were imported. The sole export of first-class importance in 1880 was beancake (and beans). The port was rudely shaken up at the time of the Japanese occupation in 1895, and now the colonising of the horse-breeding

grounds, to which the English-built railway will extend, will probably revolutionise the grain export. Of course the presence in the neighbourhood of the Russians has stimulated the import trade, especially in railway plant. If the "temporary" occupation of the port by that enterprising Power is suffered to endure, it will go hard with American and Japanese trade, as well as with English shipping. Not only are enormous quantities of raw cotton and of Japanese and Indian yarn imported, but even yarn from the Chinese mills is becoming popular. American drills have here completely driven out the English article. Beancake and beans are still the chief export, but wild silk has taken a very good place as second. The import of seaweed from Russia is not in Russian shippers' hands.

(26) Port Arthur is already a great trading place for many nationalities, but of course it is in purely Russian interests. I have not yet heard what arrangements exist for trade passing from Russian leasehold territory into the Chinese domain.

(27) Ta-lien Wan, or Dalny, is supposed to be, or is going to be, an open port in territory "leased" to Russia. British traders are not disposed to take it very seriously as yet, but the Russians are carrying out stupendous public works there with a view to a great future trade in coal, and Englishmen ought not to be caught napping whilst Germans creep in by a back door.

(28) Tientsin exported large quantities of camels' wool and straw-braid in 1880; cotton goods and opium were the leading imports, but she ranked fairly low down in the comparative scale,—far below such ports as Hankow or Foochow. "Syndicates," bent on "concessions" of all kinds, then began to arrive; there was great activity in connection with China's new navy and naval stations; the opening of Corea brought fresh steamers to the port,

and its development continued through the time of the Japanese war in 1894-5, and the subsequent extraordinary energy displayed by the Chinese in raising new armies (1896-1900). The trade has nearly trebled itself within the past ten years, and now ranks next to that of Shanghai in value. Wool is still the chief export, but the straw-braid business seems almost to have committed suicide by persistently adulterating and fouling the material. The wool, however, is now chiefly sheep's, which comes in enormous quantities from distant Mongolia, just as Tibetan wool, starting from near the same tracts, goes to Chungking. The value of hides, skins, and hair is about the same as that of the wool—about half a million sterling. Two new exports, coal and ground-nuts, make up a third half-million. Cotton goods to the value of three and a half million sterling, and railway materials to the value of half a million, are the leading imports, Japanese yarn being specially prominent. The only two others worth special mention are kerosene and foreign opium, of about equal value; but there is an immense importation of native opium from Ho Nan, and Chih Li itself grows a considerable quantity now. It will assist us in forming an idea of the topographical laws which explain the most ancient Chinese migrations and settlements, if we accept the dictum of Mr. Consul Carles, that the trade area of Tientsin now embraces all between the sea and the left bank of the Yellow River, up to Mongolia, including both banks of the northernmost River Bend down to Ning-hia, the ancient capital of Marco Polo's Tangut, and to the outposts of Tibet.

(29) Ts'in-wang Tao, nine miles north of the new sanatorium Pei-tai Ho (near the Shan-hai Kwan), has been much talked of as a "voluntary port," like San-tu Ao; but the recent trouble with the "Boxers" has postponed

the completion of that arrangement. The advantage of this port is that it is always free from ice, and will therefore afford a better channel for the coal export than Taku now does.

(30) Kalgan is perhaps entitled to a cursory mention, although it is not exactly a "port," even in the same limited sense as the inland towns of Mèng-tsz and Lungchow. About 40,000 tons of tea go overland through this place, employing for conveyance about 200,000 camels. These, it appears, are largely the same animals that bring sheep's wool to Tientsin from the region of Kokonor—that is, from the entrepôt of Baotu, on the Yellow River, which has already been twice mentioned in the chapter upon "Trade Routes." About the year 1870 I paid three visits to Kalgan, and even then there was a considerable Russian settlement, now, unfortunately, I see, destroyed by the "Boxers." The Kalgan tea trade is not so important to Russia now that direct steamers of the largest size run from Hankow to Odessa, and even to Cronstadt; such as it is, the Russians bemoan its decadence, and the decline of Kiachta energy. In the year 1872 I went up the Yang-tsze with the captain of the very first Russian steamer destined for the ocean trade, and now there are about six of them clearing for the Black Sea or the Baltic every year.

(31) Kia-yüh Kwan (lat. 40° N., long. 98° E.) possesses a "foreign" custom-house, supported by the Hankow office, but there is no European there. Since 1885 there has been a full staff, but scarcely any work to do. Now that the Russians have begun to take tea in increasing quantities up the Han River, we may perhaps look for better times.

(32) Chefoo, like Tientsin, was an exporter of straw-braid and beancake in 1880; her *pongee* silks, the product

of the "oak-worm" like those of Newchwang, were also coming to the front. Cotton goods and opium were the leading imports, and so they are at present; but the proportion of the latter to the former is now much less, Japanese yarn alone representing in value three times that of the opium imported. The total trade for 1899 was in tael value more than three times that of 1880. Of course the opening of Corea had considerable effect on Chefoo's external development, for internally the port only deals with its immediate neighbourhood. A feature of the cotton goods trade of this port is the complete rout of English by American manufactured goods, which seem to have taken all North China by storm. Another very large import was rice; but that, of course, is an unstable trade, and usually means local disaster rather than prosperity. Beancake and straw-braid still form leading exports, but silk has shot far ahead of the other two combined, and now stands for two-fifths of the total exports. Cattle for the Russians is quite a new item of industry, and if it encourages active breeding, instead of further impoverishing local agriculture, it will be a very good thing for the province. There is a very large and increasing export of vermicelli, which has kept pace well with the general rise; Shan Tung is rather a wheat and a millet country than a rice-producing one, and, indeed, now sends part of her grain tribute to Peking in "small millet."


(33) Kiao-chou, or Tsingtao, is another "free port" of the rather suspicious "leasehold" type; but, unlike Talien Wan, it falls (since 1st July, 1899) under the ken of the Foreign or Maritime Customs; it was officially opened in May, 1899, during which year the total trade amounted to 2,200,000 taels. But it is not "free" to inter-port trade at all; and the custom-house is only for the main-

land commerce. At present none but Germans have gone there, and it is not very likely that many besides Germans will ever settle there: even in 1900 the trade has begun to decrease, for the Chinese coolies dislike the inquisitorial ways of the official system. Until railways are constructed, the port can only supply and draw from its immediate neighbourhood.

(34) Wei-hai Wei has a status as a "port" even vaguer than that of its Russian and German colleagues; there are three or four English firms there, so I suppose they do at least an import trade; but I have not yet heard anything of custom-house arrangements with the mainland adjoining our pale. We need a Lord Cromer in China to get things into shape for us, and to take a broad statesmanlike grasp of the whole situation.

(35-42) Corea, which, as a vassal state, was opened to foreign ships only in 1882, is now an independent "empire"; but its trade is, on the west side at least, really part of the China trade;—indeed, for many years Sir Robert Hart managed the customs administration for all the ports of Corea. Mr. McLeavy Brown, the present "chief," is just as solid an Ulster man as Sir Robert. The Russians and the Japanese have more interest in the east coast than the west. In 1880 Corea was as unknown as Tibet, except to the Japanese, who had a factory of ancient standing at Fusan, a place I had the honour of "opening" in 1885 for one short fortnight: "someone had blundered." The extent of the annual Japanese trade there never much exceeded 2,000,000 Mexican dollars, imports and exports about equally divided. In 1876 Japan obtained by treaty two more ports, and Europeans naturally then began to look around them. In 1880 the Italians, of all people in the world, sent a man-of-war, and first obtained written

replies to their letters, the Americans having already failed that year to secure any documentary reply to their demands. In 1885 the total value of the trade at all three ports was only 2,000,000 dollars, Fusan having collapsed as suddenly as the others (Chemulpo and Wönsan) shot ahead. I regret to notice from the report for 1899 that the trade for that year is not quite so good as for the previous year. In 1898 the total had risen to nearly 25,000,000 dollars: in 1899 it was only 22,075,000. The only exports are gold and agricultural products. It appears that there is no export of gold from any part of China except those places which are near Corea, *i.e.* Newchwang, Tientsin, and Chefoo; so that there would seem to be some geological sympathy between them all, especially as Hakodate in Japan also exports gold. Of the imports one-half in value are Manchester cottons; but here, again, the Japanese are beginning to threaten our supremacy. Two new ports, Chingnampo (north-west) and Mokpo (south-west), were opened to foreign trade in 1897, and three more in 1899; to wit, Söngchin, "130 sea-miles" north of Genzan or Wönsan, some miles away from the mouth of the Tumen (for the Russian cattle and piece-goods trade); Masanpo, one of the finest harbours in existence, near Fusan; and Kunsan (west coast), between Mokpo and Chemulpo. Corean trade is apparently not worth the notice of British shipping, and is almost entirely in Japanese hands; but Mr. Pritchard-Morgan has got to work on the Unsan gold mines near Ping-yang, and several British companies are active in Chemulpo with banking, oil-tanks, and Manchester goods. The Coreans, though backward, are a splendid race of men, and would soon sympathise with the freedom and generosity of British rule if brought under it. The best hope for Corea lies



in Mr. McLeavy Brown's policy being supported by the liberal powers; *i.e.* by Great Britain, Japan, the United States, and, it is hoped, Germany.


(43) We now come to Shanghai, the great heart from the pulsations of which nearly all the above derive their arterial nutriment, and to the invigorating action of which they drive their venous blood for further treatment and distribution. In 1880 this great emporium had a direct trade of over 92,000,000 taels, two-fifths exports and three-fifths imports. The foreign complications with Russia and France helped to depress business for some years, but in 1886 trade recovered, and by 1891 it had totalled 165,000,000 taels. It must be borne in mind, however, that these are gross figures, for a large part of the Shanghai trade reappears in the form of Tientsin, Hankow, or even Swatow trade. The true trade of Shanghai, less re-exports, for the year 1899 is only 125,000,000 taels. On the other hand, the gross trade of Shanghai (including everything from or to anywhere under all conditions) was nearly 308,000,000 taels (roughly, £40,000,000). To understand the complicated distinctions between gross and net totals, viewed from various standpoints, it is necessary for those particularly interested to study the published returns.*

(44-46) There are still one or two ports or quasi-ports which ought to be casually noticed. The trade of Indo-China for 1899 amounted to nearly £10,000,000 (say 70,000,000 taels), of which Tonquin took over £2,500,000 (say 17,500,000 taels). The trade with Mêngtsz (Yün Nan) *via* Haiphong, the Red River, and Hokow, was opened in 1889, and amounted in 1899 to 5,250,000 taels, all conducted by Chinese merchants, and mostly carried in mere transit, through Tonquin, with Hongkong. As

* The report is on sale at Messrs. P. S. King and Son's, Westminster.

early as 1140 the new Li dynasty of Tonquin had opened a port, corresponding with the modern Haiphong, to the trade of Siam and Burma, but there is no specific mention of it in Chinese history. Trade seems to have then centred at Tourane, or rather at "Faifo," about 20 miles up the river. The "port" of Lungchow (Kwang Si) was also opened in 1889: the trade so far is not only contemptible in amount, but is absolutely declining: for 1899 the total was under 86,000 taels. Sz-mao (Yün Nan) promises better. It was opened to the French in 1895, and to the British in 1896, as already stated under the head "Arrival of Europeans." The average annual trade is about 225,000 taels; so far, chiefly cotton from the British Shan states. In Yün Nan and Sz Ch'wan there seems to be an unlimited demand for cotton, and it was so also during the Burmese wars of last century. Of Kwang-chou Wan, the new French station in the Leichou Peninsula, leased in 1898, it is difficult to say anything, except that there is a good native trade with Macao and Kongmun. If the French do not soon strangle the trade with *fonctionnaires*, or frighten the Chinese away, as they have done in many parts of Tonquin and also in Cambodgia, they will deserve congratulations for an exceptional display of wisdom. Nearly £12,000 worth of supplies for the French troops were re-exported thence from Hoihow in 1899.

Soochow has not yet been included in the special trade reports issued by the Foreign Office, and is really a mere appendage of Shanghai. Still, it now has the dignity of being an "open port" on its own basis (see p. 108), and its separate trade under the Foreign Customs already reaches 1,500,000 taels a year. Foreign influence is, however, more specially concerned there in developing spinning mills and silk filatures.



CHAPTER VIII.

THE GOVERNMENT

AT first sight it might appear that, in describing the government of China, we should begin with the Emperor, or at least with the Central Administration at Peking. But as a matter of fact the Manchu power is a mere absorptive machine, whose very existence (as recent events show) is a matter of comparative unconcern to the provinces, each of which is sufficient unto itself, and exists as an independent unit. Hence, just as, for the moment, we have in the first chapter eliminated Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria, etc., from the field, and have confined our preliminary geographical view of the Empire to the Eighteen Provinces, so do we for the present dismiss the Emperor and his Court from consideration, and limit our survey to what is really the living and active administration—to wit, the general constitution of China Proper, a confederation of homogeneous provinces.

It will be noticed from the list given in the first chapter that nearly every one of these provinces has an ancient and purely territorial name, in addition to its present practical or descriptive appellation: this ancient or literary name is used in official documents quite as often as the modern one. Thus the Canton Viceroy says: "Your despatch has reached Yüeh"; and the Shan Si Governor, in discussing *likin*, in the usual terse literary

style, talks of "Tsin *li*." It is just as though the modern French departmental prefects were to use the old provincial terms Gascony and Burgundy more freely than they do; or as though we should, for elegant purposes, retain the official use of such words as Mercia and Wessex.

Now, subject to qualifications which will hereinafter be made, the main idea which runs throughout the provincial organisation is as follows: Each province has a Governor, who reports on all formal matters to the Boards at Peking, and memorialises the Emperor on affairs of a less routine kind. But about 300 years ago pairs or triplets of provinces began to have a temporary Viceroy or Governor-General in addition to the governors; and when the Manchus came to consolidate their power, in 1640-50, such viceroys became permanent until, after various re-shufflings, they settled down to a definite distribution, very much as they are now. The original motive in appointing a viceroy was not unlike our idea in appointing Sir Bartle Frere or Sir Hercules Robinson as High Commissioner for South Africa; that is, military or other urgent considerations rendered it expedient for one strong man to deal with some wide question, involving more than one gubernatorial or divisional interest. But, although the Viceroy's "button" is a shade higher than the Governor's, he is in no way the superior official; and in most cases neither of the two can move without "moving" for the consent of the other. There is not even the degree of subordination which exists between the lieutenant-governors and the Viceroy of India. In most matters the Viceroy, in endorsing a report with his views or commands, adds the words: "But you will at the same time await the instructions of His Excellency the Governor"; and, of course, the Governor is equally

cautious. In the majority of cases the Viceroy and the Governor memorialise the Emperor jointly; if the matter is ticklish or delicate, the drafter and the signer are distinguished thus: "I may add that your servant John [or, if a Manchu, your slave John] drafted this despatch." Of course, I only use the Christian name "John" in order the better to illustrate to Western minds how the Emperor alone can "hear" or bandy about the private names of his high officers. Custom so ordains that in each group of provinces certain special matters fall under the Viceroy's peculiar care; for instance, at Canton and Nanking the two Viceroys look after the gabelle, have general military control, and manage foreign affairs; whilst in all provinces the Governor is practically sole arbitrator in matters of civil promotion and land-tax.

In some provinces the Viceroy, in others the Governor, has the chief say in army matters or questions of salt gabelle. In many other matters, though in different degrees, one or the other is sole or chief spokesman. Where this is so, it is not necessary for both jointly to advise the Emperor or the Board. These being the general principles, it may be added specifically that a powerful viceroy often eclipses his governor or governors; on the other hand, a masterful governor sometimes leads on or terrorises his viceroy. Thus the terrible Governor Ts'en Yüh-ying (stated, by the way, to have been of Miao "savage" origin) always kept in leash the successive Viceroys at Yün-nan Fu; he is even supposed to have murdered one, as also to have connived at Mr. Margary's assassination; but perhaps these rumours are unjust to his memory. The model exemplar of a good Viceroy is Liu K'un-yih of Nanking: he never assumes airs of any kind; on the other hand, he is quite fearless and incorruptible, and cannot be bullied in any way. He is

the safest of safe men, and I myself have several times "squared" with him the most delicate and compromising matters.

Now, although these two exalted provincial functionaries are in general the sole medium of communication between Court and locality, yet in most routine matters they are bound to act "on the proposition" of two other dignitaries, usually known to Europeans as the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Judge. In matters of civil advancement the Judge is only nominally associated with the Treasurer, and the Viceroy with the Governor; it is the Governor who under ordinary circumstances arranges privately with the Treasurer what string the latter shall pull. Thus the Viceroy and the Governor, in submitting a name for promotion, say: "The Treasurer and the Judge having duly nominated this man, we humbly submit his name for your Majesty's approval." Of course there are often other check-strings to pull at Peking before the clerks and high officers at the Board discover that there is no flaw in the recommendation. I must explain that at one time the Treasurer was the highest provincial official; but nearly 500 years ago it became the practice to send eunuchs or other Court functionaries on "soothing circuit," and gradually these officers became a permanent institution. The modern name for a governor is therefore "Circuit Soother." The Treasurer and the Judge have each an historical pedigree in the same way; but as the task before me is to give a plain and simple picture of China as it is, and to persons mostly unfamiliar with the "evolution" of Far Eastern things, I confine myself to the concluding remark that the above four functionaries form the executive, consultative, and in a measure even the judiciary and legislative body of each provincial unit:—in short they are the "Government."

But there are a few irregularities in detail which upset the perfect symmetry of this comparatively simple arrangement as a whole. To understand these, reference must be made to the list of provinces in the first chapter. The plum of the service is the Viceroyalty of the Two Kiang, that is, of old Kiang Nan (now parts of Kiang Su and An Hwei) and Kiang Si,—three provinces. The Viceroy has his seat at Nanking, and each Governor (with his Treasurer and Judge) resides at his own separate capital. Moreover, the Viceroy has a separate Treasurer and Judge of his own at Nanking: thus there are four pairs of these officers.

The next office in power is the Viceroyalty of Chih Li. The synechdochical name of this province needs special explanation. It was originally the Peh (North) Chih Li of the Ming dynasty, to distinguish it from Nan (South) Chih Li, at a time (1400) when Nanking was a rival capital with Peking. But the official expression "the various Chih Li palatinates," now in use, also means "the various executives," or "the various provinces." In the case of modern Chih Li, from which the word *Pch* is now omitted (except in European maps), there is no second sub-province, and consequently no Governor; but there is a separate Administrator for the district of Peking, just as the district of Columbia creates a special sphere for Washington, outside of Maryland and Virginia. Moreover, the northern or mountainous half of Chih Li, lying beyond the Great Wall, is under the Superintendency of Jehol and the Military Governor of Kalgan. These two governments have a strong Mongol flavour about them, and are to China Proper something like what Algeria is to France, or Poland to Russia. The Viceroy's proper residence is with his Treasurer and Judge at Pao-ting Fu; but with the advent of foreigners he began to reside half the year

at Tientsin; and now he never leaves it, except under stress of circumstances.

The next Viceroyalty in tacit rank is that of the Two Kwang. Each Governor has his Treasurer and Judge, but this Viceroy, who was at Chaoking (locally pronounced Shiuheng) until the Taiping rebellion, now resides with the Governor of Kwang Tung at Canton (itself a Portuguese corruption of the provincial name).

The Viceroy of Min-Chêh is stationed at Foochow, and, it will be noticed, uses for his title the ancient territorial names. The Governor of Chêh Kiang is at Hangchow, Marco Polo's Kinsai, *i.e.* the then *King-shi*, or "metropolis," of South China, to which the Manzi (*man-tsz*, or southerners) had been driven by the Cathayans (*K'i-tan* and other Tartars). The Governor of Fuh Kien, having Formosa under him too, used also to be at Foochow; but after the Japanese and French attacks on that island, the Governor was transferred to Tai-wan Fu, and the Viceroy performed, in addition to his own duties, those of continental Fuh Kien Governor. Still, the Treasurer and Judge remained at Foochow, and of course there are others at Hangchow. Since the Japanese obtained possession of Formosa, no re-appointment of a Fuh Kien Governor has been made.

The Viceroy of Hu Kwang ("Lake Expanse") resides with the Governor of Hu Peh at Wu-ch'ang, opposite Hankow. The Governor of Hu Nan is at Ch'ang-sha. Each place has its Treasurer and Judge. The Viceroy of Yün-Kwei and the Governor of Yün Nan are at Yün-nan Fu; the Governor of Kwei Chou at Kwei-yang, in each case with Treasurer and Judge.

The following provinces have no Viceroy, the Governor (in each instance with his Treasurer and Judge) being the highest official:—Shan Tung, Shan Si, and Ho Nan,

the oldest parts of China. The Viceroy of the largest single province, Sz Ch'wan, has no Governor, but rules alone, assisted by his Treasurer and Judge.

Lastly comes the complicated Viceroyalty of Shen-Kan at Lan-chou Fu, where the Treasurer and Judge for Kan Suh also reside. There was no Governor of Kan Suh until subsequently to the reconquest of Kashgaria from Yakub Beg, when a new Governorship of "Kan Suh New Territory" was established, with a Treasurer, at Urumtsi, otherwise known as Tih-hwa Fu: his Judge is an official of lower rank, who performs the functions, but only has the temporary status of judge, like our rear-admirals with local rank as vice-admirals. The Governor of Shen Si resides at Si-an Fu, the ancient capital of China's greatest dynasties, from the abolition of the feudal system to the times (900-1360) when the various Tartar dynasties shared the Empire along with native southern ruling houses. Of course he has his Treasurer and Judge. So there are three pairs of treasurers and judges to two governors and one viceroy.

Now, each of these Eighteen Provinces is a complete state in itself, whose corporate existence is in no way dependent upon any other state, except in so far that the poor ones dun the rich ones for the money which the Central Government "appropriates to them." Each province has its own army, navy, system of taxation, and its own social customs. It is only in connection with the salt trade and the navy that mutual concessions have to be made under a certain modicum of imperial control. In nearly all other matters the viceroys and governors "move" each other; and occasionally different provinces jointly interested in special questions, after thus "moving" to a preliminary understanding, address the Emperor or the Board together: for instance, the military station

of Namoa on the frontiers of Kwang Tung and Fuh Kien is under both viceroys, and the *modus vivendi* or *Ausgleich* in rival salt interests necessitates the co-operation of all the Yang-tsze Valley viceroys. Of late years foreign affairs have caused a further development, which practically creates two viceregal high commissioners with tacit diplomatic powers over other viceroys and governors. Thus the Viceroy at Tientsin, in his capacity of Imperial High Trade Commissioner for the North Sea Board, practically takes the lead for all "Old China"; whilst his colleague at Nanking, bearing the same title for the South Sea Board, represents the riverine and coast authorities for all the rest of China. In this way there is a tendency to unify the navy at least, if not the army; to place foreign affairs of wide importance in two leading hands; and to make commercial capitals with metropolitan rank out of Tientsin and Shanghai (the latter being in close sympathy with Nanking).

Having now got our local governments, it simply remains to remark that their dealings with Peking are of an extremely limited kind. It is perfectly well known to the shrewd accountants of the Boards what revenue each province can raise, or, what is more to the point, how much it will confess to; and the Board of Revenue towards the end of each year has only to "appropriate" on beaten lines, varying a little each year according to the state of prosperity or dearth in each province, and with an eye to the urgency of war requirements, as "moved" to their cognizance by the Boards of War and of Works. The annual circular runs something like this:—

"The vote for Manchu and other bannermen remains at 7,000,000 taels. Your aids to the provinces A and B will be as before, and come out of your salt-tax. Your *likin* and native customs will defray the expenses of your local army.

The funds C and D, which used to go to the Peking Seraglio and the Admiralty, having been diverted to the repayment of Franco-Russian loans, you must endeavour to recoup by drawing upon fund E. Your share of the 7,000,000 taels first mentioned will still be 700,000 taels from your land-tax and Foreign Customs."

So long as the provincial government sends its Peking supplies, administers a reasonable sop to its clamorous provincial duns, quells incipient insurrections, gives employment to its army of "expectants," staves off foreign demands, avoids "rows" of all kinds, and, in a word, keeps up a decent external surface of respectability, no questions are asked; all reports and promotions are passed; the Viceroy and his colleagues "enjoy happiness," and everyone makes his "pile." The Peking Government makes no new laws, does nothing of any kind for any class of persons, leaves each province to its own devices, and, like the general staff of an army organisation, both absorbs successful men, and gives out needy or able men to go forth and do likewise. Hence every man, be he squeezer, middle-man, or squeezed, has, or hopes to have, a finger in the pie. There is no snobbery in China, though there is plenty of priggishness. Any peasant or greengrocer can study or bribe his way up, and no Chinaman is ashamed of his poor relations. Thus there is a sort of live and let live feeling all round. The fat is there, and the fire is there: it is for each man to burn his fingers or feast withal, as luck and wriggling may have it. There are no passports, no restraints on liberty, no frontiers, no caste prejudices, no food scruples, no sanitary measures, no laws except popular customs and criminal statutes. China is in many senses one vast republic, in which personal restraints have no existence.

The Manchus, as the ruling race, have certainly a few privileges, but, on the other hand, they suffer just as many disabilities. Barbers, play-actors, and policemen are under a mild tabu—more theoretical than real; but aboriginal “barbarians” can easily become Chinese by reading books and putting on breeches. Indeed, there is an official expression for this transmogrification called “changing the autochthonous into the current.” All men are equal before the Emperor, and all have fairly equal chances of his smiles and frowns. The only thing is to adhere to custom, and not to overdo things: above all to respect the person of the Emperor as represented by the official uniform (always worn in public) of a mandarin, be he great or small. This being the happy-go-lucky condition of high office in China, there is (apart from special causes) no jealousy or class feeling in the country: it is simply a question of big fish feeding on little fish, unless and until the little fish can keep out of the way, eat their way up, and become big fish themselves.

Each provincial government being thus a state in itself, how does it go to work? It must be explained in answer to this question that the true official unit of Chinese corporate life is the *hien*, or “city district,” and there are some 1,300 of them. Each average province is divided into from 70 to over 100 *hien*, a term variously translated by Europeans “district,” “department,” “canton,” or “prefecture.” The half-barbarian province of Kwei Chou has only thirty-four; but then it has numerous “autochthonous” districts besides. Chih Li has nearly 140; but this total includes the Peking and Mongol districts. A *hien* is in area about the size of an English county, or a French department, with the same uncertainty or irregularity as to area and importance. It almost always consists, in pure Chinese

tracts, of a walled city and an area of, say, 500 or 1,000 square miles round the town. Very often an enormous city of lower rank forms an appendage to a sleepy old *hien*; until recently this was the case with Hankow. Every Chinaman is described first of all as belonging to a given *hien*; and so strong is the association that it follows him through life, if he gains distinction, much as the territorial surroundings of a Scotch or French magnate easily attach to his family name. Thus Li Hung-chang is often currently described as the "Hoh-fei statesman," because he hails from the *hien* of Hoh-fei; whilst his illustrious rival Chang Chï-tung is similarly called by newspaper men the "Nan-p'i Viceroy," from a city of that name on the Grand Canal, south of Peking.

The *hien* magistrate is the very heart and soul of all official life and emolument, his dignity and attributes, in large centres such as Canton or Chungking, not falling far short in many respects of those of the Lord Mayor of London. His comparatively low "button"-rank places him in easy touch with the people, whilst his position as the lowest of the *yu-sz*, or "executive," clothes him with an imperial status which even a viceroy must respect. He is the lowest officer on whom the Emperor himself (at times) directly confers an appointment. He is so much identified with the soul of "empire," that the Emperor or Government itself is elegantly styled *hien-kwan*, or "the district magistrate." He is judge in the first instance in all matters whatsoever, civil or criminal, and also governor of the gaol, coroner, sheriff, mayor, head-surveyor, civil service examiner, tax-collector, registrar, lord-lieutenant, ædile, chief bailiff, interceder with the gods; and, in short, what the people always call him—"father and mother officer." He cuts a very different figure in a remote country district from that

accepted by him in a metropolis like Canton, where he is apt to be overshadowed by innumerable civil and military superiors; just as in London the Lord Mayor is outshone by the Court and the Cabinet Ministers. In his own remote city he is autocratic and everybody. He has no technical training whatever, except in the Chinese equivalent for "Latin verse"; he has a permanent staff of trained specialists who run each department for him, share the plunder with him, and keep themselves well in the background. If a weak man, he is at the mercy of these tools, and also of his "belly-band," *i.e.* the man who advances the money for him first to secure and then to reach his post. But, if a strong man, he soon transforms all these into contributory "suckers" of the sponge he personally clutches.

The "value" of every *hien* in the empire is of course perfectly well known; but although there is bribery and corruption at Peking as well as in the provinces, the solid basis of government is not really bad, and from my experience of Chinese officials I should say that the majority of them are men no worse than American "bosses,"—that is, mere hacks of a corrupt growth, with as much "conscience" as their system vouchsafes. Purchase of official rank, and even of office, has been sadly on the increase since China began to get into trouble with rebels and Europeans; even now, though higher office can no longer be bought, the office of *hien* may be purchased, and many even higher brevet titles are on sale. But, putting aside questions of bribery and jobbery, most *hien* magistrates obtain their posts either because they have passed brilliant examinations, or because their parents have served the State well, or because they themselves have "earned their turn" by special services or efforts of some kind, which "services"

include patriotic "offerings" (office purchase) in different shapes and sizes. Whether the officer has obtained his post honourably or otherwise, his first care is (unless he be an enthusiast or a crank, in either of which cases he promptly comes to grief) to repay the expense of working up for his post, and of getting to it; his next care is to feather his nest, keep on the soft side of the Treasurer and the Governor, and prepare the way for future advancement. This is how he does it. His most important, or at least his most profitable duty, is the collection and remission of the land-tax, for which purpose he pays a liberal salary to a highly-trained conveyancer kept permanently on the premises. The Board at Peking never asks for more than the regulation amount of this, and is uncommonly glad to see even "eight-tenths" of it paid. But by means of juggling with silver rates and "copper-cash" rates; drawing harrowing pictures of local disasters and poverty; by legerdemain in counting and measuring; charging fees for the receipts, notices, tickets, attendance, and what not; it has come about in the course of time that the actual amount of the land-tax collected is anything between twice and four times the legal amount, whilst under no circumstances is the full amount even officially due ever admitted to be in hand. Say the land-tax of the district is 10,000 taels, a profit of this sum, or (at the old silver exchanges) £2,000 to £3,000 a year, would evidently bring the man back to his native village, after twenty years of work, with a handsome fortune. But he does not get all this for himself; many superiors have to be squared in a fixed, decorous, and it may even be said imperially-recognised way.

Then there is the administration of justice. Every *hien* magistrate, bad or good, must keep an army (usually

hereditary rogues) of runners, collectors, lictors, and police; and in only very few cases can he afford to pay them anything, even for food, should his integrity be so unusual as to awaken within him the desire to do so. The smallest district needs thirty, the largest 300 or more of these ruffians. In practice these men, invariably the riff-raff of the town, live on their "warrants," and no man who is "wanted under a warrant," be he witness, criminal, or plaintiff, can as a general rule get off without payments to them of some sort. Moreover, every *yamén* has hovering in the vicinity a vulture-like multitude of champerty and maintenance men, who live by sowing ill-will, and run "hand-and-glove" with the police. The amount of tyranny and villainy varies in each district with each magistrate. I have myself seen enough with my own eyes, and had innumerable free-and-easy conversations with both magistrates and runners, to enable me to state with absolute certainty that a downright bad magistrate, succeeding to a post dominated by a nest of evil-minded runners with a long-established tyrannical habit ingrained in their hearts, and practising amongst a stupid, timid, or malignant population, can with impunity assassinate anyone he likes in his own gaol, accept any bribe, commit or condone any injustice, make his fortune, and even preserve his reputation in spite of all this. On the other hand, I have seen completely honest, simple-minded, benevolent magistrates, perfectly clean-handed (subject to custom), anxious to do right, loyal to their superiors, beloved of the people, and quite capable of restraining the police; who, again, under a kind master soon fall into the habit of reasonable obedience and fairness. I once had a very faithful black-guard in my service (lent to me by a *hien* ruler for my protection) who nearly lost his life in my defence, and

who used to tell me frankly of his own former crimes as we walked along the lonely country roads together. There is a substratum of good in most *hien* (the current name for *chi-hien*) and their myrmidons. "'Tis oft the sight alone of means to do ill deeds makes deeds ill done." With all this, however, it must be stated that most magistrates supplement their gains on land-tax account by considerable profits under the head of "justice," and the lawyer, or special "justice secretary" who "shapes the law" is the most important person behind the *hien's* back.

There are other little pickings in the way of inquests (blind-eyes), licences, permits, presents from gentry, transfers of land, posts, storage of official grain, purveyances, etc., which go to make up the magistrate's fortune; for it is an understood thing at Peking that "outside expenditures" require "miscellaneous funds," while the provincial magnates in turn also understand that a magistrate who is bound by unwritten custom to repair and furnish their *yaméns*, keep all public buildings in order, forward their despatches, supply their transport, and (under breath be it said) grease their palms, must have something pecuniary wherewith to do it all. Besides, most viceroys have a son who is a *hien*, and "if you won't scratch my back, I won't scratch your back." Consequently there is a comfortable feeling all round that "the less said about insignificant details the better for all concerned."

Although the essence of provincial government thus consists in the *hien* and the four big men at the top of the tree, there are certain intermediaries who cannot be ignored. Each group of two or more *hien* is under a *fu*, or city of the first class, and each province has from five to ten *fu*. The *chü-fu* is also popularly and

officially styled the *fu*. The name is comparatively modern, and in former times there were similar administrative divisions called *lu*; but the same names have in this as in other cases at different times been applied to provincial and divisional or prefectural tracts, so that I will not confuse the reader with too much definition. Suffice it to say that a *fu* city has no real existence of its own, but is always within the walls of one or more of its own *hien*. Thus Lü-chou Fu in An Hwei, which has under it five *hien*, is really the Hoh-fei city where Li Hung-chang comes from. In such cases the *hien* which has the honour of thus housing a *fu* is called the "head *hien*" of the province. In a few cases, as for instance that of Kwang-chou Fu (Canton city), there are two head *hien* within one set of walls, but the warrants of each are limited in their run by an imaginary dividing line;—much to the comfort of local thieves. In one case, the enormous city of Su-chou Fu (Soochow), there are actually three head *hien*, *i.e.* three palaces and three rulers, within one wall; but of course only the triple head of the one body, or tripartite abstract shrieval government, is there: the *Hinterlands*, or territories subject to each one, spread out like three fans in different directions.

The duties of a *fu* (usually called a "prefect") are as unsolid and abstract as his territory. I have sat and talked with many a *fu*, but to this day I do not understand what they do (beyond re-hearing as judges in the second instance), except act as a conduit-pipe for several *hien*: just as the archdeacon is an ecclesiastical dignitary performing archidiaconal functions, so is the *fu* a territorial dignitary performing prefectural functions. All orders from above come to the *hien* through the *fu*, and conversely with the reports. The head *fu*

and the head *hien*, when in one city with the Viceroy, or Governor, have to dance attendance in person every morning: there are ample opportunities in the ante-room for squaring accounts with the secretaries and clerks. In a few cases the *fu* has some special business confided to him in addition to his supervisory functions. Thus at Canton and Hoihow there are the "prefects' customs" or "octroi"; and at Lien-chou the prefect staves off the importunities of foreign consuls stationed at Pakhoi. The Governor of Kiang Su, Luh Ch'wan-lin, who left in July, 1900, to fight the "Boxers," made the beginning of his career by using "firm language" to Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at that port in 1879. The profits of the *fu* are not so great as those of a *hien*, but he has a considerable say in the appointment of each *hien*, and can do plenty of damage by picking out awkward faults if he is not properly conciliated. The northern Chinese have a popular saying,

Fu li fu
San-pai-wu,

which practically means "each prefecture is 100 English miles from the other, and contains an area of 10,000 square miles." The patronage or choice of *fu* and *hien* officials is pretty evenly shared between the Peking government and those of the provinces; but it is always understood that the Viceroy and Governor may choose their own head *fu* and *hien*, even though Peking may appoint a successor to the man thus chosen, by way of compensation. The practice is similar to that of our own high officers selecting their own private secretary or flag-lieutenant from personally agreeable or obsequious individuals.

Above the *fu*, again, there is a still more modern and

still more indefinite division and official called the *tao*. A *tao* area usually consists of two or more *fu*, or of one *fu* and several *hien* or *chou*. The "intendant" has not even got the loan of a walled town to live in, and there is no such place as even a theoretical *tao* city. Like the *fu*, he is a conduit, but he is a much busier man than the *fu*, and always seems to have many special duties. Still, he is a "guest officer," and not so imperial a representative as the *fu*, who is the territorial magnate, or "host." The *fu* is like the colonel of a regiment, and the *hien* like the captain of a company: however you make up your brigades, you must work through the colonel and captain. At nearly all the treaty-ports the *tao* or *taotai* (with whom a consul ranks by treaty) manages foreign affairs. His *yamen* is generally within the walls of a prefectural city, but at Shanghai it is within the *hien* city of that name, and in other places it may be anywhere. He ranks with but below the Treasurer and Judge, and "savours" of them. There are several grades of *tao*: there is the simple "circuit intendant"; then there is the "intendant having a say in military matters," the "customs intendant," and so on. Besides these executive *tao*, there are also others in charge of grain transport and salt gabelle; but I leave these out for the present, as not really forming part of the regular administration. Nor do I touch upon the assistant administrative officials, outdoor and indoor, attached to each *fu* and *hien* district. Like the Japanese artist, who, with a few dashes of his brush, leaves a general impression of landscape to be gathered from a few daubs, so do I, in my imperfect way, select a few leading features in order to convey to non-specialist readers a picture which their minds may rapidly take in without undue fatigue.

The best way to realise the relative positions of the Chinese bureaucracy would perhaps be to look at an official despatch in its usual form. The Viceroy and Governor are known collectively as "the Yard," or "Two Yards," although separately the Viceroy is a "Hall," and the Governor a mere "Yard." It is like our expression "the Court," or the "Sublime Porte." The Treasurer and Judge are the two *sz*, or "bureaus"; but as *taotais* savour of them, and have consultative rank along with them, the term *sz-tao* is often used for the whole three in the sense of "advisory body," or "provincial staff" to the Yards. All new-fangled things such as Arsenal, Loans, Enquiries, Revolutions, etc., are managed by the *sz-tao*, who are a sort of "working committee," like the Committees of the House of Commons. The prefect receives petitions from the *hien*, but himself petitions one or each of the *sz-tao*, all three, or, in special cases, one or two of whom again petition the Viceroy and Governor, or one of the two. These two "move" each other, and the *sz-tao* likewise "move" each other; but the Yards "command" the *sz-tao*, who do the same to the prefect, which officer carries on the compliment to the *hien*. All grave cases have to pass upward for rehearing through the *bureau* and the Yard. All this, however, is official. Unofficially all may correspond more or less informally, and even familiarly, by letter; and in mixed company, though each officer is scrupulously deferential to his superiors, yet even a *hien*, if an able man, will in a quiet way assume the lead, or extinguish the others altogether; and Chinese officials are usually so invertebrate that they are as a rule only too glad to "enjoy happiness" in comfort, and to allow any willing horse who offers himself for the *corvée* to do the pulling of the apple-cart,—so long as they themselves do not

appear to upset it, if it should be upset. I give here a specimen proclamation to illustrate the relative rank of officials, and their correspondence forms:—

“The Magistrate has had the honour to receive instructions from the Prefect, who cites the directions of the *taotai*, moved by the Treasurer and the Judge, recipients of the commands of their Excellencies the Viceroy and Governor, acting at the instance of the Foreign Board, who have been honoured with His Majesty’s commands . . . (commands end) Respect this. Duly communicated to the Yard, or Yards (end of line), who command the *sz* (end of line), who move the *tao* (end), who instructs the *fu* (end), who sends down to The *Hien*, etc. (Note how the *hien*, as imperial agent, gives himself capital letters). We therefore enjoin and command all and several, etc.” It will be observed that a Chinese despatch resembles our official telegrams in form.

I will only add that the amount of copying and correspondence which this “house that Jack built” style involves is as tremendous as the neatness and order kept are scrupulous. Ninety per cent. of it all is totally useless; but labour is cheap and, as the French say, *ça occupe*. Moreover, of our own records, philosophy, and literature how much is not mere form?

TABLE TO ILLUSTRATE THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

Qualification of Town.	Meaning of Term (approximate).	Area of territory represented in square miles.	Title of Chief Ruler.	Meaning.	Remarks.
King . . .	Capitol . . .	100,000 to 1,500,000	Fu-yin . . .	Governor of the Fu . . .	Mukden (Shéngking), Peking, and Nanking are the only three now.
Fu . . .	"Cathedral" town . . .	5,000 to 20,000	Chi-fu . . .	Knows the Fu . . .	All <i>king</i> and all <i>shéng</i> are necessarily <i>fu</i> also.
Shéng . . .	Capital . . .	40,000 to 300,000	Sun-fu . . .	Circuit Soother . . .	One for each Province (or else a viceroy). This <i>fu</i> is a different word.
Hien . . .	Municipium . . .	500 to 1,500	Chi-hien . . .	Knows the Hien . . .	Practically means "county" and "county town"; in fact, the magistrate is usually called a " <i>hien</i> count."
Chou . . .	Municipium . . .	500 to 1,500	Chi-chou . . .	Knows the Chou . . .	This, when dependent on a <i>fu</i> , is practically a <i>hien</i> .
Chih-li Chou . . .	"Abbey" town . . .	5,000 to 20,000	Chi-li Chou, chi Chi-chou . . .	Knows the Chou, being independent Chou . . .	This, when independent, is practically a <i>fu</i> over <i>hien</i> s.
T'ing . . .	Borough . . .	500 to 10,000	T'ung-chi . . .	Associate Knower . . .	In many respects the two last remarks may be equally applicable to dependent and independent <i>t'ing</i> .
Chén . . .	Entrepôt . . .	1 to 2 not cadastral.	Uncertain; one of the sub-magistrates, or sometimes a mere <i>ti-pao</i> or "head-man."	All these officials are subordinate in some way to a <i>hien</i> , <i>chou</i> , or <i>t'ing</i> .	There are many other popular appellations for towns and villages, such as <i>p'u</i> , "a shop"; <i>ya</i> , "a col"; <i>niao</i> , "a temple"; <i>an</i> , "a nunnery"; <i>t'an</i> , "a rapid"; <i>t'ang</i> , "a pool"; <i>tien</i> , "an inn"; <i>ch'ang</i> , "a fair"; <i>hi</i> , "a market"; <i>an</i> , "a bend"; <i>ss</i> , "a township," and so on; but none of them have any official status.
Ch'éng . . .	Walled town . . .				
T'un . . .	Country town . . .				
Chwang . . .	Country town . . .				
Ts'un . . .	Country town . . .				
Li . . .	Village . . .				

CHAPTER IX.

POPULATION

IN ancient times the population of China must have been very great, for even 2,000 years ago it was stated that the "whole of the nomads put together scarcely number as many as the population under a Chinese township area." Of course this loose way of illustrating the chances of success in a warlike expedition against the Hiung-nu must not be taken too strictly. Other positive statements scattered about the history books would probably between them rectify the sentence above quoted so as to mean: "the quarter of a million of soldiers which the western part of Siberia and High Asia can raise against us would not exceed the adult male population of one of our provincial divisions." The fact, moreover, that the revenue collected in silk stuffs alone amounted at times to 5,000,000 pieces, and apparently in one year;—collected, too, from only half the area of modern China,—points to a settled population of at least 20,000,000. If we were to search diligently all the early histories, we might find even more precise indications, such as those which it has been possible for historians to give during the "Middle Ages"; but the purpose of this book will be sufficiently served if we dismiss from consideration the whole period when China was divided into two or more rival dynasties, and begin with the native Sui rulers, who had in A.D. 600 completely unified the

empire. A few years after this date (609) the population is specifically stated to have numbered 8,700,000 households, in 1,255 *hien* districts. In 652, after the fearful wars of succession and the disastrous expeditions against Turks, Coreans, etc., the number of households had gone down to 3,800,000. In 654 a biennial census was ordained. The conquest of South-west Corea in 660 brought 760,000 households with it. Probably the third or South-eastern peninsular state contained as many. By the conquest of North Corea in 668 China gained 170 *hien* districts containing 697,000 households; and these figures, compared with those for 609, give us a fair relative idea of each country's population. Then followed a period of recuperation, and the following official figures enable us to fix approximately the average number of "mouths" in a household:—

Year.	Households.	Mouths.
733	7,861,236	45,431,263
755	9,619,254	52,880,488

Another piece of information makes it plain that not more than one person in each household could have been taxed, that some households were not taxed at all, and that only one-seventh part of the persons not ranked as householders paid taxes; for, out of the above figures for 755, only 5,301,044 householders and 7,662,800 non-householders paid scot. In 807, after bloody wars with the Shans and Tibetans, 1,453 *hien* only contained 2,440,254 households, and even of this number but 1,440,000 in eight provinces (*tao*) had been counted; the rest for fifteen other provinces had been merely estimated. There can be no mistake about these figures, for it is added, "and

out of this reduced population, only one quarter that of the reign period 742-56, we have 830,000 paid troops!" In the years 820 and 821 the number of "households and tents" is twice given as below 2,400,000, and the number of mouths as below 16,000,000; but in one of the two cases it is stated "this excludes (modern) Sz Ch'wan, Kwei Chou, the Two Kwang, and Annam (then Chinese)"; and in the other, "this excludes military provinces." Finally (apparently after re-conquests), we are told a few years later that "out of 3,350,000 households we are employing 990,000 soldiers; out of a total revenue of 35,000,000 (? taels), one third goes to the Emperor, and two thirds are local."

During the Turkish interregnums, or the Five Dynasty Period (907-60), which came between the fall of the T'ang and rise of the Sung dynasty, when China was really split up into a dozen petty states, there are naturally no records of population worth noticing. But I have come across the following during the eleventh century:—

Year.	Households.	Mouths.
1014	9,055,729	21,976,965
1088	18,289,385	32,163,017
1097	19,435,570	33,401,606

The two last years, however, subdivide the householders into two classes, and use the word "adult man" (*ting*) instead of the word "mouth." A close, special study is necessary to discover exactly what this means. I am inclined to think "mouth" here means "man or woman, but not child," and *ting* means "male capable of doing *corvée*, or bearing arms." The figures for 1088 and 1097 are thus subdivided:—

Qualification.	Householders.	Adults.
Superior . .	12,134,733	28,533,934
Guest . .	6,154,652	3,629,083
Lord . .	13,068,741	30,344,274
Guest . .	6,366,829	3,067,332

The probable meaning of this is that most Chinese freeman units furnished at least a father and one (or two) sons out of each household; but that villeins, or "copyholders" with precarious tenancy, only furnished occasional men for the wars—never more than one for each two villein households—and were practically serfs. This supposition is strengthened by the fact that the T'ang dynasty (600–900) is known to have emancipated large numbers of Government *adscriptitii*, who had, during centuries of war, sought protection under great lords; but private families continued to keep them, and the T'ang Government ceased to emancipate privately-owned serfs against their masters' will. It was, however, the policy of the Sung dynasty (900–1200) to reduce the number of slaves in the households of the rich. It must also be borne in mind that the Kitans ruled over parts of modern Chih Li and Shan Si, and that the Sung dynasty positively declined from the beginning to have any political truck with either Yün Nan or Annam.

The Nüchêns (earlier Manchus) turned out the Kitans from North China, and, besides governing all their territory between Corea and the desert, pushed their way into real China much farther than the Kitans had done. In fact, the whole of "Old China" was in their hands—that is, the whole valley or valleys of the Yellow River

enclosed between longitude 108° E. and latitude 33° N. Their official figures for three years are:—

Year.	Households.	Mouths.
1183	615,624	6,158,636
1190	6,939,000	45,447,900
1195	7,223,400	48,490,000

The figures for 1183 only include the military organisation under the Tartar *mingans* or chiliarchs, and may perhaps also serve to show what the Kitan "banner" population had been: one quarter of the mouths were slaves. It is stated that the equivalent of 26,000,000 English acres were cultivated, *i.e.* between four and five acres for each "mouth." The last-recorded number of (modern) Manchu households was in 1734, when there were 26,500,000 for all China, cultivating about 150,000,000 acres; so that the proportion in 1183 is relatively quite different, unless the word "mouth" is irregularly used. If we deduct the *mingan* population from the figures of 1190-5, we get about 6,500,000 householders, consisting of 40,000,000 mouths, taken by the Tartars from the native Chinese Sung Empire. We have seen what the Sung population was a century earlier. If it had not increased, there would still have been 13,000,000 householders left in the southern empire, and probably (in view of incessant warring) this figure really does approximately represent the number for South China, as to which, however, there are no statistics at present available to me.

The Nüchens were in turn driven out by the Mongols, whose first census in 1235 showed 873,781 households, with a total of 4,754,975 mouths. Over 200,000 households were added to the next census in 1252. From 1261

to 1274 there is steady progression, year by year, from 1,418,490 to 1,967,896 households; but of course these totals only include "Old China," two-thirds of whose population had either emigrated or been destroyed. In 1275 the number of households is given at 4,764,077, but it is not clear what conquered parts this total includes. The later conquests of 1275-6 are carefully recorded, together with the number of households and mouths obtained by official inquiries in each province. These conquests practically amount to the same thing as the additions to "Old China" made by the conquering Han dynasty 1,400 years earlier, and include Hu Peh, Hu Nan, Kiang Si, Cheh Kiang, and Kiang Su, with a grand total of 7,288,331 households of 14,653,820 mouths, *i.e.* if we add up each specified minor total. But if we lump specified with unspecified totals, as the historian does, we obtain, as he gives us, 9,370,472 households of 19,721,015 mouths, settled in 773 conquered *hien* districts. This agrees roughly with a casual statement made in another chapter: "In that year (1276) we obtained ten million households from the obliterated Sung house." This Sung dynasty is none other than Marco Polo's Manji, or Manzi, this word being, as already explained in part, the modern Chinese *man-tsz* or "southern ruffians," just as the Mongols are *ta-tsz*, or *sao-ta-tsz*, "frowsy Tartars." Marco Polo says there were 1,200 towns in all Manji, and 1,600,000 houses in Kinsai alone (Hangchow). As Hangchow was only the capital of one of the "Two Cheh," the conquest of which brought in 2,983,672 households, the 1,600,000 applied to the "West Cheh [Kiang]" alone would be a fair proportion: "East Cheh [Kiang]" then included Shanghai and the coast parts down to Wênchow.

The Sung history says that in 1264 that dynasty still

possessed 5,696,989 households of 13,206,532 mouths, and that in 1276 the Emperor formally "handed them over" to General Bayen. In 1278 the conquest of Chang-chou (Zaitun) and the surrounding parts brought in about another million households. An idea of the fearful slaughters which took place in those times may be gained from the statement in 1282 that Sz Ch'wan was found to contain only about 120,000 households. This is accentuated in 1285, when we are told that "Sz Ch'wan and the Kwang Tung coast districts are but sparsely populated." In 1293 the number of households is put down at 10,402,760, without any further explanation: possibly the disastrous wars against Japan, Annam, and Java may have stopped further increase. In 1294 the conquests and annexations on the Burmo-Tibetan frontier added 900,000 households to this figure. In Kublai's time 5,000,000 cwt. of rice used to be annually sent to Peking. On the whole it seems that during the 1,500 years' interval between the "First Empire" and that of Kublai, in spite of ups and downs, the population had remained stationary: it began and ended with about 50,000,000 souls.

In 1391 the Ming dynasty, which for the first time in 600 years held the Eighteen Provinces under one sway, free from Tartar complications, counted its population at 10,684,435 households, of 56,774,561 adults. In 1393 there were 16,052,860 households, of 60,545,812 mouths. The increase of mouths over adults is not hard to account for; but, unless we assume a new or the recrudescence of an old habit of living apart from the paternal roof, it is difficult to explain the sudden upward movement of households. This year the equivalent of 140,000,000 acres were cultivated, and it is distinctly stated that "most of the land in the empire is now under tillage."

In 1491 the population went down to 9,113,446 households of 53,281,158 mouths; and in 1578 it figured at 10,621,436 households of 60,692,856 mouths. The explanation is given that (apparently in order to escape excessive taxation) "a habit had grown up of seeking the protection of rich persons, of living in boats, and of pretending to be workmen or traders."

The Manchu Government, which has issued incomplete revenue returns from the first year of its existence (1644), was not ready at all until 1651 with its population and land-tax statistics. At the end of that year there were 10,633,326 households. We may assume that the conquest of the Eighteen Provinces was practically complete in 1657, up to which date the number of householders had increased by one or two million each year, until they reached over 18,500,000. Various wars and disasters kept the figures steady up to 1708, when for the first time an excess over 21,000,000 was recorded. The financial condition of China was then so prosperous that the Emperor, in the fulness of his heart, took to remitting the whole land-tax from time to time, each province taking its benefit in turn. The total cultivation had reached about 110,000,000 acres; that is, counting bad and good land together, land-tax upon the total area (possibly 150,000,000 or 200,000,000 acres) upon which it was due from 24,600,000 householders, was gathered in *calculated* at the rate of so much an acre of good land. The Emperor determined that the sum thus derived (not quite 30,000,000 taels, or ounces of silver) was a sufficient charge upon the land; arguing that, no matter how the population might increase in the future, the same land, now for most practical purposes all of it cultivated, would in the same future have to feed two, three, or even ten persons, instead of the one as now; which meant that the

struggle for life would be greater, and each individual's power to pay taxes would therefore proportionably decrease. Accordingly, from the year 1713 the returns of "adults and mouths" was accompanied by a subsidiary return of "free ones." By 1734, the last year for which returns are published under this system, the "free ones" had increased to 937,530, whilst the other two categories remained pretty much as they were in 1712.

The words "adults and mouths" so vaguely used together now, as they were used separately under previous dynasties, must have meant in combination "tax-paying households"; for, on his accession in 1735, the Emperor K'ien-lung set about devising a more intelligent system. He said: "What is the good of recording taxable units which never increase, and free units which pay no revenue? I want to know how many human beings there are." Consequently from 1741 to 1851 we have year by year a steadily mounting return of souls, beginning with 143,411,559, and ending with the maximum of 432,164,047. If attention be paid to the methods by which I have endeavoured to extract principles and conclusions from the above defective evidence, it will be seen that the population of China cannot at any time have much exceeded 100,000,000 souls until the beginning of the eighteenth century. By the year 1762 it had overtopped 200,000,000; and so on, doubling itself every century; so that we are probably right in concluding that it only reached 50,000,000 in 1644 when the Manchus took over the power; that is, it much more than doubled itself during the century 1650-1750, despite all wars and tribulations.

During the first years of the great Taiping rebellion (1856-60), the registered population declined by two-fifths; but, though many millions must have perished, it

is not at all likely that the numbers of 1851 were more than literally decimated.* Even then, to kill or starve 43,000,000 people in ten years, would mean 12,000 a day, in addition to the 40,000 a day who (at the rate of 30 per thousand per annum) would die naturally, and would balance about the same number of births. Moreover, the rebellion only covered one-half of the total area of China, so that 24,000 a day is certainly nearer than 12,000: in other words the death-rate was nearly doubled, and in any case, from first to last, there never has been any direct evidence as to what the population of China is or has been except the Chinese official statements. I have now shown that these hang fairly well together, in spite of all defects both in quality and in quantity. We may accept them or reject them; but it is unreasonable to accept only so much as may fit in with our own preconceived notions, and then reject all the rest. The mere opinions of Europeans are therefore worthless, so far as they conflict with specific evidence.

I give here a table in two columns showing the population of each province in 1842 and 1894—that is, before the Taiping rebellion, and since China has recuperated her forces. For convenience sake I ignore fractions over or under 100,000 as being unessential to the main question. It is notorious that Cheh Kiang, Ho Nan, Kiang Su, and Kiang Si suffered most by the Taiping revolution, so that

* In a pamphlet entitled *Population and Revenue of China*, reprinted from *Olia Mersiana*, 1899; and in a paper published in the *Royal Statistical Society's Journal* for March in that same year, I have given further specific evidence bearing upon statistics, and have also discussed the question how far the Taiping rebellion of fifty years ago affected the population. I need not repeat all the arguments here. The same pamphlet gives statistics from Russian sources showing what the population of each province was in 1894. But these statistics, which I have critically examined by the light of recent famines and other disasters were in their turn all obtained from the Chinese official tables.

we need not marvel at their comparative backwardness. Shan Si suffered from a terrible famine in 1877-8. Kan Suh and part of Shen Si were ruined by the Mahometan rebellion of 1860-75. Sz Ch'wan calls for special remark: we have seen that in Kublai Khan's time it had already been once depopulated, whereas all visitors to the celebrated Ch'êng-tu plain certify to its being at the present moment one of the richest and most populous spots in China, and this plain alone (the only large plain in the province) must cover an area of 3,000 square miles.

Name of Province.	1842.	1894.
An Hwei	36,600,000	35,800,000
Chêh Kiang	30,400,000	11,800,000
Chih Li	36,900,000	29,400,000
Fuh Kien	25,800,000	25,200,000
Ho Nan	29,100,000	21,000,000
Hu Nan	20,000,000	22,000,000
Hu Peh	28,600,000	34,300,000
Kan Suh	19,500,000	9,800,000
Kiang Si	26,500,000	22,000,000
Kiang Su	39,600,000	24,600,000
Kwang Si	8,100,000	8,600,000
Kwang Tung	21,100,000	29,900,000
Kwei Chou	5,700,000	4,800,000
Shan Si	17,100,000	11,100,000
Shan Tung	36,200,000	37,400,000
Shen Si	10,300,000	8,400,000
Sz Ch'wan	22,300,000	79,500,000
Yün Nan	5,800,000	6,200,000
Rough totals	419,600,000	421,800,000

During the rebellions which ushered in the Manchus 250 years ago, the depopulation was again so complete as to be nearly absolute. When wandering over the province in 1881, I came across innumerable "traditional

proofs" of this fact. Every villager in the province speaks of it as we in England speak of the Great Plague of 1665. Another specific proof is that when, in 1712, the land-tax was made unchangeable for ever, Sz Ch'wan had (with the exception of the four half-foreign and pauper provinces, Kan Suh, Yün Nan, Kwei Chou, and Kwang Si) the lowest land-tax of all—under 700,000 taels, against an average of 1,700,000 for the other provinces. At the rate of proportionate taxation per household, this would give 700,000 households, or about 4,000,000 souls, instead of the 80,000,000 now supposed to be there.

Apart from the fact that Sz Ch'wan has enjoyed comparative peace for two centuries, there was an enormous immigration at the time of the Taiping rebellion from all sides; so that probably some of the losses in the registered population of other provinces re-appear amongst the gain in the officially registered population of Sz Ch'wan. I found, when there, that a stream of immigrants from Hu Kwang (*i.e.* Hu Nan and Hu Peh) and Kiang Si had long been and still was steadily pouring in: I came across but one village where the original population had remained unchanged. As neither Hu Kwang nor Kiang Si has apparently suffered any great drain of population, it seems likely that the desolated provinces still farther east have during troublous times sent streams of refugees into them, which streams have either remained there, or have themselves moved through, or have pushed on before them the original population. Still, all allowances made, it is exceedingly difficult to believe that there are now 80,000,000 people in a mountainous province, the western, north-western, and south-western parts of which are still but very thinly populated by semi-independent tribes. Yet there is other and indirect evidence in favour

of some really great increase in population. Whilst in other provinces no attempt has ever been made to surcharge the land-tax (except in the way of ordinary peculation), in Sz Ch'wan for many years past one "fine" and one "benevolence" have been annually levied on land-owners in proportion to their land-tax: in other words, the official land-tax alone has been more than quadrupled; for these two items, levied only on the richer districts, amount to considerably over 3,000,000 taels a year. There is yet another indirect piece of evidence. Sz Ch'wan is notorious for the fewness of its civilian officials (all of whom, under the universal rule, must go elsewhere to serve): in other words, it is the one province in the Empire where it pays well-to-do persons better to stay at home than to "trade" abroad as mandarins; and that trade, as we all know, is one of the most lucrative in China, and the one patronised by the most highly-educated persons. As an illustration, by exception to what I state as the rule, I may take the case of the late General Pao Ch'ao, one of the very rare instances of a Sz Ch'wan military mandarin of capacity. After all his services, it was found on his death that he had been grossly corrupt, and had made his fortune in a most dishonourable way. However, the Viceroy Liu Ping-chang (himself a corrupt scoundrel, whose disgrace was subsequently insisted on by England) managed to arrange things so that the Emperor did not compel General Pao's heirs to disgorge.

CHAPTER X.

REVENUE

IN an outline work like this it would be unprofitable to enter retrospectively into the whole history of Chinese finance. In the chapter on "Early Trade Notions" I have made a few remarks bearing upon the subject of very early trade and taxes. The chief authority for these observations is the first standard history of Sz-ma Ts'ien, who devotes a special chapter to the Budget; and all subsequent dynastic histories have, in imitation or continuation of this arrangement, consecrated one or more volumes to "Eatables and Goods," which expression practically means "Finance and Trade"; for the radical idea at the bottom of Chinese financial methods is "feeding the people, and feeding on the people": in accordance with this notion all salaries were once calculated in hundredweights of rice. Just as Anglo-Indians now say "he is a 6,000 rupee man" (a month), so did the Chinese once say "he is a 2,000 cwt. man" (a year).

The root of all legitimate taxation has always been a tithe or proportion, in money, kind, or both, of the land's cultivated produce. The salt gabelle (formerly associated with iron licences) has, dynasty by dynasty, taken but a second place in importance. Inland and Foreign Customs always held a subordinate and irregular position until our own days, being viewed rather in the light of the Emperor's personal *fiscus* than of the State's exchequer;

and in any case they are not more than 1,200 years old, even in their infant stage. How the different dynasties rang the changes, sometimes capriciously, upon these three main items of revenue is a matter of antiquarian rather than of practical interest.

We must do the best a short span of life enables us to do, and endeavour to get a good hold of the outlines or principles of Chinese history before we devote our best energies to the elaboration of special details. With these reserves, therefore, I refer to what I have already said in earlier chapters, and dismiss the whole subject of practical finance previous to the present Manchu dynasty, confining myself to a glance at matters as we now find them. Up to 1734 the Board of Revenue's annual budget consisted, on the debit side, of a statement accounting for receipts of—

1. Land-tax in ounces of silver.
2. Grain-tax in hundredweights of cereals.
3. Straw, grass, etc., in bundles.
4. Salt produced in "drafts" (quarters) for retailing.
5. Salt dues on above in taels ($\frac{1}{2}$ tael per draft).
6. Tea in "drafts" (quarters), apparently for export.
7. Copper cash coined from Government copper.

At the beginning of the dynasty the total revenue receipts in money or bullion were under 15,000,000 taels, and in 1656 under 20,000,000. At the same time, the Emperor has left it on record that he was well aware enormous fortunes were made out of the provinces by his conquering generals. In spite of expensive wars, remissions of taxes, and imperial visits or costly tours of inspection, the average expenditure was so much below average receipts that for over half a century (1740 - 90) there was a balance of 60,000,000 or

70,000,000 taels always in hand. It must also be remembered that the international gold value of the silver tael was then nearer eight shillings than the present three shillings, and its local purchasing power was also much greater than at present. If we regard one tael as equivalent in local power to one pound with ourselves, we shall not be far wrong. During this halcyon period, the eighteenth century, the regular receipts may be roughly put down at 40,000,000, and the regular expenditure at 30,000,000 taels; the accumulated balance was only occasionally drawn upon when the annual surpluses were unequal to special demands; but these annual surpluses usually covered the exceptional expenses, just like the "free resources" of Russia are always at hand (in theory at least) to defray unlooked-for charges. But every now and then, under special stress, the sale of titles or office was temporarily resorted to, in order to ease the money market. The following is a specimen of a genuine pre-Taiping budget:—

Receipts.

Reformed land-tax . . .	29,410,000
Profits on salt . . .	5,745,000
Customs [very little foreign] . .	5,415,000
Sale of office . . .	3,000,000
Tea, fish, rushes, mining . . .	322,000
Transfer fees . . .	190,000
Octroi and miscellaneous . . .	858,000
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	44,940,000
Less sale of office (exceptional) . .	3,000,000
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Total ordinary cash receipts (taels)	41,940,000
Hundredweights of grain received (value from Tl. 1 to Tls. 2) . . .	4,841,000
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Total receipts . . .	46,781,000

All the above revenue seems to have gone either actually to Peking, or (indirectly thither) as pay to the central and provincial armies; or to officials; or to services connected with Peking and its armies, such as posts, grain-boats, or mints; or to administrations of other matters associated with the Peking interests, such as repairs to the Canal, to the Peking rivers, the Hwai dykes, or the Yellow River.

Now let us take the corresponding credit side. Out of a total expenditure of 31,000,000 taels, only one two-hundredth part goes in any way directly to the public, and even this trivial sum of 140,000 taels for "educational establishments" probably refers to Peking official colleges, or Manchu schools.

The following is a condensed specimen, then, of a genuine pre-Taiping expenditure sheet:—

Army and army interests	.	.	19,599,100
Salaries, allowances	.	.	4,554,700
Yellow River	.	.	3,800,000
Posts and boats	.	.	2,120,000
Palaces, princes, eunuchs, etc.	.	.	1,309,000
			<hr/>
			31,382,800
Education	.	.	140,000
			<hr/>
			31,522,800

As the number of soldiers included in the above pay total is 800,000, I presume that the 100,000 or so of bannermen at Peking would absorb between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 taels, whilst the 100,000 bannermen in the provinces, *plus* the 600,000 Chinese provincial troops, would require from 16,000,000 to 17,000,000 taels.

The working revenue or expenditure of the provinces, which of course was never reported in detail, and never

appeared even locally on paper in the shape of a budget, was in real fact somewhat as follows:—1,300 *hien* rulers would have to net on the average at least 10,000 taels a year, over and above all allowances, in order to make their own fortunes and those of their superiors. The “allowances and salaries” issued by the Emperor were really held back as security, and very often quietly peculated, by the *hiens’* superiors. These *hien* would also have to spend on the average at least another 10,000 taels a year in order to entertain passing officials of rank, pay the cost of their own maintenance (including police), the salaries of secretaries, etc. Of course some *hien* secretaries would have their tens of thousands, whilst others would only have their hundreds of taels; I only speak of averages. The various customs monopolists would also require 5,000,000 taels a year for their own fortunes, and to defray the cost of presents to the fisc at Peking; scarcely any of the customs receipts went to the *ærarium*, whether local or central. In other words, the 45 or 46,000,000 of official revenue must be at least doubled if we are to get even approximately at the first instalment only of what was really extracted as actual working revenue from the popular bed-rock in a regular way. And all this, again, is quite apart from the irregular tyranny, bribery, peculation, and extortion by special inquisitors, military men, the rapacity of tax-collectors, police, and so on. Anything done for the public good, such as road-making, bridge-repairing, sanitation, charitable establishments, municipal police, local schools, feasts, theatricals, lighting, police—in fact everything except what concerns the Emperor and his service—was, and is, defrayed by local subscriptions or popular rates, municipally or rurally imposed, over and above the imperial and official taxes levied directly or indirectly,

as above described, in the name of the central or local government.

Having now taken a retrospective glance at the principles upon which revenues have been collected and spent in the immediate past, let us endeavour to gain an insight into the working of a contemporary budget:—Towards the end of each year the Board of Revenue, like a distant embodiment of Themis, looks round upon provincial mankind, takes up its files, and sees that the following items of expenditure, in which the Central Government has an immediate interest, are good, and must be defrayed:—

1. Pay and salaries at Peking . . .	8,000,000
2. Palace needs . . .	1,400,000
3. Russian and French frontier armies .	5,000,000
4. Yang-tsze defence armies . . .	3,000,000
5. Navies . . .	1,000,000
6. Provincial armies . . .	20,000,000
7. Yellow River . . .	1,500,000
8. Getting grain to Peking . . .	1,700,000
Railways . . .	—
Arsenals . . .	—
Foreign loans (repaid) . . .	—
New-fangled notions . . .	—
	<hr/>
	41,600,000

It will at once be seen that, even in the good old times of comparative solvency previous to the Japanese war, the expenditure on armies, navies, and things connected with them, had risen within a century from 19,000,000 to 38,000,000 taels; but since 1898, again, both the central and the provincial armies have been improved at great expense, and in spite of disbandings and retrenchments now probably cost much more than 40,000,000.

Hence it has become urgently necessary at once to reduce the 20,000,000 taels wasted upon utterly useless provincial troops; hence, again, discontent and disloyalty. The palace needs have not increased. The Yellow River costs less than it did; not because its condition is better, but because times are worse, and the people must therefore suffer in the shape of extra floods and diminished public works. Posts and boats are never mentioned in these impecunious days; apparently the provinces, whose interests compel them to obtain intelligence, willingly accept the burden themselves. When China was building her own railways in a modest way, and at snail-like pace, the provinces had to send up between them about 500,000 taels a year for that purpose; but when, in 1886, the new Admiralty was established in consequence of the shock caused by the French war, the railway fund was partly diverted to Prince Ch'un, the present Emperor's late father, as Lord High Admiral. Again, when the Japanese destroyed the fleets, and Prince Ch'un was dead, portions of both funds were devoted to "pressing needs,"—in this case to "building a new palace for the Dowager-Empress"; and now a beginning is being made with a new navy, whilst railways have been engulfed in foreign loans, and are being financed by credulous foreign syndicates, so that the Chinese can at least enjoy a good "smash" at some one else's expense (at least in the first instance), to relieve the anguish of their own despair. Arsenals have had an up-and-down life too, the Foochow Arsenal, especially, being regarded as a white elephant, kept up largely in order to please the French; moreover, the recent feverish haste to complete military preparations has transferred most of the engineering and workshop activity to Tientsin and Nanking. Finally, foreign loans, old and new, the repayment of which, and of

interest thereon, absorbs about 25,000,000 taels a year, are entirely a new charge on the revenue. The "new-fangled notions" include concessions, speculations, mills, steamer companies, mints, foreign copper for modern coins, mines, telegraphs, telephones, electricity, etc., some of which pay, and some of which are worked at a loss; in a few cases the central or a provincial government finds itself financially involved in one or more of these. In their heart of hearts the Chinese would like to pitch the whole lot into the sea, and go back to happy old times. And I am not sure that they are not right; "progress" does not seem to conduce to content at all, and, personally, I think there is much to be said for the life of a so-called "barbarian."

It will be seen at a glance that, bad though things were before the Japanese war of 1894-5, matters are infinitely worse now, and the Board has to see that 60,000,000 or 70,000,000 taels are found annually for expenses, instead of the 40,000,000 of the happy old days: this means a corresponding diminution in the "free resources" which used ultimately to find a way into various private pockets. It may be imagined what the result will be when the "Boxer" affair has to be written off, with its damage to foreign investments, compensation for foreign expenditures, and so on.

Well, then, the Board has a fairly shrewd notion of what each province receives or can receive in the way of revenue. Four provinces out of the eighteen require very heavy subsidies to get along at all, and these subsidies practically cover the item "Frontier armies to keep in check the Russians and the French," who threaten the existence of those four provinces. Two rich provinces (Chih Li and Kiang Su) also receive subsidies from other provinces not so rich; not because they themselves are

too poor to pay all, but because in the shape of arsenals, navies, or other expensive organisations they undertake, directly or indirectly, part of the defence of other provinces, which defence those provinces used once to undertake for themselves.

The Board finds that the receipts it can, at this day, count on for the year are (roughly):—

1. Land-tax, in money	.	.	26,000,000
2. Native Customs	.	.	4,250,000
3. Foreign Customs	.	.	22,750,000
4. Profits on salt	.	.	14,000,000
5. Likin	.	.	14,000,000
6. Profits on native opium	.	.	3,000,000
7. Miscellaneous	.	.	3,000,000
Loans and benevolences	.	.	—
Sale of office	.	.	—
Foreign loans (received)	.	.	—
			<hr/>
			87,000,000

This total represents the maximum probable receipts up to the time when the “Boxer” rebellion broke out, and does not necessarily conflict with any other tables given in this chapter. There is even here an excess over ordinary expenditure of 46,000,000 taels, which total still leaves 25,000,000 for the service of loans; 3,000,000 for arsenals; 2,000,000 for railways, palaces, and other novelties; and 16,000,000 for provincial needs.

Things would thus not be so very bad, in spite of parlous times, if all the receipts were paid, in one currency, into one central chest or account (as the Foreign Customs receipts are); and if all payments were drawn in one currency from this one chest, and remitted in one way; but, in the first place, all provinces have two main currencies of pure silver (several “touches”)

and copper cash (several qualities), the relation between which two differs in each town every day. Besides this, each province has its own "touch" and "weight" of a silver ounce; and some provinces use dollars, chopped and unchopped, by weight or by piece, as well as pure silver; and the dollar exchange varies daily locally and centrally in regard to both copper cash and silver. Even this difficulty, which involves an enormous waste of time and energy, and opens the door to innumerable and inscrutable "squeezes," might be philosophically ignored if receipts and disbursements were lumped in one account,—if the venous blood were allowed a free course to the heart, and the arterial blood a clean run back to the extremities. But the Board, which is as corrupt and conservative as the provinces, goes about its business in a very hand-to-mouth, rough-and-tumble sort of way. Instead of saying: "Your receipts are 5,000,000, and your disbursements 4,900,000; send 100,000 to the balance chest," it says:—

"From your land-tax, eight-tenths nominal of which are this year only expected (after deduction made for disasters), 500,000 will be sent for Peking salaries (original), 100,000 for the same (extra), 200,000 for the palace, and 100,000 to make up for shortage in the remittances to Manchuria for 1896. It must arrive (with the usual extras for Board's fees) in part before the seventh, and entirely before the tenth moon. As your salt *likin* is transferred to Sir R. Hart for the service of foreign loans, six-tenths of the ordinary *likin* which used to go to the Manchurian armies must replace the salt *likin* remittances on Peking account, whilst four-tenths will take the place of what used to be repayments on Fuh Kien account, but which since 1886 have been transferred to the appropriation for Yün Nan copper (minus scale and waste). If this be insufficient, the saving of 7 per cent. on the scale for army payments accumulated since 1881 can be temporarily trans-

ferred to the arsenal contribution (subject to discount). The province of Kwei Chou complains that your 6,000 taels a month for its frontier army have not been sent. Sz Ch'wan has been directed to advance the requisite sum; and meanwhile, as Sir Robert Hart has compounded with Sz Ch'wan and Hu Peh for a lump annual sum down instead of collecting their joint salt *likin*, you can direct the Salt Commissioner to send up quickly for the new Tientsin artillery the 200,000 taels a year formerly devoted to the Canton torpedo college."

This picture of Chinese finance is of course an artificial one, slightly exaggerated with an extra tinge of local colour so as to illustrate the hopeless confusion that reigns. Each viceroy or governor disputes every new demand, and it is quite understood that some appropriations are intended to be more serious than others. Some simpleton of an honest man from time to time throws everything out of gear by allowing a truth to escape: the Board never lets a "flat" of this sort score in fact, even though he appear to do so in principle. A governor cannot be expected to show zeal for Yün Nan copper when he knows that the high officer in special charge is making a fortune out of it. On the other hand, the "Board's rice," though a matter of no public importance, is always promptly sent; on the same general ground that a consul, in writing to the Foreign Office, is always very careful to docket his despatches neatly—to avoid a wiggling. It does not do to quarrel with your bread and butter; and underlings at head-quarters can easily put a spoke in the wheel of the biggest man in the provinces if he gets nasty to them.

There are many other absurd results of this rule-of-thumb system. Province A receives subsidies from province B, but, itself owing others to province C, pays B on behalf of C. Thus there are two freights to pay,

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There are many other absurd results of this rule-of-thumb system. Province A receives subsidies from province B, but, itself owing others to province C, pays B on behalf of C. Thus there are two freights to pay,

and two losses on exchange. Sometimes A may be directed even to pay a subsidy to a province B, which already pays one to province A. Funds which might easily be sent by draft are usually despatched in hollowed-out logs of wood, with a guard of soldiers as escort, accompanied by carts, fighting "bullies," and a commissioned officer. Even when sent by draft, there is a charge of 2 or 3 per cent. for remitting, and a commissioned officer is sent to carry the draft—(just as we send favoured officers to carry treaties or news of victory), so that he may gain "kudos" for his zeal. It is pathetic to read the accounts of hundreds of coolies trotting all the way to Shanghai from Shan Si with heavy logs of wood containing silver wherewith to repay the interest on European loans. The extraordinary care and punctuality exacted in matters of form, duty, or national honour are only equalled by the shameless speculation and callous waste of time and money which prevail in personal matters connected with the performance of the same public duty. Officers of high rank, who are known to make 30,000 or 40,000 taels a year out of their posts, gravely work out their balances to the thousand-millionth part of an ounce, forgetting that (even if the clerk's salary were only sixpence a day) the time occupied in counting and subtracting each line of figures would cover, ten thousand times over, the clerk's salary rate per minute. In a word, the whole Chinese financial system is rotten to the core; childish, and incompetent; and should be swept away root and branch. Until there is a fixed currency, a European accountancy in all departments, and a system of definite sufficient salaries, all reform is hopeless to look for.

*Table of Revenue Items for Eighteen Provinces of China
and Three Provinces of Manchuria.**

	Total.
Money land tax	25,967,000
Grain tax, value in money, commuted or not	7,540,000
Native Customs	4,230,000
Taxes of all kinds on Salt, direct or indirect	13,050,000
Foreign Customs Collectorate	22,052,000
Likin, excluding that on salt and opium	12,160,000
Taxes on native opium and opium licences	2,830,000
Miscellaneous undefined taxes, licences, fees, etc.	2,165,000
Duties on reed flats	215,000
Rents on special tenures	690,000
Corvées and purveyances (roughly valued)	110,000
Sale of office and titles	266,000
Subsidies from other provinces	9,282,000
Tea taxes	900,000
Fuel and grain taxes	110,000
	<hr/>
Total	101,567,000

[Native loans and benevolences not included in the

Grand Total, as being exceptional] . . . [6,334,000]

* For fuller particulars, see the reprint from *Otia Mersiana* alluded to in the chapter on "Population."

Table of Total Revenues of each Province.

Name of Province.	Total (including subsidies).
An Hwei	4,033,000
Chêh Kiang	5,786,000
Chih Li	6,360,000
Fuh Kien	6,035,000
Ho Nan	3,235,000
Hu Nan	2,765,000
Hu Peh	7,320,000
Kan Suh	5,946,000
Kiang Si	4,800,000
Kiang Su	21,450,000
Kwang Si	1,730,000
Kwang Tung	7,525,000
Kwei Chou	1,107,000
Shan Si	4,040,000
Shan Tung	4,530,000
Shen Si	2,380,000
Sz Ch'wan	6,050,000
Yun Nan	1,985,000
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Total	97,077,000
Shing King	3,340,000
Kirin	470,000
Tsitsihar	680,000
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Grand Total . .	101,567,000
(Less subsidies from one province to the other)	9,282,000

CHAPTER XI.

THE SALT GABELLE

THE salt industry contributes its share to illustrate for us both the natural principles on which China is divided into provinces, and the continuity of her institutions. It will be noticed from the accompanying map that the areas from which a revenue is derived from salt do not entirely correspond with the political subdivisions of the Empire into groups of provinces. We have the Valley of the Canton River, the Old Region of the Northern Yüeh kingdoms, the Old Kingdoms of Wu and Ch'u, all supplied with sea-salt, extracted and prepared in different ways, according to the natural facilities at hand in each producing place. Then we have the various kinds of well-salt, with or without fuel in the shape of gas, which supply the western and mountainous parts of China, broadly corresponding to the ancient Kingdoms of Shuh, Tien, and K'ien. The lake-salt of the desert competes with the pond-salt of Shan Si for the service of what may roughly be styled the mixed Tartar-Chinese regions. Finally, there are the primitive reed-flats of the north, which serve the needs of the greater part of Old China. These administrative areas will be found to correspond in a general sense with the different stages of Chinese conquest, and with the spread of Chinese influence. A glance at the list of provinces given upon page 4 of the first chapter, and a reference

to the remarks upon Han Wu Ti's annexations, in the chapter on "History," will perhaps assist to make this clearer. A reference to the first chapter will show us that the vast tract called the Two Kwang—that is, West Kwang and East Kwang—being the northern half of the old state of South Yüeh, is simply the delta about Canton, including all the network of streams which in any way contribute to it; the Swatow River system in the east is really by nature and ethnography part of Fuh Kien. Accordingly we find that the sea-salt which is prepared at the dozen or so of places along the coasts is, and since the fourth century always has been, all concentrated under one management. This is the modern administration of the First Class Salt Commissioner at Canton, aided by a Second Class Commissioner for Kwang Si, both subject to the supreme nominal direction of the Viceroy. There are seventeen subordinate mandarins on the staff, and 159 depôts of all kinds, managed by six different "chests" or counting-houses, the ancient head centre of all being, as of old, at Tung-kwan, lower down than Canton, at the junction of the "Great" and the "Lesser" rivers. Owing to financial straits, efforts have been made within the past year or two to stretch the annual yield of excise as far as possible, and it may be now put down at as nearly as possible 1,000,000 taels.

It will be noticed that the head waters of the West River above Peh-seh rise in Kwang-nan Fu (Yün Nan): accordingly this prefecture alone uses Canton salt, and in some way not clearly indicated sends return supplies of copper for the mint. One of the northern tributaries of this West River rises in the township of Ku-chou (Kwei Chou), and in the same way that department gets its salt supplies from Canton, instead of from Sz Ch'wan or the Hwai monopoly. It is not quite so obvious why three

districts in the south of Hu Nan and three whole prefectures in the south of Kiang Si should make two more exceptions, though certainly part of the so-called "North" River rises in the first-named province, and part of the "Small" River in Kiang Si: no doubt there are special local conditions to consider; and in any case the irregularity is nearly a century old, at the very least. For salt administrative purposes the Two Kwang, so far as they are drained into the delta, are divided into two distributions: that of the "Great River" (west of Canton), and that of the "Small River" (east of Canton). The Swatow River rises in T'ing-chou Fu (Fuh Kien), and therefore that large prefecture uses the Canton salt in vogue in the valley of the Swatow River, in preference to the less accessible coast salt of Hing-hwa (Fuh Kien). The island of Hainan is of course included in the Canton scheme, which thus rounds itself off by cutting corners from provinces politically and financially appertaining to rival salt industries.

The salt industry of Fuh Kien, being smaller than that above described, is managed by a Second Class Commissioner and seventeen subordinate mandarins, under the supreme nominal control of the Viceroy at Foochow: this administration (like that of Canton just described, which dates from the organisers of the fourth century of our era) can only be traced historically back to times when a good political hold upon the land had been first obtained by advancing Chinese civilisation (say A.D. 1000). I find that, when changes were made in 1157, the dues produced 80,000 "strings" a year. The number of subordinate salt officers employed in each province depends upon the stage at which the salt leaves official hands to pass through middlemen to the consumers: hence in Fuh Kien it is unusually large. Now that Formosa is

Japanese territory, the development of Fuh Kien salt productiveness is of course further circumscribed, at least officially; but I have no doubt that, with so conservative a people, things continue to run very much in their old channels. During the Taiping rebellion there was a period of spasmodic energy in Fuh Kien, owing to the transport service of the Yang-tsze or Hwai system having become disorganised; but, since then, matters have settled down to a dull uninteresting routine, and very little information of interest now reaches the general inquirer. The total nominal income raised from Fuh Kien salt, which as an article of commerce is supposed not to leave the province at all, is about 500,000 taels a year. As an instance, however, of what goes on behind the scenes in China, I may mention that I once went to the point where the head waters of three provinces meet, and, sailing down several hundred miles to Wênchow (Chêh Kiang), met enormous fleets of Foochow salt boats actually working their way up from behind, as it were, to the northern and inland frontiers of Fuh Kien. From inquiries made I found that a huge trade of 70,000 tons a year was connived at by the sagacious *likin* officials of Chêh Kiang. French statistics place the salt consumption of all Indo-China in 1889 at 150,000 tons, so that my figures may not be far from the mark, having in view the comparative areas of Indo-China and the region served as explained.

Following our way up the coast, we now reach the next province of Chêh Kiang, which, for the purposes of its salt administration, is still divided into East and West Chêh. This nomenclature takes us back to times when one of the Yang-tsze embouchures entered the sea at Hangchow, and a considerable part of the very modern province of Kiang Su was included in the Chêh regions.

In the year 1132, what was called the Hwai-Chêh salt system or systems was put on an Excise basis. From Shanghai, all down the coast half of the province to the Fuh Kien frontier, was the division of Eastern Chêh; and the inner parts, including Chinkiang, Nanking, and Hangchow, was the Western division of the Two Chêh, as already partly explained in the chapter on "Population." Just as in England our ancient dioceses overlap more modern administrative boundaries, so in China, for grain and salt purposes, the obsolete divisions of Kiang Nan and Two Chêh are still in use, though Kiang Nan has become two provinces, and the Two Chêh have become one. As the area of supply is large, there is a First Class Commissioner in charge of it, under the nominal supreme direction of the Governor at Hangchow; and there are thirty-nine subordinates at the various distributing depôts. As in the case of the two industries already described, the salt is nearly all, if not all, sea-salt, collected and treated under varying conditions and in different ways at certain centres along the coast. During the Taiping rebellion this salt also took advantage of the general disorganisation of transport to encroach upon the Hwai monopoly: it went far up the Yang-tsze, and even down the Poyang Lake. But nearly a century back I find "Fychow" (Hwei-chou Fu) in An Hwei, already consuming the West Chêh article, and this exceptional arrangement, which perhaps is an ancient one, is easily explained by taking a glance on a good map at the river system, and reflecting that teas from the same region have been driven within the last year or two by *likin* exactions from Kewkiang to Ningpo. There is another corner of An Hwei province (Kwang-têh), and also a wedge of Kiang Si (Kwang-sin) similarly included in the Two Chêh system, but without the justification in

either case of a river source. All Kiang Su south of the Great River is included, except the extensive prefecture of Nanking. There are special arrangements for the two islands of Tinghai and Ch'ungming, into which, however, I need not enter here, as my object is merely to sketch general principles. Since the Japanese war and the consequent foreign loans, it has been found necessary here and elsewhere to increase the consumers' price of salt, and of course this adds something to the general feeling of discontent and unrest now prevailing in China. In some previous papers upon "Salt" which I have published,* I have under-estimated the revenue for Chêh Kiang at 500,000 taels; but I see from later official documents that it is now put down at nearly 1,000,000, as indeed is only natural, after all, considering the rank and staff of the Commissioner.

The great organisation known as the Two Hwai—that is, the Northern and Southern divisions of the Hwai River (which, owing to Yellow River vagaries, now only exists in a truncated or mouthless condition)—is well worthy the attention of a British syndicate. The more the Yellow River (and fresh water generally) can be kept away, the better for the salt flats; and the Chinese engineers of the Hwai are almost as expert as the Dutch manipulators of the Zuider Zee dykes in regulating the levels of competing waters. It will be seen from any tolerably good map that the whole of Kiang Su north of the Great River and east of the Canal is a dreary flat, and a great portion of this land is very lightly taxed, owing to its brackishness, and to its inability to grow other crops than rushes. Here lie all the celebrated salt flats of the Hwai, and the business distinctions of North and South, whatever they originally meant, now

* *Economic Journal*, March, 1899.

refer chiefly to difference of origin, colour, and treatment in the trade article, together with capriciously demarcated respective areas of consumption, which are apt to vary a little when one or the other kind of salt runs short in its own "preserve." The Nüchên Tartars and the Sung dynasty used to have a customs and salt station on the Hwai. Since the great Taiping rebellion, the whole system has been completely reorganised by a succession of very able viceroys ruling at Nanking. Their chief aim has been how to regain for the Hwai interest the area lost during the wars of 1858-64, and how to establish an *Ausgleich*, or *modus vivendi*, with the immense salt-well exportation from Sz Ch'wan, so as to leave the latter a fair share of the consumers' ground which it rescued from the miseries of "insipid food" during the long Taiping anarchy; and so as at the same time to arrange that the relative prices of the rival salts should not be too high for the indigent people, or too lightly taxed to admit of a substantial revenue; and also that the general revenue systems of the three great Yang-tsze compound states—Sz Ch'wan, the Two Hu, and the Two Kiang (half the area and half the population of all China Proper)—should be sufficiently elastic to provide the usual remittances for Peking, and for the support of their own several armies, navies, and arsenals. In accordance with this complicated arrangement, the Governors of the Hu Peh, Hu Nan (Two Hu); Kiang Su, Kiang Si, and An Hwei ("Two" Kiang); and Ho Nan have no say at all in "high policy" questions of salt: the whole gabelle is under the administrative control of a First Class Commissary at Yangchow, who again is under the supreme "diplomatic" and (in this case rather more than) nominal supervision of the Viceroy at Nanking, who is *de facto*, but not *de jure*, in regular consultation

with the Viceroy at Wuch'ang (Hankow) in matters affecting the *Ausgleich*. Each of the above six provinces (except An Hwei which has none, and Kiang Su which has two) has a Second Class Commissary; and there are thirty-four subordinates, but all attached to head-quarters alone. Thus each province (except An Hwei, which is quite close to both Yangchow and Nanking) has an imperial accountant for purposes of local finance, but no control over distribution. The great central depôt for stored salt is Ichêng, between Chinkiang and Nanking.

It would weary the reader were I to state the names of each producing "yard"; the peculiar system of land taxation modified to suit the producing districts; the way "warrants" are issued to speculators, salt is weighed out, gross and tare distinguished, order of precedence in sales arranged, dues, *likin*, and other charges apportioned, and so on. As the merchants who practically farm the industry have "offered as benevolences" 8,000,000 taels during the past twenty years, over and above the sums which the business is bound under regulation to yield—in other words, as the Government has dared to "squeeze" 400,000 taels a year besides its regular income of 5,000,000 or 6,000,000 taels—it may well be imagined that the wealthy owners of "perpetual warrants" must make a large profit. As many distinguished families invest in this syndicate, just as we Europeans invest in Consols or Rands, there is, of course, a universal conspiracy not to disclose to outsiders the real profits; and, as the Viceroys at Nanking have to defend the interests of their provinces against Manchu rapacity, such profits and revenues as are disclosed to them beyond the regular stereotyped figures never reach the Peking Board's ears officially. Therefore, of course, I

cannot prove by documentary evidence what everyone knows; namely, that this great organisation is capable of great and beneficial developments in honest hands.

Hwai salt, of two main kinds, is consumed in those very limited parts of Kiang Su south of the Yang-tsze not already described as appropriated to the Two Chêh trade; in all Kiang Su north of the Yang-tsze, except the wedge served by Shan Tung; in all An Hwei, except the two corners also above mentioned, and except also in one district (Suh-chou) in the extreme north not drained by the Hwai River, and served from Shan Tung; in that south-east corner of Ho Nan which is drained by the head waters of the Hwai River; in all Kiang Si, except the corners served by the Two Kwang and Two Chêh systems; in all Hu Peh, except (*a*) the extreme south-west corner, where no navigable stream communicates with the Yang-tsze; and (*b*) (to a limited extent, but not as a trade) even in those districts of the same corner which have such navigable communication; also (*c*) only concurrently, since 1870, with Sz Ch'wan salt in the six prefectures west of the Han River; and (*d*) subject to some tolerated encroachments of local well-salt in the extreme north-west. It is also consumed in all Hu Nan, except the parts appropriated to Canton salt; and except in the extreme north, where, since 1870, it runs concurrently with Sz Ch'wan salt; finally, in the four eastern prefectures of Kwei Chou, these being drained by the head waters of the Hu Nan rivers. In a word, Hwai salt serves nearly the whole Valley of the Yang-tsze, up to the gorges and the mountains.

The great Sz Ch'wan salt industry, first organised in 1132, is totally different from all those described, and the brine is extracted from very deep Artesian wells,

which also produce unlimited quantities of hydrogen gas, thus always gratuitously at hand as fuel for treating the salt; in some cases speculators distribute this fuel, like our coal gas, in long pipes.* The interests involved are almost as great as in the case of the Two Hwai, and the secrecy observed (*i.e.* beyond the stereotyped official point) is quite as impenetrable to those not "in the swim." Yet there is only a Second Class Commissary in charge, with seven subordinates; but the Viceroy, who has nominal supervision of the whole, exercises a much more direct controlling influence over the well-salt than does even his sea-salt colleague at Nanking, with whom, as with the Viceroy at Hankow, he has to fight out his financial battles. In wandering over the provinces of Sz Ch'wan, Kwei Chou, and Hu Peh, I had good opportunities for studying the working of this wonderful industry. In many places the salt, especially when of the hard kind like blocks of stone, is practically small money, and its retail value varies unerringly so many fractions of a farthing per pound according to the freight rates of boats in demand, and the number of miles coolies have to walk. A lost traveller could almost grope his way about the country by simply asking the retail price at each village and the next one in any direction. The waste of fuel, of human and beast labour, of time, and of patience is of course gigantic, but it might have serious effects upon the popular economy of the province were machinery suddenly introduced, carriage cheapened, and strict honesty incontinently insisted upon. The nominal yield in taxes to the Government is about 2,000,000 taels a year on salt taken out of 5,000

* I have frequently described these wells at length, but perhaps the condensed account given in *Chambers's Journal* for 1896 is the most accessible to European readers.

Artesian wells actually working (over 8,000 in existence). The reason there are so few officials in charge is that large stocks, which are ignored by the administration when they reach the middleman's hands, can only travel by water; and the water-ways are few, shut in, unconnected by canals, and easily controlled. There is really only one great exit eastwards from Sz Ch'wan, as there is only one from Kwang Si. The salt service of course covers the whole of Sz Ch'wan province, and (concurrently with or independently of the Hwai salt) those parts of Hu Nan and Hu Peh above specified; all Kwei Chou province, except the eastern area reserved to the Hwai system of Hu Nan, and the corner appropriated to Canton as explained; and the north wedge of Yün Nan which communicates *via* Lao-wa T'an with the highest navigable part of the Yang-tsze. The governors of Yün Nan and Kwei Chou have each nominal supervisory control in their own provinces, but there is no Kwei Chou staff at all, and no Yün Nan staff for this particular salt; the Yün Nan officials are there for the management of quite another branch, now to be separately described. As to Tibet, which receives from Sz Ch'wan endless human caravans of tea by way of Ta-tsien-lu and Kwan Hien, I presume it must also take some of the Sz Ch'wan salt; if it does, I cannot find trace of it, though I see that in 1180 trade with Mrs. Bird-Bishop's tribes was sanctioned. There are some very ancient wells close to Tibet in the extreme west near Ya-chou (the great entrepôt of the tea trade with the Tibetan tribes) which were working 570 years ago; but as Tibet is a brackish and nitrous country throughout, I expect it supplies itself, and needs no Chinese salt. In any case plentiful supplies for the northern frontier can be obtained from Mien-chu city.

In the days, over a thousand years ago, when a Shan

empire ruled in Yün Nan, there was already mention of the local Black Salt-wells, and in Kublai Khan's time there is frequent allusion to trouble with the "barbarians at the salt wells." At the commencement of the Manchu dynasty, their henchman, the satrap Wu San-kwei, was allowed to increase the dues for a time in order to pay his Yün Nan troops; and in our own days the Panthay Mussulmans held profitable possession in their turn. Except in the north corner of the province, devoted to the Sz Ch'wan monopoly, Yün Nan salt is free all over the province (with the further exception of the corner appropriated to Canton) after it has been purchased from the private proprietors of the wells and has paid Government dues; a Second Class Commissary and twelve subordinates manage the business, and the annual yield to government account is about 500,000 taels. Towards the Burmese and French frontiers—at Muang-u for instance—there are a few other unimportant wells, but the population there is too scant and "barbarian" for Chinese officials to make much out of that or any other industry.

We have now nothing left to consider but Old China, all the salt systems above described dating subsequently to our era, at least so far as any known official organisation of them is concerned. I will leave Manchuria out of consideration altogether, as the salt revenue collected there in the twelfth century by the Nüchên officials never amounted to much, and the same may be said of Manchu times, previous to the quite recent reforms* of the Viceroy of Ikotanga (now deceased): indeed, until 1887 salt was free altogether: but even in Nüchên and Mongol times there was some official control of the Liao-yang salt flats. It is hardly necessary, either, to do

* See *Times*, 23rd May, 1898.

more than merely mention Mongolia, which produces no revenue to the Central Government of any kind, salt or otherwise. There is, however, a Mongol-owned salt lake, called Ghilen-tai, in the Desert to the west of the Alashan Mountains, which supplies the wants of what may be called the Great North Road, from the Yellow River at Bao-tu, or at Tokto, where it is discharged from boats and carried east right away to Kalgan and Sün-hwa Fu north of Peking; and also in the other direction north-west to Uliassutai. Some restraint has to be placed upon this Mongol salt, which is almost free in Kan Suh, so as to prevent encroachment upon the Shan Si system. It is by no means improbable that this Lake Ghilen is the identical place mentioned in B.C. 200, and stated to be near modern Lan-chou Fu, where the inhabitants, as I have stated in the third chapter, thrived in the salt and iron trade. The Piebald Horse Pond salt (Hwa-ma Ch'i) from a place just south of the Great Wall, where the Kan Suh and Shen Si frontiers join, has the run of the greater part of Kan Suh, and also part of Shen Si, concurrently with Mongol salt; but the entire revenues derived from both the above industries are exceedingly small; so much so, that the management of them is left to two executive *taotais* in Kan Suh and Shen Si, of course subject to the Viceroy. There are also some wells in South Kan Suh, probably geologically connected with those of Sz Ch'wan; however, the whole of the salt service superficially described in this paragraph rather surrounds than belongs to Old China, which is thus hemmed in on all sides by areas supplied from wells or flats dating from some time subsequent to our era. It is well to note once more how every subject, be it trade, language, salt, or geography, tends to accentuate this one salient point—that the Yellow race or Chinese

are essentially a Yellow River people, and that the disastrous irregularities of that stream are rightly termed "China's Sorrow" in a very special and literal sense.

The oldest salt industry of all is, as we might expect, that of Shan Tung: there is no salt to speak of on the peninsula itself; it is all derived from coast places north and south of it, round about the present mouth of the Yellow River, and about the German "sphere" of Kiaochou. What with the Grand Canal, the River Wei (from Wei-hwei Fu), and the canals connecting the various Yellow River beds, Shan Tung has unrivalled facilities for distribution, and, as might be anticipated, consumes not one pound of any salt but its own. The trade is divided into two branches, called respectively the "warrant system" and the "north and south freights," the latter being half in official hands and half in mercantile, the two working together. The warrants seem to run over the mountainous peninsula and its base, down to the extreme south frontiers. The north freights evidently refer to Shan Tung itself, or the greater part of it; the southern freights to the extraneous parts of Ho Nan, Kiang Su, and An Hwei. The whole administration is under a First Class Commissary and thirteen subordinates, of course under the nominal supervision of the Governor. Up to 1837 the centre of the Commissary's operations was Tientsin, which I suppose means that the Viceroy of Chih Li had until then general supervision over two commissaries; but the distance was found inconvenient, and so in that year the Governor was made supreme responsible chief over his own commissary. I notice that the Mongol dynasty made several similar changes (1260-1338), and recast more than once the organisation established by the Sung house in 1181. I have no doubt the vagaries of the Yellow River often decided

to which administration this or that part of the distribution service should belong. Since the Japanese war the retail price of salt has been raised here, as elsewhere, and efforts have been made to make the dues contribute more money to the public chest. Perhaps the total credited to the Government would now reach 400,000 taels.

In the chapter on "Early Trade Notions" it was mentioned how a very ancient statesman once utilised the charms of woman as a lure to catch the gold of strangers. This man, usually known by his popular name Kwan Chung (B.C. 700-645), was premier of the state of Ts'i (Shan Tung), whose salt business we are now discussing; he was also the first to conceive the notion of a Government monopoly in salt and iron, based upon an average annual minimum consumption per individual of 30 lbs. of salt, and upon the indispensability of ploughshares, axes, pans, knives, and needles. Thus it is plain other people knew how to make money out of salt, iron, and women before the shrewd men of the Ordos Desert. The wealth thus brought to one petty state was shared by the feudatory powers in the vicinity, who soon took to imitating so lucrative a policy. It was under this stimulus that the Sz Ch'wan salt wells were discovered (B.C. 330), and possibly the Ghilen-tai industry also: a large export to the steppes of the Hiung-nu grew up, and to those states as well which were dependent upon Ts'i for their salt supply. By the time the First Emperor came into power, the salt and iron revenues of China had increased twenty-fold. Ever since those days the Shan Tung salt administration has had a steady history, but perhaps rather as an appendage of the one about to be described than as a separate organisation of its own.


The "Ch'ang-lu," or Long Reed system, derives its name from the city Ts'ang Chou, on the Grand Canal

(south of Tientsin), once so called. In 1285 Kublai Khan "once more divided the Ho-kien (Chih Li) and Shan Tung interests," which, as above explained, are really one in working principle. There is now a First Class Commissary at Tientsin, with sixteen subordinates, and the Viceroy (who until recent years resided at Pao-ting Fu) has nominal supervision. The yield is about 500,000 taels a year; but here again the merchants are viewed as a milch cow, and are second only to the Hwai traders in point of yielding capacity, if we may judge by the "loyal benevolences" which are frequently exacted. The latest plan for raising money was to issue "manifest faith" bonds, repayable after a term of years, and bearing interest; of course all loyal officials and salt merchants were expected to subscribe; naturally their exuberant loyalty was too much for them, and most of them have already "begged not to receive interest," and even "protested that they do not want even the capital"; *à fortiori* "recognition in the shape of rank." The Dowager-Empress (Chinese Catherine No. 3) has coyly "whilst vowing she would not consent, consented." The price of salt has been thrice raised one centime a kilo since 1895, and about 100,000 taels have thus been added to the 500,000 hitherto yielded. The service includes all Chih Li, except those parts north of the innermost Great Wall, which use Ghilen-tai salt; and there are special arrangements for the city of Peking. It also covers the whole plain of Ho Nan, except the south wedge belonging to the Hwai system, *i.e.* the level tract bounded on the west by the base of the mountainous triangle served by Shan Si salt, and on the east by An Hwei, Kiang Su, and the small Ho Nan wedge supplied by Shan Tung salt. Thus Ho Nan is rent by many rival salt masters, but has none the less a Second Class Commissary

of her own to look after both her grain and salt interests, and to arrange accounts. The people in the north of China, alternately under Tartar and Chinese rulers, never took kindly to the taxation of salt, which was now abolished and now re-established for various reasons by dynasty after dynasty; but there is specific mention of salt-works near Tientsin when North China became reunited in the seventh century; and a century after that the great financier Liu Yen so developed the Government monopoly in salt that it produced half the total revenues of the empire. It may be mentioned that the "Long Reeds" of the locality bearing that name are useful as fuel for boiling the salt; it is said the ashes of the same reed soaked with sea water are often boiled again.

There now only remains to be examined the very ancient Shan Si salt organisation now known as Ho-tung or "East of the (Yellow) River." The extreme west of China used to consume this lake salt until the Sz Ch'wan wells were discovered, and it remained a Government monopoly until A.D. 506, when the Tungusic dynasty then ruling North China threw open to free exploitation a number of the works. In 924 the Turkish house representing Central China placed an official taxing superintendent over the official ponds of An-yih and Kiai city—names which exist to this day—near what is known as the Lake of Kiai. After the expulsion of the Tartars, the Sung dynasty placed eighteen of the marshes under Government control. In 1010 and 1116 the "red salt" of this locality is spoken of officially. In 1178 the Sung dynasty prohibited the import of Shan Si salt from the Nüchên dominions into Ho Nan. Kublai Khan's villainous "Saracen" (Ouigour) adviser Achmac, mentioned by Marco Polo, increased the dues

very heavily; but still a few ponds were left free to the public. The Manchus merged the salt dues in some districts into the land-tax, so that wherever this took place the people became entitled to free salt. In 1846 the heavy cost of keeping the works in repair led the Government to consider once more the advisability of putting them up to public auction. The result of all this is that Shan Si salt has only a very limited circulation in that province; but it supplies all the western half of Ho Nan—south of the Yellow River only—and the valley of the River Wei in Shen Si. As this arrangement brings it near the head waters of the River Han, great precautions have to be taken to keep it out of the Hwai preserves. There is a Second Class Commissary for the province, who resides at P'u-chou Fu in the extreme south, far away from his nominal superior, the Governor at T'ai-yüan; and he has eight subordinates. The revenue is about half a million taels, and there are perhaps thirty districts possessing salt ponds; so that the whole region must be very saline.



CHAPTER XII.

LIKIN

THE idea of this now notorious tax is repeatedly said to have been conceived in 1849-51 by the *taotai* Yao, then engaged upon certain administrative reform schemes, and his original idea was only to tax tea and salt. But the first mention I can find of *likin* in standard records is towards the end of 1852, when, during the Great Rebellion, ten provinces were called upon to raise extra funds, and Li Hwei, the Governor of Shan Tung, instituted a *lit'ou*, to be contributed by traders. But he at once found that the expenses of collection were barely covered by the receipts. Both the above compound words practically mean a "percentage," or rather "per *millage*," as it is reckoned on thousands; not necessarily one, but two or three per *mille*. The Governor Hu Lin-yih at Hankow about this time instituted such a charge in his province in order to pay the troops operating there against the Taipings. The next thing heard of it is in the spring of 1854, when the Governor-General of the Two Kiang reported the success of the *likien*, or per *mille* "contribution," in certain tracts drained by what is known as the Inner Lower River (north of and parallel with the Yang-tsze, between the Canal and the sea), and suggested its extension to other provinces. In 1855 there were already complaints of extortion at the dozen or so of stations

established one after the other below Yangchow on the Yang-tsze River. In Kan Suh province the new levy proved so full of abuses that it was at once suspended; but general regulations for the empire were none the less drawn up by the Cabinet Council in that year, and the Board of Revenue was officially charged with the duty of promulgating them and exercising general supervision. Thus the tax is an imperial one.

In the summer of 1856 the late Marquess Tsêng's celebrated father, Tsêng Kwoh-fan, then in the field against the Taipings, applied unsuccessfully for permission to devote all or a part of the *likin* collected at Shanghai to the support of the armies operating against the rebels in Kiang Si; it was decided that the presence of foreigners at Shanghai was an insuperable difficulty, and that, in any case, Kiang Su had a prior claim over Kiang Si. In the absence of clearer language, it seems clear that at this stage the Chinese saw full well how far the common-sense interpretation of the Nanking Treaty was an obstacle, and that they would never have dared to place a *likin* on foreign goods had not our own boneless policy stiffened them up to it. The following year, on the recommendation of the Nanking Viceroy Iliang, the Emperor decided against the idea of levying a *likin* over and above the duty on tobacco, on the ground that the traders would be liable to vexatious interference at every place they passed. The levy is here described as an "unfortunate necessity"; so that it is plain that from the beginning the Chinese recognised its unconstitutional nature. In 1858 the Governor of Ho Nan reported the progress in his jurisdiction of the new idea, and was warned not to allow any "undue harassing" of the persons charged with the tax. Meanwhile the Governor of Hu Nan signified his desire to

stop the further levy of *likin* in his province, as being found injurious to trade: the Emperor's answer was ungraciously evasive: "I have no doubt you understand what is right more than most of them: you are no fool." The Nanking Viceroy Ho Kwei, who had expressed doubts about the wisdom of giving encouragements for "contributions" charged upon foreign goods at Shanghai, "in which there might be contraband," was told by the Emperor not to make too much fuss about imaginary difficulties, but to give the usual rewards;—in other words, to sell titles at so much per lump sum collected; which confirms the notion conveyed by the word *kien*,—that the levy was nominally at first a voluntary gift. Mention is made at the same time of *likin* paid at Taku by Canton and Foochow junks entering the Tientsin River, and of *likin* on salt at Tientsin for Sengkolint's in's ("Sam Collinson's") army. In 1859 *likin* was newly established at Chefoo, it having been found that the various junks were beginning to go there in order to evade the charges at Tientsin. Orders were next issued to charge *likin* on native as well as on Indian opium in the interior, and the *likin* per pecul on foreign opium was fixed at Tls. 20, in addition to the Tls. 30 import duty; but the local officials were only allowed to collect the former. It does not here appear who collected the latter, but I suppose the embryo of the Foreign Customs, either under Mr. Wade or Mr. H. N. Lay. At all events, it is quite clear that we gave ourselves away in the Treaty of 1858. At this time allusion is made to *likin* on native opium grown in Yün Nan, "where foreign opium scarcely exists." In 1860 a collection upon trading carts and bullion caravans was authorised at the Shan-hai Kwan—the gate to Manchuria—based on the same rules as that collection made outside the Fak'u Gate of Mukden.

Li Han-chang was entrusted with the collection of *likin* in Kiang Si, where the army of Liu K'un-yih was then operating successfully against the rebels. Chungking *likin* to the amount of Tls. 10,000 was urgently called for as a military aid from Sz Ch'wan. In 1861 efforts were made to keep open the main Chéh Kiang roads, then harassed by Taipings, so as to facilitate the collection of *likin* from passing traders. The belated *likin* accounts of Kwang Si were also called for, and orders were given to rearrange the multifarious *likin* charges in Kiang Nan.

The above precise information all comes from the original decrees forming the basis of published Manchu history, and I have thought it well to quote the facts chronologically, in order to trace the historical growth of *likin*, which in its origin may be defined as "one per *mille* unwillingly levied under stress of exceptional circumstances upon a limited number of luxuries in transit." Specific mention is plainly made of collections in the majority of the provinces, and it is evident that if the Chinese Government has subsequently taken an ell, it is largely because we ourselves tacitly abandoned inch after inch; at the same time, it must be admitted that we are partly responsible for the financial straits which have necessitated the irregularity.

Since 1861, during the forty years' nominal reign of the two boy emperors under the tutelage of Chinese Catherine No. 3, things have gone from bad to worse. We are all familiar with the howl of despair which our merchants and consuls have raised at every port, and have steadily kept up. My revered old chief, Sir Brooke Robertson, at Canton, had a well-defined if mistaken policy, and he was too strong a man with the Foreign Office to be overborne by Sir Thomas Wade.

He said we were taking away from the wretched mandarins—who, if corrupt, were none the less victims of a system which gave them no adequate pay—their accustomed local revenues, and were leaving them no chance of reasonable gain; that therefore he would do nothing in the matter: and nothing ever was done at Canton till he retired and died. What he meant was that, as the Foreign Customs pays in all its money to the credit of Peking, and Peking appropriates very little of it to salaries or provincial uses, the local authorities must have some new means of oiling the administrative machine. To understand his theory, which is really a very just one, reference must be made to the remarks made in the chapter on "Revenue." Not one cent of anything Peking can get hold of is ever voluntarily given up by Peking to any person for any purpose except what concerns, directly or indirectly, the interests of Peking. The Foreign Customs, of course, interfered greatly with the development of the native collectorates, which were always regarded as the great plums of Palace favour; and if the Hoppo of Canton—to take one as an example—could not recoup the million or so of dollars he had paid for his post, how could he send a regular stream of gold watches and chocolate creams to his patrons of the Seraglio? Not only so; the Taipings had ravaged the greater part of the country, and the rebellion had seriously reduced the yield of the land-tax. If the *hien* had no longer any "superfluity" on the land-tax, how was he to grease the prefect's palm, the prefect the *taotai*'s, the *taotai* the treasurer's and the judge's, and so on up to the Governor, the Viceroy, the Board, and the eunuchs, not to say the Emperor and the Empress-Dowager? I do not defend the Chinese system; but I say we must put a little human nature into our con-

demnation of it. How are you to make bricks without straw? or, as the Chinese say: "How make a meal without rice?"

It must be remembered that Peking and the provinces are, though competing rivals, still one great "trust" or "combine" for all matters connected with the great national industry of raising the wind. A *hien* to-day may be a secretary of state to-morrow. The mandarins are the skilled "hands" in a big co-operative scheme, and they will either change the foremen or strike, unless reasonable compromises are made with them. Moreover, the "boss" himself accepts presents, not to mention his mother and his wife; and above all the gang of hermaphrodite servants in the household. Finally, the people themselves are "in it," for China is purely republican, and any industrious man but a barber or a comedian may become a viceroy. It is like an exaggerated Tammany Hall, nearly every one says (or the majority say): "All right, we know all that; reform is necessary, but give me my share of the good things in the meantime." Yet there have not been lacking officials who have taken a higher view. In 1879, when the national conscience began to wake up, and the sale of office was abolished in view of renascent prosperity, it was seriously proposed to abolish *likin* too. However, Yellow River and other disasters and complications soon drove the Government once more to the sale of titles, and sometimes of real office; so *likin* had perforce to remain.

I may perhaps meet a want if, having given a general sketch of the theory and practice of *likin*—which has now magnified its net and narrowed its meshes so that almost everything in the Empire is taxed which is in transit, either inwards or outwards, by land or by water

—I endeavour to point out specifically, province by province, where the mischief lies.

1. An Hwei.—The *likin* office at Wuhu has three branches, which command the trade routes to all that part of An Hwei south of the river. The Native Customs of Wuhu have also three sub-stations, but I am not certain if they are identical with the *likin* stations. In the years when the export of rice to other provinces on a large scale is authorised, Wuhu collects as much as Tls. 400,000 *likin* on grain alone. In order to escape *likin* on the Wuhu and Kewkiang routes, the “Fychow” (Hwei-chow) teas of South An Hwei have lately been driven to Ningpo and Hangchow.

2. Chéh Kiang.—The routes of distribution are nearly all by river or canal. Both in the north and in the south the merchants manage to square the *likin* officials; notably so at Hangchow, where the enormous piece-goods trade is shrouded in mystery; and on the Wénchow River, where a vast illicit salt trade is winked at. In 1884 the Emperor was informed that half the *likin* of this province was peculated: in that year every foreign house at Wénchow but mine was burnt by the mob; but no trouble was made: cash for all concerned was subscribed in the province within a few days of the “row.” In the spring of 1900 it was admitted that *likin* was the chief source of provincial revenue, and now considerably over Tls. 2,000,000 a year in value. Quite recently we hear complaints of the general clogging of trade by the action of *likin* authorities, and of persistent refusals to issue transit-passes in certain specified cases.

3. Chih Li.—Until recently I thought there was little or no *likin* here, but in 1898 an official statement put the Tientsin and Ta-ming Fu collections at Tls. 160,000, and last spring the “Grand Inquisitor” Kangi reported that

Native Customs "and *likin* together" could easily raise Tls. 370,000 a year more than had been customary. There are certainly charges of this kind at Kalgan, and at the Tu-shih K'ou Pass in the Great Wall; but, on the whole, I think we must give to the much-abused Li Hung-chang credit for a wise trade policy during the twenty-three years of his viceroyalty.

4. Fuh Kien.—It is a matter of notoriety that *likin* has almost killed the tea trade of Amoy. Even at Foochow cheap tea has to bear (together with export duty) a *likin* burden of 35 per cent. on its value, and every package of foreign goods taken half a mile from the "settlement" across the bridge into the city has to pay: no imports and no exports are exempt from the levy. Fuh Kien and Kwang Tung are the two provinces where *likin* is most oppressive, and where foreign custom-houses are most numerous.

5. Ho Nan.—Perhaps it is partly because there are no foreign ports in this province that *likin* is very light, and such as it is, it is nearly all on native opium. It is important to note that, in a province where the Governor can freely handle his own revenue, he observes the warning given to him in 1858, and does not harass the traders.

6. Hu Nan.—Here, again, there has not been, so far, any direct Foreign Customs complications to deal with; the *likin* is very moderate considering the wealth of the province, which possesses everything of its own but salt; and in any case only the half of it is levied on general merchandise: the rest is charged on salt and opium. In 1896 the Governor objected to increasing his *likin*, as being a clog upon trade.

7. Hu Peh.—This is one of the worst *likin* provinces in China, as well it might be, with three Foreign Customs

establishments to deal with, and after remaining in Li Han-chang's clutches for a great number of years. He himself was officially accused about twenty years ago of the grossest peculation in *likin* matters. He evidently "opened the appetite" for it (as the Chinese say) in 1860. Still, the tea trade does not seem to be much injured by it, for it is the interest of Hu Peh to compete with the Kewkiang line of taxing stations, which only benefit Kiang Si province; moreover, salt can easily be got at and cornered at Ichang and Hankow, whether it comes from Sz Ch'wan or from the sea; and in any case the trade position of Hankow is so central and so magnificent that it can easily stand a "squeeze." Chang Chi-tung is now engaged on reforms, and he considers *likin* to be his chief source of revenue; it cannot now fall far short of 2,000,000 taels, apart from salt and opium.

8. Kan Suh.—As we have seen, this province had a short but inglorious *likin* career in 1854, and even now the trifling *likin* does not pass through the Treasurer's hands: the *taotai* at Lan-chou Fu manages it, in the same way that the Ning-hia (Kan Suh) and Fêng-Pin (Shen Si) *taotais* manage the salt. The custom-house at Kia-yüh Kwan for Russian trade has been a failure ever since its establishment about fifteen years ago: if, as I suppose, the brick tea from Hankow passes this way, it does not pay duty like tea exported by sea. The Great Wall ends here, and practically there is no foreign trade; hence no *likin*.

9. Kiang Si.—This has always been an exceedingly troublesome *likin* province so far as foreign trade is concerned, but of late the transit-pass system has worked without the former friction; yet the authorities still decline to permit the "extensions" so successful in

Chinkiang, and which Mr. McLeavy Brown devised in 1878, much to the advantage of the donkey-skin trade. The natives easily "arrange" about their exclusively Chinese pottery export, and the officials are forced by the competition of Hankow, Ningpo, and Canton to be moderate in reference to tea; for, on one occasion, as stated in the chapter on "Salt," I visited a point within a few miles of which three river sources take you straight by boat to Kewkiang, Foochow, Ningpo, and Wênchow: by crossing one single pass on foot in South Kiang Si, you can also sail to Canton. The stress of circumstances has, since the Japanese war, compelled the local government of Kiang Si to increase by 20 per cent. the *likin* on spirits, tobacco, tea, and sugar. Apparently this refers to local consumption only.

10. Kiang Su.—The Shanghai, Chinkiang, and now the Nanking Foreign Customs give the *likin* authorities plenty to think of. The transit-pass system is very active, and Chinkiang taps the whole of the northern An Hwei trade. But the River Viceroy's collecting stations in the Yüan-kung P'u neighbourhood are a great nuisance to traders, and all along the Grand Canal and about Hwai-an Fu the *likin* pests are a severe clog upon trade. The chief haul in this province is obtained from the Su-Hu (Soochow and Shanghai) group of stations; Nanking (on grain only) contributes in money value about a quarter of what these two do. The Chinkiang grain export hinges on what Wuhu does, and *vice versa*. The Viceroy and Governors of the Two Kiang rely chiefly upon *likin* for the support of their armies, and the "Boxer" raids have had the effect of accentuating their differences of opinion as to whose claims were best.

11. Kwang Si enjoyed fine times during the prolonged

period of Sir Brooke Robertson's *non possumus* administration. Being a mountainous province, its trade was absolutely confined to the rivers, which all but one converge directly or indirectly at Wu-chou Fu. As I have pointed out under "Salt," this place is the same sort of bottleneck exit from Kwang Si that K'wei Fu is from Sz Ch'wan, and the glory of both places has departed since the opening of Wu-chou and Chungking. Though situated in a poor province, even in 1885-6 this head-station was able to contribute 300,000 taels a year towards the army; and enormous fortunes were made by the officials there. In 1856 the levy was increased by 100 per cent., and, as we have already seen, the officials were remarkably chary of sending in their accounts: at that date they took 1,000,000 taels a year; but when the Taiping rebellion was over, this sum was reduced by 50 per cent. once more, and twelve stations were abolished. The inland "port" of Lungchow concerns the French alone, and their own transit system through Tonquin is not such as to justify their finding much fault with that of China. The Nan-ning trade, which I find mentioned in the sixth century, will ultimately go by way of Pakhoi, Hanoi, or Wu-chou, accordingly as the incidence of French or Chinese taxation *en route* clogs or facilitates commerce; in any case it will be chiefly with Hongkong. An idea may be formed of how the trade of this province is controlled by running the eye on a good map over the following stations: Kwei-lin, P'ing-loh (one river); Yüh-lin (Pakhoi River); K'ing-yüan, Lin-chou (another river); Nan-ning, Peh-seh, Sz-ch'êng (a third river), and Sin-chou, Wu-chou (near the east frontier). According to Consul Brennan, the Canton head-office has a list of eighty stations, some of them thirty years old, and a tariff

embracing 700 articles. A few transit-passes for cassia were issued at Canton in 1886, but the French war of 1884 had necessitated new taxes. As these taxes crippled trade severely, the then Viceroy, Chang Chi-tung, abolished them. But in 1890 the redoubtable Li Han-chang, whose career, it will be remembered, began with *likin*, and who, everyone thought (and hoped), had long retired from the public service for good, appeared upon the scene, and corruption of the worst kind at once set in afresh: the extra taxes just abolished were more than renewed, and transit-passes had therefore to be resorted to perforce for taking cottons and kerosene up country at paying rates. This proved a great success, and since then, although there is still a great deal of mischievous vexation and nagging, coupled with attempts to establish "destination taxes" and such charges as a sort of counter-vailing measure, imports have been able to avail themselves of treaty privileges so long as they first reach Canton by steamer and not by junk; but native merchants are still afraid of bringing down produce in their own names under transit-pass; still, whenever they are applied for they are at once granted. At the new port of Wu-chou they avail themselves of foreign names in the old Chinkiang style. I am proud to be able to record that in 1892 we routed a combination of Li Han-chang and Chang Chi-tung upon the great "pig question" which then shook the Hoihow world. In 1899, in consequence of Kangi's inquisitorial visit, seven of the *likin* stations converging upon Canton were called upon to pay 164,000 taels a year more than hitherto.

12. Kwang Tung.—Canton is, of course, in this province, but its transit-pass existence is rather bound up with Kwang Si and the provinces beyond; hence I have already partly discussed it. Swatow, however, belongs

to an entirely different river system (Han). In the old pre-Convention days opium *likin* gave some trouble; but, as at Canton, no transit-passes to speak of were used until 1898, when an attempt to browbeat the cotton import led foreigners to counter-manceuvre and assert their treaty rights, which are at this moment in full vogue. Pakhoi, in the extreme south-west of Kwang Tung, has now firmly established both export and import transit-pass working arrangements, and the same may be said of the island of Hainan, which also belongs politically to Kwang Tung, and is the Chicago, or "porkery," of the Far East. In 1899 both export and import transit-passes were used in numbers more than double those issued in 1898. At the new port of Samshui (including Kongmun and Kumchuk), the native traders are no longer afraid of taking out passes in their own names. Before leaving north for "Boxer" reasons, the last Viceroy, Li Hung-chang, took a very important step by compounding with the "seventy-two hongts" for the total abolition of *likin* throughout the province, in consideration of one lump payment of \$4,000,000 a year. It is too soon to judge of the success of this far-reaching change; but as Kwang Tung *likin* has never yet officially appeared for more than 800,000 taels (say \$1,000,000) a year, this contrast is interesting as showing how large a sum the merchants can really afford to pay in exchange for complete liberty of action, and also how easy it would be to abolish *likin* throughout the Empire by giving a fair share of the taxes to the local administration.

13. Kwei Chou.—The *likin* of this poor and remote province is insignificant so far as revenue is concerned, but it is very troublesome to trade. There are three or four competing trade routes by way of Hankow

(through Hu Nan and the River Yüan, or through Sz Ch'wan and the River Kung-t'an), Canton (Peh-seh and Hing-yih), and Chungking (either by the Sung-k'an River or the K'i-kiang River); so that the *likin* officials have to moderate their demands in each competing quarter.

14. Shan Si.—Since 1896 spirits and tobacco have been taxed, and this year it is said that the charges are to be doubled. The other *likin*, which is distinctly stated to date from 1859, appears to be chiefly levied on salt and opium. Apart from the fact that Shan Si has no port, the absence of practicable roads makes *likin* difficult of collection, even if such apologies for roads could carry a sufficient traffic. The one land road, east to Chêng-tung in Chih Li, is not much used, and will not in any case support a large traffic in its present primitive condition: it is recorded in 645 that the T'ang Emperor used this road in travelling back from Corea to Si-an Fu, by way of the Shan-hai Kwan (Sept. 1900, in the allied occupation). Tientsin is the port of supply for Shan Si, and the usual route chosen is *via* Kalgan and Abbé Huc's road, described in the chapter on "Trade Routes." There seems to be no other alternative but for goods to traverse the one main road running north and south through the heart of Shan Si, and then get on to the Grand Canal by way of Wei-hwei Fu and the River Wei. So far as I can learn, no obstacles are placed in the way at Tientsin by *likin* collectors.

15. Shan Tung.—The *likin* of this province is very insignificant, the Foreign Customs at Chefoo being quite "out of it," and merely the trade focus of a few mule tracks. Tientsin is really the port of all but a fraction of this province; and even Shanghai is so more than Chefoo. It is too soon to speak yet of Kiao-chou. If the Germans would only show to us half the liberality

with which they are treated at Hongkong, and handle the Chinese coolies without harshness, they might easily obtain both our co-operation and the Chinese goodwill; but I notice in the *Japan Mail* that the trade is already falling off.

16. Shen Si.—The *likin* was insignificant previous to 1894, but since that date it has been gradually rising, and now the charges on tea and sugar have been raised 20 per cent., in order better to meet the heavy charges for foreign loan services.

17. Sz Ch'wan.—*Likin* is very heavy, and easily collected on all river routes. For example, down the Min (Chinese Upper Yang-tsze) River, Tibetan wool has to pay at half a dozen barriers before it reaches Chungking. Wherever there is a good chance by land, foreign imports are promptly *pincés* too; as, for instance, at the capital of Ch'êng-tu, which commands a rich plain, and throttles all produce at its gates. One of the consequences of there being no canals anywhere except in the Ch'êng-tu plain is that a great deal of trade is carried on over mountain roads, in order to avoid *likin* exactions. I have daily passed or met thousands of coolies trotting along with salt, opium, and solid silver for local towns—in Hu Nan, or to Hankow and Mien Chou—bringing back loads of cotton and silk: many a “lark” have I had with them on the roads, or in the frowsy inns. Previous to the opening of Chungking there were incessant complaints about the irritating action of *likin* barriers, but now things are running much more smoothly. I lived there a year, and the people at last did me the honour to “go for” me as a wizard and an “infernal” man. It may be of interest to know that the celebrated K'wei Kwan taxing station at the upper end of the gorges first began to levy duties on tea in the year 1154.

18. Yün Nan.—Although the “ports” of Sz-mao (Esmok) and Mêng-tsz are open to trade, the interior economy of this province is not much affected thereby: as in Kwei Chou, the charges, though strict, are definite, and, in the case of Yün Nan at least, frank goods for the whole province. The two chief trade routes are with the Yang-tsze, *viâ* Lao-wa T'an, and with the Canton River, *viâ* Peh-seh. French transit through Tonquin is a greater horror to the Chinese traders than even Chinese transit through China; but of late even the French have seen the foolishness of killing the goose with the golden eggs, and the Red River transit is growing in popularity.

19–21. A few years ago the Tartar General and Viceroy Ikotanga greatly reformed the various charges in Manchuria which correspond to the *likin* of other provinces; but with the advent of the Russians and the railway everything is being changed and remodelled. Previous to 1891 no transit-passes were ever taken out, for the inland charges were very light; and even since the reforms, which were pointed rather at speculation than at increase in taxation, I do not notice that there have been any complaints in any of the three provinces.

Having now glanced at the general effect of *likin* upon trade, I may perhaps be permitted to express a personal opinion that the merchant guilds of each province would probably be only too glad to imitate the example of Canton, and pay a fixed sum of from 1,000,000 taels to 10,000,000 taels a year to the Government, according to wealth, provided that no *likin*, octroi, fees, or any charges whatever were, under any pretext, levied on either imports or exports, except at the treaty-ports and by the Foreign Customs. It would also pay foreign commerce well to agree to a general increase of duties under the same conditions. But, hand in hand with these two

reforms, which would at once restore the financial equilibrium of the Empire, out of the 100,000,000 taels or so thus encashed, at least one-half would have to go towards inaugurating an entirely new scheme of civil service, in which all mandarins, high and low, and all "underlings," should have a sufficient and even liberal salary or wage for work done. For many years to come no accounts should be entrusted to Chinese, and a fixed currency should be at once introduced, so as to get rid of the bugbear of shroffs and compradores. As with the Chinese in Foreign Customs' employ, there is no harm in their merely handling the money and acting as cashiers, so long as Europeans manage the accounts and employ a definite currency, whether it be gold, silver, or copper. A far-reaching reform of this kind would, however, require a man of the calibre of Lord Cromer, and the best part of his lifetime at that. Unfortunately national jealousies render such a scheme next to impossible, the more so in that no country except England has a financial system, even of her own, which is based upon sound principles. A few hard-headed Scotchmen are badly wanted as chartered-accountants; a few Ulster Irishmen as managers and masters of "blarney"; and one or two genuine Englishmen (Lancashire, of course, by preference) to see fair play.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE ARMY

AT the present time, when the whole civilised world, so to speak, is arrayed in arms against China, the question of her armaments is of unusual interest. But it is no easy matter to pourtray the existing army from any point of view whatever. First of all, there is the old Manchu military organisation into "banners," or army corps, extended after the conquest so as to include the Mongols and a few faithful (or traitor, accordingly as we may look at it) native Chinese. The late Sir Thomas Wade with infinite pains drew up about forty years ago a full analysis of this system; but at present it is practically obsolete for the effective purposes of war, and therefore not worth describing in detail. Yet it may be useful, whether the Manchu dynasty disappears before the "Boxers" or not, to put on record the main features of the formidable aggregation which sufficed to overrun China 250 years ago.

There is no doubt that the principles of military organisation perfected by the Manchus were conceived in the same general spirit and form as those of their ancestors the Nüchêns, who imperially ruled North China from 1113 to 1234; and these latter again drew part of their inspiration from a distantly allied race called the Kitans, who had ruled much the same territory as northern emperors, and on an equal foot-

ing with the rulers of South China, from 907 to 1112. As modified by the early Manchu chieftains and emperors, the organisation is as follows:—

There are eight Manchu banners, in pairs of four colours (plain and bordered), three banners being of higher caste than the other five, like the three Kitan "superior tents." Thus, with the assimilated Mongols and the descendants of "faithful" Chinese, there are twenty-four banners, numbering in all from 200,000 to 220,000 men. Just as every ordinary Chinaman belongs to a *hien*, and has his domicile registered in the office of his "father and mother mandarin," so every bannerman belongs to what the Manchus call a *niuru*, and has his military domicile registered at the head-quarters of his colonel, who thus stands in the same (or a somewhat similar) patriarchal relation to his military people, be they princes, officers, or common troopers, as does the magistrate to his civil population. About 150 years ago, when the banner organisation was at its best, there were 679 Manchu, 227 Mongol, and 264 Chinese colonels (or *tsoling*, the other current name for the Manchu *niuru*), each in theoretical command of 300 families (troopers); but the actual total has always been at about two-thirds of the theoretical, and the natural increment of able-bodied men has from economical considerations been drafted off into the categories of expectants, supernumeraries, and so on, drawing less or no pay. With this limited force of archers and spear-men China was conquered, for artillery was only used on rare occasions; but of course local troops had even from the first to be forced or cajoled to assist the comparatively small bodies of bannermen, who acted rather as "stiffeners" than as the main body, just as the bulk of our Indian and African armies are of native races, merely

"stiffened," in the proportion each emergency requires, with a backbone of British soldiers. The *élite* of the banner forces, always more than half, has from the first served to hedge in majesty at and around Peking; but at certain vital provincial centres, such as Canton, Foochow, Hangchow, etc., banner garrisons with their families, forming a sort of hereditary privileged caste within the inner walls, have been kept under a Tartar General, theoretically in order to "keep down" the turbulent "Man-tsz" or Chinese, and to hold the keys of the city gates. The feeding of these privileged soldiery is a first charge upon the revenues of China, and it is thus only natural that so expensive an incubus should severely test the loyalty of the Chinese majority not enjoying any such banner privileges. For many years past 7,000,000 taels has been the fixed "first" appropriation for those at Peking alone, and a "supplementary" vote of at least 1,000,000 usually follows. As all this money comes from the provinces, *à fortiori* the latter have to find the money for their own local bannermen and for the Chinese armies as well. If the finances of China, so flourishing 100 years ago, had not been shattered by a succession of rebellious and foreign troubles; if these bannermen had maintained their military virtues, and their robust simplicity and manliness, the Empire would neither have felt the burden severely, nor grudged the necessity of this heavy charge: the preservation of order, and a national sense of pride in power and prestige, would have amply compensated for the price paid to a few privileged keepers of the peace and the purse-strings; just as in India the taxpayer has some satisfaction, in the shape of security for person and property, to show for the (to him) huge salaries he pays to his British conquerors. But, unhappily, the otiose bannermen, both at Peking and in the provinces, have

degenerated into idle, flabby, and too often opium-smoking parasites; they have neglected even to keep up their archery, which in any case is useless in these days of magazine rifles, though it might have nourished a wholesome muscular force if persisted in. In the provinces they are often, practically, honourable prisoners, rigidly confined within the limits of the city walls, in the midst of a hostile population speaking a dialect which bannermen must learn in addition to their own if they wish even to purchase a cabbage in the streets; and the Tartar General, who nominally outranks the Chinese Viceroy, is really often sneeringly regarded as an "old frump," or a "drunken swab." When I was second at Canton, my consul used to say: "Let's go and see the *maiden aunt* on the way to the Viceroy's." I have visited these Tartars and their people at four or five places, besides watching the bannermen closely at Peking, and of course this picture requires different lights and shades according to locality, for there are some excellent Tartar Generals as well as many brave banner soldiers; but in the main it is, I think, correct, or was so until very recent upheavals.

The Chinese army or "Green Banner" is organised in the following way, or was theoretically so organised until the Taiping rebellion and foreign wars necessitated fresh patchwork. As I did in the case of civil government, so do I now with the military administration: in order to leave clearly outlined impressions, I first state the general principles, reserving exceptions and special detail for the end. Each province has a General, in supreme command of the green troops, and in immediate command of a portion of them; his *yamén* is sometimes at the provincial capital, sometimes at a *fu* or other place more strategically important. This officer's rank is one

nuance higher even than that of a viceroy; but in the diplomatic and civil part of his business he has to report and memorialise conjointly with the Viceroy, who (unless the General be a very able man, and charged with very important duty) is often to most intents his superior officer. He has under him from two to six brigadier-generals, each in high command of a brigade, and in immediate command of part of one: their *yamên* is either at a first-class city, or (like that of the *taotai*, with whom they seem to pair off) at some special point where foreigners or other objectionable persons have to be kept down. Both the Viceroy and the General "command" the brigadiers, but the General has a tendency to weaken his rigour into "moving." It all depends upon the real work being done. And so it goes on. Colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, sergeants, and corporals are each in command of greater or smaller bodies of men, stationed in the cities, towns, and markets, and co-operating with prefects, *hiens*, assistant magistrates, and other civilian small fry, down to the village headman. When I was at Kewkiang in 1871, my "boy" was offered a colonelcy, but he rightly felt that to be my cook was more honourable than to storm "th' imminent deadly breach" for the benefit of a mandarin's pocket. Military officers are supposed to ride on horseback, and not sit in sedans, but in these degenerate days this rule is honoured more in the breach than the observance. Civilian officers can never serve in or very near to their own province, but military officers nearly always do so; and indeed must, for otherwise they would not be able to talk promptly to their men. In raising regiments to serve against the "Boxers," great care has been taken to secure a force made up of pure Hu Nan men. To emphasise this last point, I may say that the notorious

ex-rebel Lao Vinh-phuc (Liu Yung-fu) has just been "excused" promotion to Ho Nan province because he only speaks Cantonese; and General Ch'êng of Foochow, who has just elaborated a scheme for a standing imperial army, insists that each regiment must in future consist of men from one *hien*.

Now, for two centuries at least, all "green" officers, from general to corporal, have been engaged, despite numerous spasmodic punishments and reforms, in wholesale speculation, and neither the garrison branch nor the fighting branch of the troops supposed to be under their commands, even if it has in some cases existed at all, has had more than a partial or temporary existence. A green soldier, like a bannerman, came in the long piping times of peace to regard what reduced pay and allowances his officers left to him as a sort of hereditary sinecure, there being a tacit understanding that A and his successors would pay one shilling to B and his heirs, provided B would now and for ever sign vouchers for two shillings, and clap on a uniform "to his back" each time the Viceroy or any other "big man" should come round to hold a review.

When the great rebellions and the foreign complications consequent thereon broke out fifty years ago, the imperial leaders (some of the younger of them, like Li Hung-chang and Liu K'un-yih, are still in harness) had recourse to the device of hiring "braves" to do the fighting. That is, such "soldiers" as existed, and had no stomach for the merry wars, were left to perform garrison and police duty, whilst either sturdy peasants or such of the youthful soldiers as were willing and able to fight were engaged, at much higher rates of pay than the craven soldiers received, in order to induce them to face the enemy. Under competent leadership

the Chinese brave—and indeed the Chinese soldier, when his concrete existence with all his limbs and organs about him is placed beyond cavil or doubt—is, I take it, as good as any other average fighting man. But of course a warrior to succeed must be fed, and supplied with arms at least nearly as good as the enemy's; even if he gets no pay, clothes, medical attendance, or protection from the elements—all which accessories a Chinese warrior can and will dispense with at a pinch more or less cheerfully.

When the wars of the sixties were over, spasmodic efforts were made, not only to drill and supply with foreign weapons a certain number of banner-men at Peking, Canton, and a few other places where foreigners were well to the fore, but also to keep the braves up to the mark. The greens were too far gone for anything to be done with them, *quâ* greens; but, carefully weeded out, some of them were occasionally available as reserve braves. As a Foochow green captain wittily remarked three years ago, in his report to the High Commissioners, when nettled at the Board's contemptuous comments on his mere soldiers: "After all, there is no essential difference between a soldier and a brave. Both are Chinamen. If you pay my soldiers as well as you pay his braves, my soldiers will be braves; but if you starve his braves as you are starving my soldiers, his braves will be soldiers. Braves or soldiers, it is in each case a question of true pay-rolls, unpeccated pay, sufficient food and drill, and good rifles."

After making a fair show against the Russians in Ili and the French in Tonquin—not to mention the earlier reconquests of Turkestan from Yakub Beg (1874), and Yün Nan from Suliman the Panthay (1873)—the Chinese, or rather the Manchu Government, began to get presumptuous, and our own blunders led them, or

contributed to lead them, on the wrong tack in Corea. The result was the Japanese war, in which braves, bannermen, and soldiers were all alike knocked "sky-high"; and China, smarting under the weight of shame and a heavy indemnity, began to make genuine and serious efforts to put her military house in order. It was at once seen and admitted that, as a fighting value, the whole green army might be abolished at one stroke of the pen; but it was pointed out, and also at once admitted, that the "vested rights" even of soldiers must be considered, or the worm might turn; not to mention the necessity of providing for gallant officers who had received brevet rank for more or less imaginary victories, and who looked to substantive promotion. Besides, feeble though the greens were, there was no other force to maintain elementary order in the country towns, to check smugglers, to guard city gates, to escort prisoners and dignitaries, to watch passes, fords, and other pivot points on lines of communication. It was therefore decided to do away with a quarter or a half of the greens in every province, according to the degree of corruption prevailing in each place, and at any rate not to fill up or create more vacancies. The difficulty about officers was the same as the *impasse* which now exists in Spain. "How can we deprive His Majesty's deserving officers of their salaries and expectations? And, if we pay them for commanding, how can we entirely abolish their commands?" The young Emperor and his advisers were in a fair way to solve some, if not all, of these knotty points by introducing sweeping reforms. But the Empress-Dowager's counterblast gave short shrift to most of these, and the intrigues of disappointed peculators, both civil and military, doubtless had a good deal to do with bracing that energetic lady up to decisive

action point. The weak part of Chinese reforms is and always has been the absence of continuity and sustained effort. The Chinese never know how to persist. No sooner are reductions made and the savings therefrom applied to new efforts, than fresh votes are required to complete these efforts. When the results are good, it is felt that economies may be made. And thus things go on in a perpetual vicious circle. Compensation to incapables who have been got rid of: savings thus overestimated, and insufficient to get good men: sudden alarms and hasty additions: ultimate extra expenditure instead of the savings expected, in order really to get the men required: reduction in the number of the men now competent, or in their pay, in order to bring the permanent expenditure back within normal limits. Disappointment of either men, officers, or both; speculation at work once more. *Débâcle!*

Although several viceroys and governors took advantage of the Empress-Dowager's *volte face* to obtain "reconsideration" of certain reductions already sanctioned, each province on the whole, or at least each one exposed to "foreign insult," has made genuine efforts within the past two years to place its military power upon a proper basis. The shiftings of armies consequent on the "Boxers'" rebellion and the ensuing hostilities with Europeans make it impossible to give, even for the one province in which we are all for the moment interested, the exact locality of each force, the extent and quality of its armament, the name of its commander, and so on.*

* Those in Great Britain who are specifically interested in military details will perhaps be aware that I have from time to time published the latest information upon these points in the *United Service Magazine*; and, even if they are not thus aware, I believe that some continental specialists have had the papers translated for their own use, and, it is hoped, for the common benefit of the Allies.

It may be worth while, notwithstanding the ferment now going on, to state the military position of Chih Li as it was at the end of May, 1900:—

1. The re-organised Hwai army and Lien ("trained") army, now forming together the Hwai-Lien force of 20,750 men, costing 1,521,267 taels a year, was stationed at the Taku and Peh-t'ang forts, at the Shan-hai Kwan, and at various strategical places in the Pao-ting Fu region. Probably it was with these forces that the foreign troops first came into collision.

2. Tung Fuh-siang's twenty-five camps of irregularly armed 12,000 men, partly natives of Kan Suh, moved to Yung-p'ing Fu after their disturbance with foreigners near Peking last year.

3. Junglu's 10,000 personal bodyguard of well-armed troops at Peking; mostly Chinese, partly Manchus.

4. Prince Twan's new force of 10,000 "Tiger Genii" enlisted last September, slightly inferior to the last named.

5. Yüan Shī-k'ai's forty-two camps of 19,000 men, German-drilled force: China's best troops; partly taken by him to his new governorship of Shan Tung.

6. Nieh Shī-ch'êng's thirty camps, *plus* seven companies of 13,117 men at Lut'ai, for the support of the Peh-t'ang forts.

7. Sung K'ing's twenty-four camps, *plus* one company at the Shan-hai Kwan; assisted by General Ma Yüh-k'un.

8. The five great camps of gendarmerie in twenty-three stations in and around Peking, under the Manchu Military Governor, consisting of 10,000 men officered on the Chinese system.

9. The Shên-k'i Ying or Artillery Force, formerly under Prince Ch'un, father of the Emperor, and now under

Prince K'ing. This force consists of twenty-four regiments of 1,000 men apiece. The reorganised Palace Guards, Vanguard, Musketeers, and so-called *Hiao-k'i* camps.

The only other armies in any way formidable to European foes are those under the supreme command of the able and sagacious Viceroy Liu K'un-yih, of Nanking, assisted by his Provincial-General and his Admiral of the Yang-tsze. There are five flags, numbering in all 1,500 men, at the Wusung forts; eleven camps of excellent German-drilled troops, numbering 2,640 men, and five flags of Hu Nan men (1,500), both bodies at Kiang-yin; three separate forces of 3,000, 1,500, and 900 men at Chinkiang; ten camps and three flags of viceregal and other forces at Nanking. In accordance with Chinese practice, the *cadres* of all these troops will be brought up to what we should call a war-footing if the "Boxer" trouble spreads. All the above troops are thoroughly well armed with the latest magazine rifles, and part of them hold well-chosen, well-constructed forts, provided with the best and largest quick-firing and breech-loading guns.

It is chiefly the two army systems of Tientsin and Nanking, just cursorily described, that have absorbed the enormous armaments recently imported from Germany, France, and Great Britain, as admitted in the House of Commons by Mr. Brodrick,—whose statement, however, was by no means exhaustive.

As to the other provinces, their armies are still in a state of flux, and I must content myself by giving a rough table showing progress up to date; for anything definite I might write would probably be obsolete before these words are in print. It must be added that the Tartar General at Nanking and his assistant at Chinkiang

have been making a show of improving at least a selection of their bannermen (4,000 men), and that the three provinces of An Hwei, Kiang Su, and Kiang Si have all of them large bodies of braves and soldiers capable of reinforcing the up-to-date troops above enumerated, which are primarily intended to defend the Yang-tsze and Wangpoo rivers.

To revert to the Manchu or banner garrisons dotted about over the Empire. I exclude Tibet, Turkestan, Mongolia, and Manchuria for the moment, my object being to give the reader in the first instance a clear view over the Eighteen Provinces, and to show what strategic ideas the conquerors held when they made existing dispositions. Chih Li need not be again mentioned in this regard, after what I have said about the nine armies actually in the field.

In Shan Tung there is no Tartar General, but there is an assistant-general at Ts'ing-chou (near the new German colony), with a subordinate at Teh Chou, on the Canal near the Chih Li frontier. No further mention is necessary.

Shan Si, Ho Nan, An Hwei—the other three provinces having only a Governor—none of them possesses any banner troops—that is, strictly speaking. But Shan Si has a Tartar General at or near the old Turkish capital (Marco Polo's Tenduc) outside the Great Wall, with an assistant at Kwei-hwa. His concern is entirely with Mongol affairs.


I have already mentioned the garrisons at Canton, Foochow, Hangchow (with an assistant at Chap'u), Nanking (with an assistant at Chinkiang). I have inspected five of the six, and am in a position to say that, as military units, all are *négligeable*. In a sketch like this further details are unnecessary. The Tartar General

at Foochow is somewhat incongruously at the head of both Foreign and Native Customs, and sometimes also (not always) in charge of the French-managed arsenal. His colleague at Canton is in charge of the foreign college there.

In Yün Nan, Kwei Chou, Hu Nan, Kwang Si, and Kiang Si there are no Tartar or banner troops. Wu San-kwei, the Chinese General who practically gave the Empire away to the Manchus, was rewarded with the satrapy of Yün Nan, which brought him into active contact with Burma. The Manchu and other northern troops he took with him to Yün Nan partly account for the fact that almost pure Pekingese is still spoken in that remote province. After his rebellion was crushed by the second Manchu emperor, the satrapy system was abandoned; all banner troops were withdrawn (except those mentioned) from China south of the Yang-tsze, and viceroys replaced the former satraps at Canton and Foochow, as well as at Yün-nan Fu. Never before had China been entirely placed under one completely homogeneous system.

The Tartar General at Ch'êng-tu Fu (Marco Polo's Sin-din Fu) is rather an important man, for he commands some ordinary Chinese troops as well as his bannermen, frequently acts as Viceroy, and with the Viceroy has joint control over foreign (including Tibetan and aboriginal) affairs; but his fighting capacity seems to be *nil*.

The Tartar General at King-chou Fu in Hu Peh (the old capital of Ch'u 2,000 years ago) occupies a post which, during the satrap wars, was of the utmost strategical importance. As will be seen from a good map, he dominates the entrance from the mountainous west and the gorges into the Great Plain of China. In



view of foreign aggressions, he is just arranging for a second specially drilled force to be stationed at Shih-shou near the mouth of Lake Tung-t'ing.

The Tartar General at Si-an Fu, in Shen Si, is never mentioned in any way such as would take him out of the category of mere ciphers. His colleague at Ning-hia in Kan Suh has some influence in Kokonor matters.

I have said that each Chinese province has a General; but Shan Si, Shan Tung, and Ho Nan—the three provinces where the Governor rules supreme, free of any Viceroy—have no General, and the Governor in each case is acting-General to his own brigadiers. Kiang Si, Kiang Su, and An Hwei have no General, but their Viceroy at Nanking has (since the Taiping wars) had the additional support, besides his General for Kiang Nan, of an additional General (or Admiral), called the Water-Army General, for the whole Yang-tsze River. This powerful official has to do not only with the three Kiang provinces, but also with the Yang-tsze portions of the Two Hu as far up as Yoh-chou Fu.

The other coast provinces of the South have also a Water-Army General as well as a Land General. "Admiral" Ting, of the modern "North Ocean Navy," was a General, for Chih-Li possesses no regulation Water-Army. All these matters are, however, of merely academical interest.

Of course modern exigencies will compel China to mend her ways, and possibly within ten years she will, under stress of imperious necessity, be metamorphosed as quickly as Japan was twenty years ago. But the old Chinese "army" of fifty years ago was simply a rabble, provided with bags of rice, gay flags, umbrellas, fans, and (quite a secondary matter) rusty guns, gingalls, spears, heavy swords, and (very occasionally) fairly good

rifles and cartridges, of a date always behind the times. If there were time and money, hired coolies carried the provision bags and the arms, while the soldiers carried the umbrellas, opium-pipes, and fans. If matters were urgent, the soldiers carried all. There was never any medical staff, not even bandages, and (if the warrior did not slink away before shooting began) the man hopped off when wounded, to die or recover in the nearest ditch. His pay was always a doubtful quantity, but he did not mind that much, so long as he was allowed to plunder the people he was marching to defend. When not on the march, entrenching himself, or trying to "start" the enemy on a run, he spent his time in smoking, gambling, or prowling after women. Discipline of any kind there was none; but if officers were insulted heads went off in no time: in all other matters officers were disposed to be easy, so long as the men were not too curious about accounts, and were ready to cover the commander's flight when the enemy really "came on." Still, despite this sorry picture, Chinese armies, under zealous and capable commanders, such as Tso Tsung-t'ang, the conqueror of Kashgaria, Fêng Tsz-ts'ai, and Lao Vinh-phuc (both ex-rebels), "conquerors" of the French, and others, notwithstanding old or mixed conditions, have displayed excellent qualities; and even officers of the old school have shown considerable strategical and tactical ability. In "dodges" pure and simple Chinamen are always at home, and by nature they are all good guerilla warriors, just as they are all good traders and cooks. But they have never yet had a fair chance in war, and the officers, being almost invariably ignorant men—mere vulgar "rankers" masquerading as "officers and gentlemen" on the score of low, physical courage alone—and despised by the supercilious civilian,

have never regarded themselves quite seriously, especially since Europeans, taking them by surprise with new-fangled notions, have driven their men away like sheep. On the other hand, the men, who took an easy view of their officers' incompetence so long as the whole business was a huge joke all round, feel a natural reluctance to tolerate imbecility in others when it comes to being mowed down themselves, without a chance of replying on equal terms. Ridiculous, therefore, though was the figure which the Chinese cut in the war of 1894-5, before the advance of the plucky little Japanese, it is scarcely just to describe their behaviour as craven cowardice; it was "ignorance, sir, sheer ignorance." I have found my Chinese followers in all provinces invariably true and staunch to me in times of danger, and I should not hesitate to lead a Chinese force, properly armed and brought into shape under my own supervision, against any European troops in existence. The Chinese have not the fighting instinct—that is, they do not relish coming to blows "just for the fun of the thing,"—but they are not afraid of death, and they have no little honest pride, gratitude for kindness, and sympathy with brave and disinterested leaders, such as Gordon. For all these reasons I do not hesitate to "stick up" for the poor Chinaman, and to assert that he has in him the makings of a soldier.

CHAPTER XIV.

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

IT is only natural that, at a moment when all Europe is up in arms to defend her sons against the attacks of riotous hordes, special interest should attach to the question of the personal qualities of our supposed enemies. Volumes have already been written on this subject; but the Rev. Arthur Smith, in his matchless volume *Chinese Characteristics*, is universally regarded as having best expressed those judgments which most of us feel but few of us are gifted with the art of clearly enunciating,—not to say with the *verve* and insight of the inimitable author. I feel an unjustifiable pride in recalling the fact that when the first papers came out anonymously about thirteen years ago I was repeatedly asked—dubiously—if I was the author; the sentiments being occasionally recognisable as mine, the just doubts being whether I was capable of writing anything so entertaining and readable.

I have not read any of Mr. Smith's appreciations, except the first few anonymous ones, and I now therefore simply give, not the judgment of mankind, but my own individual opinion after a generation of total residence in nearly all parts of China. Of the Manchus, as distinguished from the Chinese, I can only speak touching those who inhabit Peking, Canton, Foochow, Nanking, Hangchow, and Chinkiang. Except in the case of

Peking, where the Manchu and Chinese population is so mixed as to be indistinguishable to any but the most observant eye, the Manchus are all "bannermen"; that is, a privileged caste of soldiers, having their families with them, living in cantonments amongst a people speaking (except in the case of Nanking and Chinkiang) a totally different dialect. Their life is a haughty and exclusive one, and what natural characteristics they may have are inevitably coloured by the nature of their surroundings, just as a Prussian garrison in Schleswig, or a Russian garrison in Poland, however well disciplined, would inevitably give itself the airs of a conqueror. Of all these Manchus I should say their chief characteristic was a combination of laziness and pride; but wherever placed with foreigners in the relation of pupil to teacher, as for instance in schools, drill-grounds, laboratories, etc., their bearing is distinctly less priggish and more gentlemanly than that of Chinese. The specimens of Manchu mandarins (always from Peking) I have met in the provinces have invariably appeared to me to be more jovial, easy-going, accommodating if not reasonable, impulsive, and careless of consequences than the Chinese: at the same time less capable of business, less cautious about public opinion, more ignorant and indiscreet. The princes at Peking are of course haughty, and a trifle sullen, as becomes the degenerate descendants of fine manly fellows like the earlier emperors; for they feel themselves *de jure* entitled to all the deep-felt respect their ancestors exacted, but *de facto* impotent to obtain even a shabby imitation of it. The Manchus, like nearly all northerners, have a tendency to get drunk. Here, again, they differ from the Chinese, but are not so bad as the more simple Mongols. Even at official interviews a Manchu mandarin is occasionally flushed with liquor,

in which case he often becomes a braggart. As to bravery, I don't believe a Manchu is by nature either more or less brave than a Chinaman. If it is brave to commit suicide rather than to suffer, then both are equally courageous. If it is cowardly to run when you have no confidence in the honesty or capacity of your officers, then both are equally cowardly. But, generally, it appears to me that true courage is often indistinguishable from pinchbeck all the world over, and depends very much upon local ideas of "good form," and external circumstances and surroundings of every kind.

With the above slight qualifications, and also reserving the rights of Manchus in Manchuria, of whom I know nothing, I should say the Manchu is indistinguishable in character from the Peking Chinaman, the Peking Chinaman from the northern, the northern from the central, and the central from the southern. In other words, they all run into each other, just as a Russian runs into a Pole, a Pole into an Austrian, and thence into a German, Dutchman, Englishman, and American. To put it in another way, if you begin to distinguish at all, you must first decide whether you are going to split hairs or cleave mountains, for every single Chinese village differs in character from the next one adjoining. The broad lines of distinction must be taken in another way, and in order to get any real idea of how a Chinaman differs from ourselves, we must therefore ignore petty details both in ourselves and in them, and see if there are any main features of an unmistakable kind.

Perhaps the easiest way to do this would be to go about it the other way, and try to see ourselves as others see us. The average Chinese does not trouble himself to decide from our complexion or our food whether we are Jews or Christians; from the vivacity or stupidity of our

manner, whether we are Latins or Teutons; from our readiness to fib or our smugness, whether we are Russians or George Washingtons in disguise. No! he lumps us all together as "foreign devils" or "barbarians" from the West, who wear tight-fitting clothes instead of baggy ones; who have long noses and deep-sunken eyes, mop-like hair instead of a pigtail; who eat ox-meat, cheese, and other coarse things instead of rice and a scrap of pork or fish — and smell strong accordingly; who assume a bullying attitude, and ogle women; who are prone to violence when misunderstandings occur; who get drunk; and so on, and so on.

In the same way the general reader will soon get confused if he is told that a Cantonese will scrupulously burn his incense outside his front door at 7 p.m., whilst a Pekingese will see his own grandmother anything but blessed before he will sacrifice to her coffin. Examples of this sort might be multiplied and diversified by thousands. The man in the street does not particularly want to know that the Manchu pigtail was only introduced 250 years ago, and is essentially a Manchu characteristic. All he sees is that there is a vast tract of country as big as Europe, inhabited by 400,000,000 of yellow-skinned men with long queues; women with stumpy feet, rarely seen out-of-doors; and swarms of half-naked children who yell out opprobrious epithets at Europeans. These people squat on the ground as often as they sit on chairs; are totally indifferent about air and smells; shovel their food down with chopsticks; are always scratching their persons; have slobbery mouths and plenty of vermin; get the best of every bargain; tell a lie whenever they speak at all; wear paper shoes and baggy trousers; steal everything they can sneak away; drown their babies; smoke opium;

practise the most fearful immorality; never wash, etc., etc. These, and other points like them, exhibit the broad lines of imaginary Chinese character, and it is for us now to see how far they are true.

1. A Chinaman is universally considered to be a liar. And so he is. But, after a few years of initiation, I have never found much difficulty in extracting the truth from any Chinaman, be he milkman or mandarin. Not only so,—I always felt great confidence in the truthfulness of my own servants, though they often popped out sundry lies. We have our own lies—divorce-court lies, club lies, society lies, husband-and-wife lies, and so on. The distinction is that we lie with a different motive. A Chinaman generally lies in order to get some petty pecuniary advantage, to save trouble, to conceal neglect, or to spite an enemy. We lie in order to keep up conventional ideas of honour and virtue, to save our relations from pain or disgrace, from a feeling of *esprit de corps*, and so on. But we know the measure of our own lies; we instinctively apply the grain or the bucket of salt where we feel it is required; the shock is broken; we all do things and feel things in the same way; the motive is familiar. But with the luckless Chinaman the conditions presented to us are new and abrupt. He does his lying in a different way altogether; and so we call him a liar. He calls us liars too, and believes it. He is not so nice and particular about the truth as we think we are: and that is about the measure of my condemnation. On the other hand, he is not nearly so hypocritical.

2. A Chinaman is thought to be a thief. The “chit” system is universal in China, so that pocket-money is unnecessary. A “chit” is a pencil scrawl on a piece of paper, naming (in any form) a sum of money, which

is "collected" from the compradore or, as Anglo-Indians say, the "butler" once a month. I always kept the safe locked, possessed no jewellery I had not always on, and I never locked up anything but money and important papers; particularly I never locked up wine or cigars. During the whole course of my life in China (with one notable exception, when a thief at an inn walked off with me and my bed in my sleep, deposited me in a handy spot, and extracted a valuable fur coat from underneath me), I was never robbed of anything. I have several times been menaced with violence by men who appeared to be thieves, but who perhaps were policemen or "watchers"; yet I got off by various devices, such as firing an old pistol, or pointing a candlestick at the robbers; and I have missed silk handkerchiefs (as we miss umbrellas in England) occasionally. I usually had at least a dozen servants and retainers wherever I was, and if any of them stole my property I was never conscious of it. Of course I took reasonable precautions, as everyone ought to do; if a person deposits tempting articles in tempting places he must expect to lose them, even in a country like Norway, where simple honesty is carried to *naïveté*; but I possessed few tempting articles, no articles I did not need to use, and these were always in their proper place, so that I did not lose them, or, what is equally satisfactory to a sensible man, was not aware of it. I well remember once asking my permanent "boy" how it was that so many of my forks had a stain. He said it was done by various "coolies," or under-servants, each of whom in succession invariably "tested" the electro on his own account, merely as a business-like act. On another occasion, when I wished to lock up the same electro box, he said: "Not at all; if you lock it up, someone will mistake the contents for silver, and carry the whole

box away, or break it open; whereas, if you leave it open, each thief will be able to ascertain for himself that it is not worth stealing."

3. Chinamen are always regarded as being dirty. This I deny, or, rather, I qualify. In the warm parts of China a Chinaman, clothes and all, is much less offensive to the senses (my senses) than an Englishman of the same class, clothes and all. In the cold north, where fuel is dear and scarce, the custom prevails in winter of piling on clothes upon clothes, and rarely changing them. In Mongolia I fell in partly with local custom, and neither took off my clothes nor washed any part of my person but my hands and face for a whole month. No vermin will at any time touch me, so my case is perhaps special; but I noticed everyone else near me, Chinese and European, "grew vermin," to use the local term. Still, it was too cold to take any garment off for long; and so, instead of undertaking ablutions, the others all employed their energies, at leisure moments, in the same way that monkeys do, with a view to retaining the exclusive use of their own skin for themselves. In the south of China it is the custom amongst the working classes to swab as much of the body as can be got at without taking the trousers off with a wet rag or dishcloth. This, extended to all the body, is really all a man requires in any part of the world, and in any case it is more than our own "working classes" habitually do. The Hakka Chinese, in the extreme south, male and female, properly wash the whole body every day of their lives. But apart from washing, the Chinese do not eat such strong food as we do, and therefore, even if they are "nasty" in their habits, they are not exactly rank and dirty—*i.e.* not ranker and dirtier than we are ourselves. Their nastiness is in form rather than fact; for instance,

my servants used at a pinch to wipe my dishes with their sleeve or coat-tail; blow down the spout of my tea-pot in their anxiety not to keep me waiting for a drink; themselves take a swig from the spout; draw the said coat-sleeve across their noses; wipe their faces after washing with a pair of trousers, a coat-tail, or the lining of a hat; spend hours in hunting for body-vermin (a favourite Chinese pastime); and so on. But, for all that, I do not call them dirty beyond the ordinary rancidity of poverty all over the world. The saying: "The Japanese wash their bodies, the Chinese wash their clothes" is fairly true. Nations differ in the form of their cleanliness. For instance, no matter to what continental country you go, you will get more liberal supplies of table-linen than you will in any British steamer, hotel, or eating-house. On the other hand, there is no country where window-curtains look so clean and neat as in England. I do not think there is any country in the world where the "working classes" dress so dirtily as in England; nor is there any where the homes are kept so neat by the same dirty men's wives.

4. The Chinese are said to be ungrateful. This I totally deny. The fidelity of Chinese servants is really extraordinary, if they are treated with even moderate sympathy and consideration; and this, whether it be a native or a foreign master who is concerned. Nothing makes a more powerful impression on the Chinese mind than impartial justice. To them it is a grand sight to see wages paid out without deductions on the "scale," or "hanky-panky" of any kind; to see the master refusing presents and bribes—which last, indeed, few persons dare even offer; to observe that he will not "run up" a bill for compensation in cases of riot. When they begin to get used to the cold mathematical precision of the British

mind, going straight for its object without fear or favour, they begin to feel that they are in the presence of a weird, strange being of a superhuman kind. But again, when they find that, in addition to this chilly justice, they are positively receiving some tenderness or consideration, such as gratuitous medical aid, free assistance in righting a wrong, the present of a coffin to their mothers, and such-like things indicative of disinterestedness, they positively overflow with feelings of respectful gratitude. I have seen a pack of cunning-looking Chinamen blubber like babies in taking leave of their master, and the more impassive he looked the more they blubbered. It is this gratitude for kindness that often deceives missionaries into a belief that "faith" has been aroused in the Celestial mind. Even officials of the most rascally description show great fidelity to a friend. On one occasion I procured the dismissal of a tolerably high mandarin for corruption; but, feeling rather sorry for the man, I sent him a gorgeous but useless silver epergne packed in a box I had never even opened, and which was always getting into my way. He also never opened it, probably thinking I was playing him some dirty trick, or was inferentially sneering at his misfortune; but, some months afterwards, when he had got to his own province, I received from him a letter, written in the best of good taste, avoiding all allusion to public matters, and sending me some little "literary" paintings of a most artistic kind done by himself, evidently at the cost of great labour. He had divined correctly that no other "presents" would be appreciated, or even accepted. On yet another occasion I asked a high official to put in writing some facts touching a matter in which both he and I had been deceived. He said, "X. has certainly behaved badly; but he was my friend when he did it, as you are now; and I

would no more tell you in writing that he did it than I would tell him that you asked me to give information against him." In fact, there is a very high standard of both gratitude and honour amongst friends in China, in spite of treacheries and rogueries. I cannot recall a case where any Chinese friend has left me in the lurch or played me a dirty trick, and few of us can say the same of our own colleagues and countrymen.

5. Chinese politeness is generally termed hollow. Chinamen are not so effusive and formal as the Japanese (old system), and they are much more ceremonious than even the French. It is only given to the few in any race of mankind to possess the instinctive and inborn politeness which comes of kindness taking its own natural form. For most of us fixed formalities are necessary, just as the letter of the Law is found indispensable, with or without the rigid dogmas of religion, to restrain the vast majority of persons who are not sufficiently well-balanced by gift or training to be competent to set up and adhere to their own standard of right. In this sense, therefore, the Chinese politeness is hollow; but it achieves its object, and, being absolutely fixed, it, like the rules of the confessional, saves the trouble of thinking, and prevents men from the *gaucherie* of external "sin" in form. Chinese male simperings and our own "feline amenities" are cast in much the same mould. The stupid, gawky clownishness, or rudeness, of the English rustic or factory hand is quite unknown in China. There are no *h's* to leave out, and no man is ashamed either of his own relations or of his friends'. There is a natural ease of manner amongst all degrees, which the "classified" British mind cannot even conceive. It is akin to the outspoken frankness and ready wit of the French, which contrasts so painfully with our self-consciousness, starchy snobbishness, and

mauvaise honte. The Chinese are (unlike the Japanese) much given to brawling and coarse language; they are as badly off for respectable adjectives as Tommy Atkins himself. In a word, they are not at heart so kindly and sympathetic as we are, but they certainly are more sprightly and polite, and they rarely "take social liberties."

6. I think it must be conceded that the Chinese are cruel. Nearly all domestic animals are treated without any consideration whatever—not of an interested nature. If kindness or tenderness is shown, a great parade is made about it. Children are rarely checked in their cruelty to mice, flies, and such creatures. Buddhism has certainly had some mollifying effect, even upon the Chinese heart; for instance, there are societies for "preserving life," and dens or keeps for "letting animals go" in; and some people—especially Mongols—pay attention to Buddha's precepts about not taking even the smallest life, even to the extent of killing a flea. But all that is a mere drop in the ocean of cruelty, or rather callousness. Perhaps one reason is that the standard of bodily comfort is so low in China that the slightest divergence from it in an unfavourable direction means cruelty. If an ordinary Chinaman lives over a sewer or a pig-sty, as I have often had to do in Chinese inns; if he feeds on coarse grain, wears rags, sleeps on the dank floor, and possesses only 5s. worth of property in the world, all told; how are you to make criminals object to the rigours of prison life? Yet it is a fact, in spite of this specious way of putting it, that the Chinese seem positively to gloat over misery. Where is there a country in the world where you will see, as you may now see in Shanghai, prisoners, surrounded by a jeering crowd, starving to death in the sun and rain,

suspended by the neck for days and nights so that the toe-tips just touch the floor? Where was there ever a country (except perhaps Bokhara) where maggots were positively bred up to bore into the wounds of chained prisoners? The callous way in which beggars are left to die in the public streets; the brutal treatment of foreigners when at the mercy of a mob; the contemptuous ignoring of drowning men; the lingering executions; the swarms of lepers left to rot on the roads; the tyranny of gaolers;—all these and many other things go to show that the Chinese are undoubtedly as low down as any nation in the scale of downright cruelty.

7. As to mercantile honour, in spite of occasional lapses, such as occur in all countries, it is so universally admitted that Chinese credit stands deservedly high, that I need not say another word about it. It is also a curious fact that, although Government credit *vis-à-vis* of the people stands so low that it could not well go lower, as regards foreign obligations it is, subject to political risks, as good as that of almost any country. It is quite pathetic to watch the extraordinary assiduity with which funds are collected for the service of the loans; and even touching to read of coolie caravans trudging laboriously along with loads of silver all the way from Shan Si to the banks of Shanghai, where the bullion is paid into the credit of the Customs Taotai for the benefit of overfed financiers in Europe. Nearly all foreigners who have ever been employed by Chinese have noted the scrupulous punctuality with which their salaries are paid. The national honour seems very sensitive upon this point. At times the treasury may be hopelessly depleted, and underlings, through whose hands the money passes, will always endeavour to make a "squeeze" on the scale, or on the exchange; but that

does not seriously affect the main consideration herein indicated.

8. "Morals" is of course a vague and comprehensive word, but I use it here, advisedly, in the contracted sense of popular English usage. The Chinese are undoubtedly a libidinous people, with a decided inclination to be "nasty" about it. Herein they differ from the Japanese, who are excessively lax, but very rarely *raffiné*. A check is placed upon this national characteristic by the almost universal practice of early marriage. Moreover, 90 per cent. of the population are too poor even to think of any further indulgence than the possession of a single wife affords. Among the well-to-do classes the civilian mandarins, who never serve in their own province, are forced to lead a secluded and sedentary life, and in most cases prefer to leave their first or legitimate wives at home, partly on account of the dangers of travel, and partly in order to look after the family graves and honour. Hence concubines are almost recognised as a necessity. Most rich mandarins, however, go beyond necessity, and they are the most profligate class. Next come the wealthy merchants; but these, when living at home, are naturally more bound to decency by family ties than are the mandarins who move about to temporary habitations with their servants and concubines. Still, amongst all classes and ranks the "moral sense" is decidedly weak, and there is hardly a Manchu or a Chinese living possessed of that form of "Puritanical" virtue seen in some Europeans,—that condition of mind which shrinks from a ribald or even a *risqué* story; sternly refuses any sexual temptation that may offer, or forces itself to be content with a chivalrous platonic attitude. The depressing spectacle of 2,000,000 old maids in England (the proportion would be 20,000,000 in China) has no

counterpart there. Neither man nor woman exists in China to whom his or her own nature remains a sealed mystery. Of Chinese women it is less easy to speak than of men, for nearly all respectable ones lead a *purdah* life; but to judge by the language of novels, what one reads of in law cases, and sees in street life; by the jealous behaviour of men, and the brutally cruel customs in vogue for punishing all female lapses, "every (Chinese) woman is at heart a rake," and precautions are taken accordingly by their lords and masters. Some provinces have decidedly more "conscience" than others. The Cantonese, though exceedingly libidinous, disapprove of "French vice" of all kinds. On the other hand, Fuh Kien has an infamous reputation, possibly owing to its ancient connection with traders from beyond the seas; and undoubtedly the morals of the province are made worse by the fearful prevalence of female infanticide, and the consequent scarcity of women in that province. The northerners, more especially the crapulous leisured classes of Peking, openly flaunt the worst of vices. No doubt Tartar influence has had its effect, for from Bokhara to Corea all Tartars seem fashioned from one mould in this respect. Offences which with us are regarded as almost capital—in any case as infamous crimes—do not count for as much as petty misdemeanours in China; not even in Canton, where disapproved. This easy-going view works both ways: it obtains for the Chinese the mistaken reputation of universally indulging in vile gratifications, but such indulgences, by the mere fact that they are no crimes, soon run themselves out harmlessly in youth, and ridicule suffices to do the rest; and what an old scamp does in his harem concerns no one but himself and his slaves. Anyhow, there is no humbug, concealment, or Mrs. Grundyism. On the whole, I am

disposed to say that the Chinese, taken as a whole, are not much worse than Europeans; in each case, some countries (or provinces) being greater sinners than others.

9. The Chinese do not treat children well. Japan has been justly described as the paradise of children. China is the reverse. Fathers and mothers, especially rich ones, of course pet and fondle pretty children of both sexes, and they like to see them well dressed. Also fathers of old or official family are careful to have their sons well trained, according to native ideas of propriety. But the masses of fathers ignore their daughters altogether, or regard them as *impedimenta* of the female department, to be kept safely out of the way, and dry, like any other indispensable stores. Sons are viewed chiefly as links, connecting the person with one's ancestors and futurity. The American idea of children—and indeed they are usually ill-bred sickly little creatures, brought up under exaggerated ideas of liberty—is monstrous in Chinese eyes. No such sight exists in China as a father sitting down to dinner to eat, smoke, and chat with his sons, and even to exchange “views.” The only approach to such easy familiarity is when a busy shopman and his sons, usually with other relatives or *employés*, sit round one table for convenience or economy's sake, and snatch a hasty meal by shovelling rice down together from one big dish; but even then the sons must mind their *p*'s and *q*'s: to sit down before a father is “seated unco' right,” or, as each in turn picks a bit with his chopsticks from the meat or condiment plate, to “bag” the best piece of meat out of the tureen in a playful way, would be an outrage on the paternal dignity. *A fortiori* a wife, still less a daughter, can never join the festive board on even terms, as with us. On one or two occasions I have seen a labourer in the remote fields munching

along with his wife, who had brought the dinner to him in a rag, as our labourers' wives do; or I have seen a very young man sprawling on a cow and chatting with a girl in the wilderness: even these slight touches of human nature seemed to me so extraordinary that I at once "made a note of it." Mothers are essentially "spankers"; even if kind at times, their tempers are so ill-balanced that they are apt to scold and slap on the slightest provocation. The cries of the child only feed their spite, and urge them on to downright cruelty, as though "inebriated with the exuberance of their own verbosity" and screams. Fathers do not beat much; their castigations are reserved for their wives. When a boy gets beyond the "spanking" age, his mother has to treat him as a superior being, and the father would not tolerate any further beatings of the son except under his own authority. Girls are steadily beaten and bullied by their mothers from weaning time until they are women, when they become a prey to something worse—mothers-in-law. It is by no means rare, however, for a father, or mother, or both, to show excessive affection for one or all of their children. There are kind good hearts in China, as elsewhere. I am only speaking of "averages" as seen by myself. The *patria potestas* as it obtains in China is totally foreign to our ideas; of European nations the French alone, and to a limited extent the Spanish and Italians, have any vestiges of it left: not many. No doubt it is found best for the country, for we must assume that all institutions become such or remain such because approved. But the product is displeasing to us. The very words used in politeness for "your father" and "your mother" show us what the Chinese think:—"your noble severe" and "your noble tender one." In China children certainly romp about

with great freedom; but so do the pigs; they are none the less capriciously treated and cuffed about: they fear rather than respect or love their parents.

10. Temperance in "self supply" is a Chinese virtue; in that respect we are inferior to them in even a disgusting degree. Drunkenness is so rare that it is not regarded as a vice at all, but rather as good form, to get tipsy at a feast; just as with us the act of kissing is so little connected with lust that it is quite "the thing" to do it in public. But a Chinaman thinks even our walking with women to be barefaced immorality. Strong drink is sometimes disapproved of in political or economical philosophy because it causes anger, and a waste of good grain; never because men get drunk: accordingly, in times of scarcity distilling is often forbidden or checked. In the extreme north (especially Manchuria) liquor is considered almost a necessity, and there is a good deal of red-nosed tippling among the well-to-do. Occasionally soldiers get flushed and violent, but that is on the same principle that they eat criminals' hearts and livers—to gain pluck. Notwithstanding all this, in a word, neither drunkenness nor "drinking" exists in China: the exceptions are a minimum quantity. In eating there is no question of indulgence in the case of 95 per cent. of the population: a man shovels down all he can get for his money, and if he can afford to buy more than is necessary a little extra rice does him no harm. "Indulgence" only exists amongst the mandarin and rich mercantile classes, and the chief idea is to "feed up to the occasion"; hence the enormous consumption of expensive aphrodisiacs, real and imaginary, such as bird's-nest jelly, sea-slugs, ginseng, cats' organs, deers' horns, and a host of other trumpery and even disgusting objects. I have often been asked by mandarins why

their powers were failing, and what they ought to eat in order to raise a larger family.

11. Industry is the ruling virtue of the Chinese, from the top of the scale to the bottom, but with the not unreasonable qualification that a man must be working for himself. No one is more industrious in amassing pelf than the identical mandarin who neglects to bestir himself to do justice. No one works better than the builder or artisan on a piece job, or worse than the same man on a time job. All Chinese (except opium-smokers and the over-married) are risers with the sun; usually before it. Until (in very recent years) kerosene was introduced, there was no artificial light worthy of the name; hence everyone was in bed by six or eight, according to season. If the days in winter were as short as with us, the Chinese would probably have adopted the lazy, sleepy habits of the Russians; but the days do not vary much in length, especially in the south parts. In these circumstances, it is no great virtue to get up at four and six, or even at two or three. All Chinese inns are in full swing of motion two hours before daylight. A Chinaman works hard all day, but never feverishly; he stops for an occasional snack, swig, or smoke, and is always ready for a running chat. The principle of Chinese industry is to neglect all secured rights and aim at more. Thus, a man will work well for £50 a year; but if you give him £1,000 to do the same work, he will probably neglect it in order to turn £50 more in some fresh way. No matter what takes place, or under what circumstances, a Chinaman, whatever be his rank or position, at once sees money or money-loss in it. If you give him a free passage, he smuggles; but a free passage alone will do, if the smuggling is impossible; if it is easy, he lets his friends smuggle

too. If nothing else occurs, there is chance of compensation after a disaster, hence arson is a common offence in these days of insurance. If you give him a present, he will even ask—if possible—for a “better dollar than this one,” or count up the copper cash to see if they are all good and sound. If a mandarin admits a claim, there is certain to be a hitch in the quality and weight of the silver before you actually encash it. A boatman delays you an hour because “fuel is cheap here.” In a word, the whole wits of nearly every living Chinaman (and woman) seem to be devoted to turning to pecuniary profit every incident in which he has had, has, or may have a hand, direct or indirect. Accounts are kept by considerable traders with scrupulous exactitude. No Chinese ever needs information as to market prices or values; or, if he does, he knows how to get it without having to trust anybody. In short, as traders the Chinese are easily “number one.”

12. We talk about Jack being a “handy man,” but he is nothing to a Chinaman. The usual exceptions excepted, every Chinese knows the time without a watch; can at a pinch buy, prepare, and cook his own food; wash, patch, if not make his own clothes; judge the weather, till the fields, carry a pole and its load; indicate the north, manœuvre a punt, sail a boat, catch fish, saddle a horse; tackle animals, birds, and reptiles of all kinds under unexpected circumstances; walk or ride a long distance, sleep anywhere at any moment, take no exercise whatever for any length of time, loaf time away; gain the graces of any woman of any nationality (if she will let him); eat anything, go anywhere, remain without change—and other things innumerable. What a Chinaman can’t do may be summed up as follows: Shave himself; do up his own hair; cure his own

maladies; keep off vermin; fight with his fists; manage a steamer; keep military or naval discipline; handle trust money honestly; tell a plain, unvarnished story; be punctual; show nerve in times of sudden danger; eat cheese; or tolerate a female "master."

The complicated question of Chinese character does not permit of settlement in a few cursory pages, but the above will at least serve to indicate the general impression which a quarter of a century of residence among Celestials has left on my mind.

CHAPTER XV.

RELIGION AND REBELLION

PEOPLE are apt to confuse themselves by first hankering back upon the obsolete historical word *religio*, the very derivation of which is contested and obscure, and secondly by confusing the word "piety" with religion. This vagueness leaves open the door to unlimited argument, the total result of which is to land us in quite as foggy a region of thought as that in which most men's actual feelings on religion generally flounder. We must go to the root of matters at once and ask ourselves: What is the popular view and ordinary effect of formal religion? With us in Great Britain the first thing is to "go to church," and not to work on Sundays; then to say our prayers, to say grace, and (in a progressive string according to the degree of our piety) to be chaste, sober, charitable with money; to praise God, look to a future life, and so on. Except that there is no Sunday, and the curious idea of "praise" has never entered a Chinaman's mind, a "good man" in China—which means in this connection exactly the same thing as a pious or religious one—is very much a counterpart of the good Englishman. He visits the church or temple with quite as much more or less little understanding as most of ourselves of the reason why he does so; and says prayers—but only when he has anything to pray for; he pours out a libation or scatters a thank-offering for his food, and moreover

does not forget an acknowledgment, often daily, to his ancestors. In chastity perhaps inferior, in sobriety decidedly superior to our average selves, he is infinitely more charitable, especially to relatives; in his private, but not in his public capacity. As to a future life, he is totally indifferent on that subject so long as his head is kept on his shoulders in this one, in order that he may make his bow in decent form when he arrives in any other sphere there may be. In "natural religion," therefore, a Chinaman differs little from ourselves.

In "faith," "doctrine," and "dogma" it is different; and I do not believe any power will succeed in drumming any one of the three into the Chinese mind, which is much too clear to take on trust any mere insistence upon alleged facts which cannot be proved by plain evidence. With us a cook who wants a good situation advertises that she "holds Church views." Most Chinamen have also their views, and if not so orthodox to our taste as those of the cook, they are usually at least more intelligible. There would never be any "missionary rows" if things were allowed to stand in the "view" stage; but unhappily our churches militant think it their duty to try and effect a change, not only of view, but also of behaviour by active means, instead of allowing the Chinaman to think and act (as they themselves do) for himself. The average Chinese, though behindhand in science, is, in many matters, the intellectual superior of the average European—more especially is he the superior of the untrained Protestant missionary of the colporteur class, who has only a "call to Christ" to justify his turning teacher of the world: hence comes the trouble.

The foundation of religious feeling seems to have been much the same in ancient China as elsewhere. The sun

was seen to rise, shedding warmth and light; the moon did the same, in part. Hence the saluting or worshipping of the sun; and, by analogy, to a lesser extent, the moon. The wind and rain were as often agreeable as objectionable. Hence the idea of bad and good forces, with an appeal to the pair for some show of discrimination in their favours. When life sped, it was difficult to imagine (the body being still there) whither the intelligence and activity had gone. Hence confused ideas of souls, ghosts, gods, and so on. It is easy to extend this natural system. Desire for children, gratitude to parents, remorse for injury done to the dead; mysterious noises in darkness and solitude; droughts, floods, eclipses. In a word, Chinamen saw themselves surrounded by many things they could not understand, and their imaginations (like those of our early ancestors) constructed strange "beliefs" to account for them.

The next stage was the Confucian. Confucius had the good sense to say that he understood nothing about souls and natural mysteries; he therefore declined to discuss them. But meanwhile forms and ceremonies had insensibly grown up with advancing wealth and experience; besides which Taoism and other philosophical doctrines were beginning to make men speculative and polemical. Confucius, therefore, did his best to reconcile popular customs or prejudices with the practical business of state; he does not seem to have much sympathised with mere "thinkers." He evidently thought Laocius a humbug, and he would have thought Kant a humbug too. He was a sort of popular democratic Lord Chesterfield, and tried to teach his children of China how to be decent, orderly, and gentle; how to give and take without violence; how to observe distinctions of rank; how to keep women in check; and

so on. He did this with such success (despite a suspicion of priggishness) that his influence still remains. He was no religious teacher; but as a moral instructor he must be given rank after Jesus of Nazareth,—even after Shakyamuni; with, but before Mahomet.

A great revolution in thought took place about two centuries before our era; the time coincides with the conquests of the Parthians, and it is possible that Græco-Roman civilisation was affected by the same wave that influenced China—whatever it was. At all events there was a general movement and a simultaneous expansion in the world, all the way from Rome to Corea. The result was that China now first heard of India, Buddhism, and the Parthians; and before long Buddhist philosophy took a firm hold on the Chinese mind, just as Christianity at the same time got a grip of the Roman or Greek mind. The history of its spread over the Far East is a long one. Like Christianity, later on it soon became surcharged with useless “doctrine,” and priestly corruption; in other words, the men who handled it were but poor representatives of the founder. Hence it lost caste, and had its ups and downs from dynasty to dynasty, just as our European religions had during Tudor times. But it left behind a lasting effect in this way. Buddhism was democratic; it was the enemy of class feeling, luxury, cruelty, and greed. It was merciful, favoured simplicity and economy, and gave women an equal status with men. Hence it has had a decidedly good influence upon men’s minds, and especially upon women’s; in fact, Chinese women, having always been uneducated, and therefore unable to read or understand contentious philosophy; being assigned moreover by Confucius a back seat in life, could have no religion or moral teaching except Buddhism and “nature.” All Buddhist “doctrine” is

discredited in China by men of intellect now, and so are priests as professors of it; but the true and simple teaching of Shakyamuni survives; and, as priests possess glebes; are independent; and are usually travelled and sometimes even well-read men, with a leisured taste for calligraphy and antiquity, they often enjoy the respect and companionship of the learned. Both they and their temples are more popular with women than men like to see, and in some provinces there is moral laxity; just as in Brazil, Manila, or Hungary the Catholic priests are less strict than they are in England, Germany, or France. When men die, the families, and especially the women, like to have a few priests in, and they are not particular as to doctrine, or even as to religion, so long as chaunting and processions of some sort go on. Just as distinguished French scoffers are reported to send for a priest at the last moment, so even a Chinese mandarin thinks it good form to summon a Taoist or a bonze when a calamity takes place. It is only another form of "church parade." In Singapore there is a Roman Catholic church in which a figure of the Blessed Virgin has somehow acquired a repute amongst the pagans; and, as the Portuguese priest in charge himself told me, there is a sort of annual pagan "wake" held every year there. The fact is that, politics apart, the Chinese take an easy and broad-minded view of all religions, and would never persecute anyone so long as no gross immorality or interference with administration, custom, and liberty took place. The Mussulmans in North China are never in the least interfered with, because they have the good sense (like the early Jesuits had) to fall in with popular feeling, and "let things be." It is only in Yün Nan and Kan Suh, where Mahometans have become rather aggressive, that wars and persecutions have taken place, the faults, as usual, being on both sides.

Such was the state of affairs when Christianity first appeared. I say "first" advisedly, for though Nestorians Mazdéans, Manichæans, Jews, and other Western sectarians had been alternately tolerated and suppressed at various times between the seventh and the thirteenth century, they had never been clearly separated, in the popular mind at least, from Buddhists and Mussulmans, of which they were considered perverted forms. At first there was no hostility to speak of; but the attitude of the less prudent Roman Catholics in the seventeenth century towards the time-honoured custom of "ancestor-worship" (which is really much the same as the annual visits to cemeteries in vogue in France and Italy) sowed the germs of future trouble. The disputes of the Jesuits, Dominicans, and Franciscans involved the Pope and the Manchu Emperor in antagonistic polemics; persecution was the result; and for two centuries Christianity only existed in the provinces by stealth. The treaty of Nanking (in 1842), and still more that of Tientsin (in 1858), gave a fillip to propagandism; and now perhaps there are 500,000 nominal Christians in the empire, *i.e.* about one for every thousand souls, and it must cost about £500,000 a year to give them ghostly comfort. It is quite a mistake to suppose that the Chinese masses entertain any hostile sentiments towards religious feeling as such: they respect it, in whatever form; and the gentle doctrines of true, simple Buddhism, which possess so much that is (externally at least) similar to those of true, simple Christianity, have, as already stated, on the whole, exercised a lasting effect for good on the Chinese mind: so do medical missionaries and really charitable school teachers exercise a decidedly good effect upon the Celestial mind of to-day: but by kindness, not by dogma. What causes trouble is the clashing of militant doctrine with the village customs

and social habits naturally dear to the rustic mind. I will just enumerate a few instances to illustrate my meaning. Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries alike inveigh against foot-binding. This is not unreasonable, and even the Chinese themselves are beginning to see that it is an evil custom; but prudence is manifestly required; otherwise it is manifest that hostility and jealousy must arise between conservative and progressive females, just as with us a too energetic display of the Bloomer costume is apt, as a mere novelty, to cause a "row." Both Roman Catholics and Protestants rightly inveigh against the use of opium; and there is little risk of hostility on this ground, except, perhaps, because many Chinese consider the objection to savour of hypocrisy, when they see the compatriots of the reformer actually trafficking in the drug. The Protestants, but not the Roman Catholics, usually make an unnecessary fuss about the use of spirituous liquors. Coming as they do from drunken countries where liquor too often means vice, they have not the discrimination to see that their exhortations are quite unnecessary in a land where intemperance is practically unknown. The questions of slavery and concubinage are more serious; but here again Europeans are misled by their own words. Slavery in China has never at any time savoured of the brutality it has assumed in European or Arab hands: in denouncing Chinese slavery—which, though admitted by the Chinese themselves to be objectionable, is really more a social caste distinction, or *diminutio capitis*, than a heartless traffic in human flesh—the missionaries are unjustly censuring the Chinese in principle for the past abominable crimes of their own ancestors. So, again, the word "concubinage" connotes with us degrading ideas which the corresponding Chinese word in no way expresses. Apart from the fact that

polygamy was universal at one time both with our own religious ancestors the Jews and with our own political ancestors the Romans, it is still the rule rather than the exception all over Asia, and there seems to be nothing inherently or naturally evil in it. We have no right to force on other peoples rites and ceremonies when the sanctions and grounds do not exist which render those forms incumbent on us. Then there are the village temple feasts, the prayers for rain, the exorcising of demons, the obeisance to Imperial tablets, to Confucius' shrine, and so on. These last are the points where the narrow-minded views and actions of some missionaries give most trouble. If it is the custom for all to subscribe to a temple or other "superstitious" feast, it is monstrous for a too strait-laced missionary to back up the protest of a more or less genuine convert who may simply want to escape paying his scot: in fact, the missionary himself ought to subscribe to anything in the shape of local rates which has the approval of authority. Anyway, he has no business whatever to question an official decision touching the incidence of rates or popular levies upon a Chinese. Our own church rates, though not now compulsory, have been so at times. Even admitting that the Chinese customary levies are absurd and unjust, they are not so much so that we are entitled to condemn them more severely than many of our own follies committed in the name of religion.

So far from being irreligious, the Chinese are decidedly religiously inclined, though their religious feelings may not take that gloomy, Anglo-Dutch form which is the peculiarity of "dissenting" countries. In the first place, all Chinese have a deep veneration for the idea of a soul, or the continuity of life; this idea is derived partly from the old Shamanistic or natural religion, and partly from

the Buddhist notion of transmigration. Hence the great care of the dead, the love of funeral ceremonies, the readiness to spend money upon graves, the desire to propitiate the ghosts of ancestors, the yearning for a son, the strong family sentiment of unity, and the strict subordination of younger to elder. Hair-splitting doctrine has no charms for the Chinese mind, which, however ill-trained, is essentially intellectual and liberal. The most militant and aggressive religion on earth, that of Mahomet, has learnt to live in peace everywhere except on the borders of China, where foreign races complicate the situation; and a Mussulman may be and occasionally is a Chinese Viceroy; as, indeed, even a Christian might be if he would only make reasonable concessions, and give us a little more bright, cheery, tolerant human nature, instead of seeking to condemn those whose consciences do not permit them to accept his views of what is right and true.

The above being the general feeling of the Chinese, we may now go on to describe them as exactly the contrary of what they are usually supposed to be; that is, they are religious-minded, tolerant, and non-militant; but neither the educated nor the ignorant classes will have what they honestly believe to be humbug thrust down their throats, and religious animosity—which has never been exercised in one single instance against the Russian Orthodox Church—has to thank the mistaken zeal of Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries for its own birth and growth. This brings us to the germane subject of Chinese rebellions and secret societies, which have invariably been provoked by religious sectaries.

In the beginning of the year 1308, immediately after John of Montecorvino had been consecrated Archbishop of Cambalu (Peking), Christian priests, Buddhist bonzes,

and Taoist monks were ordered to "pay taxes in future like any one else," and steps were taken to put a stop to the "exacting claims of Buddhist priests." The evident connection of religion with rebellion is apparent from the following: "Princes and Tibetan priests in the imperial *cortège* having oppressed the people on the roads, such things are now prohibited. Prohibited is also the White Lily Sect; and their buildings will be destroyed: their sectaries will once more be made common people." Again, in 1322: "Prohibition of White Lily Buddhist business." And in 1349 there was a red-turban revolt in the north of modern An Hwei, once more under the ægis of the White Lily Society. It was given out in this connection that Mâitrâya (the Buddhist Messiah) was coming to earth. Shortly after this a Buddhist priest turned the Mongols out, and founded the Ming dynasty. In 1622 a White Lily revolt broke out in the exact spot where the present "Boxer" rebellion of 1900 had its birth. The Jesuits, then establishing themselves in China, were not unnaturally connected with this rebellion in the Chinese mind, and for some years the Prime Minister severely persecuted them. Meanwhile the White Lily leader gained headway, sacked Peking, and put an end to the Ming dynasty, which was replaced by the very Manchus whose assistance the Ming statesmen had sought. During the two first centuries of Manchu rule there were not many serious popular rebellions; but, such as they were, religion was always at the bottom of the trouble. In 1778 a revolt in South Shan Si brought the White Lily Society once more under review. In speaking of a Mussulman schism of the same date, the Emperor says: "It is similar in principle to the White Lily faith amongst bonzes." Rebellions were now spreading rapidly all over the Empire, which was really in a very parlous

state when the aged Kienlung abdicated in 1795 to his son, after a splendid reign of sixty years. In that year the leading White Lily chief was taken and executed; the services of General Nayench'êng (grandson of Akwei, the Manchu conqueror of Burma) are now first mentioned. In 1813 a "Boxer" revolt broke out once more in the old spot (South Shan Tung), and some of its sectaries even gained admission to the Peking Palace. The Emperor Kiak'ing's life was only saved by the bravery of his second son, afterwards the Emperor Taokwang. Though the term "Boxer" is used by General Nayench'êng in connection with its rising, its lineal descent from the White Lily sect is amply attested by him, though its official name at the time was *T'ien-li*, or "Heavenly Order" Faith. Its indirect connection with Christianity, or at least with Christian ideas, is evident from the fact that the term "White Ocean Faith" is also vaguely used by some of the conspirators.

At last, in 1850, the direct connection of Christianity with rebellion was made perfectly clear when the standard of revolt was raised in Kwang Si by a student of the Christian doctrine named Hung Siu-ts'üan: he styled his sect the Shang-ti Hwei, or "Society of God," and reigned for ten years as "King of Heaven" at Nanking, claiming blood relationship with Jesus Christ. It was not until 1864 that the late Marquess Tsêng's father succeeded in retaking the city; and meanwhile half China had been ravaged. I have already referred to the Great Rebellion in the chapter on "Population."

It is unnecessary to inquire into the exact religious or anti-religious motives which inspired the present "Boxer" revolt: matters of opinion in religion and superstition alike are of no scientific importance to anyone but the holder, so far at least as they are unsupported

by evidence of truth: but, so far as those opinions bear upon practical human affairs, it is interesting to note several indisputable facts: (1) the "Boxers" are inspired by the tenets of the old White Lily Society—i.e. they are a protest made by the spirit of Buddhism against the spirit of militant Christianity; (2) the militancy against which the "Boxers" protest is the evident connection in their minds between the land acquisitiveness of Europeans and the supposed alliance between European militant missionaries and European political aims. As usual in human affairs, the protests of ignorant men assume a violent form, and passion feeds upon itself as it rages. None the less I am strongly of opinion that we Christians have not in China acted up to the principles we profess; we have not given the Chinese fair play; and we are ourselves largely to blame for the disasters which have overtaken us in China. My humble views upon this point were stated at length in the *Asiatic Quarterly Review* for October, 1900, and they appear to be partly supported by those so much more ably expressed by Sir Robert Hart in the *Fortnightly Review* for November.

The "Boxer" rebellion has had two most important literary consequences. The great library of the Han-lin Academy, and that of the Russian College at Pei Kwan, have both been utterly destroyed: most of the "Albazins," or Russified Chinese, also perished. In retaliation, the Russians are now carting off to Europe the whole of the vast manuscript collection from the Mukden Palace: this includes manuscript copies of the Greek and Roman classics, which must have been brought from Europe either by the early missionaries, or by the Mongols after their conquests in Hungary.

APPENDIX

THE CALENDAR

IN attempting to summarise a few notions respecting the Chinese chronology, I must confess at once that I am totally ignorant of even the most elementary scientific principles which govern this subject. But the general contact with foreign countries has had an economic influence upon China in this field also, and for this reason I simply state the impressions left upon me after reading through a selection of the Chinese histories, and endeavouring to understand some of their special chapters upon the Calendar and Astrology.

The Chinese began by noting lunations—that is, periods (of $29\frac{1}{2}$ solar days more or less) over which the moon apparently travelled in such a way as, at the end of each period, to bring herself in the same relation to the sun as when she started. The most ancient word for “year” seems to have meant “a course”; then a year was “a star period”; then “a sacrifice”; and finally “a harvest.” The earliest Chinese day began at dawn; then at cock-crow; and finally at midnight: it also seems that the idea of “daily day” is only an extension of the idea, “first day of the moon.” In fact, in our own times the popular Foochow name for “a month” is a “month-day.” The *Book of Rites* tells us that “in the twelfth moon the sun completes his orbit, as the moon her lunation; and the stars resume their places.” At a very early date it was discovered that the course of

the sun roughly corresponded to twelve lunations, but that it was necessary to add a thirteenth moon now and then in order to square off the sun with the moon. Observing, by means of a pole, the maximum length of the sun's shadow at noon, in winter the Chinese acquired the notion of a "winter arrival," which is exactly our word "winter (sol)stice," or "(sun)stand." The year is divided into twenty-four "joints-vitalities," of which each alternate one is called a "central vitality," this last apparently meaning "the instant the sun enters a zodiacal sign." If a month has no "central one" in it, *i.e.* if the entry takes place exactly at the junction of two lunations, then a moon is intercalated, and the first of its "joints" belongs to the "central one" of the preceding moon, whilst the second belongs to the first joint of the next moon.

The Chinese then proceeded to start off each new year with a lunation and a day having some fixed relation to the solstice. In the oldest times this point changed several times, but was usually much as now, the differences being, like those of the Russian, Julian, and Gregorian calendars, only a few days. The Ts'in dynasty (255-206) began the year with the new moon nearest after this "arrival," and they counted up the "superfluities" of each and all the twelve lunations until they amounted to a whole extra lunation. This extra moon was always considered the same for chronological purposes as the one preceding it; thus "extra sixth moon" is the moon after the sixth; but it is still the sixth, and the regular number twelve thus remains for ever. It is as though we should always call the 29th of February "28th (B)," and consider it part or duplicate of the 28th. Now, like every other nation, the Chinese soon got into a mess with their superfluities, and each successive dynasty fumbled about as best it could in order to give the people an intelligible fixed time for sowing the crops. The earliest records having been

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The Chinese then proceeded to start off each new year with a lunation and a day having some fixed relation to the solstice. In the oldest times this point changed several times, but was usually much as now, the differences being, like those of the Russian, Julian, and Gregorian calendars, only a few days. The Ts'in dynasty (255-206) began the year with the new moon nearest after this "arrival," and they counted up the "superfluities" of each and all the twelve lunations until they amounted to a whole extra lunation. This extra moon was always considered the same for chronological purposes as the one preceding it; thus "extra sixth moon" is the moon after the sixth; but it is still the sixth, and the regular number twelve thus remains for ever. It is as though we should always call the 29th of February "28th (B)," and consider it part or duplicate of the 28th. Now, like every other nation, the Chinese soon got into a mess with their superfluities, and each successive dynasty fumbled about as best it could in order to give the people an intelligible fixed time for sowing the crops. The earliest records having been

destroyed, no one knows exactly what the ancients did to get through time. Confucius never spoke of either calendars or a future life, as being two subjects on which he had no definite information. We are, however, told in the *Book of Rites* that the sixth lunation of the Chou dynasty was the fourth of the Hia; and in the opinion of that distinguished sinologist the late Alexander Wylie, the Chinese possessed a work treating of Plane and Solid Mensuration, Equations, and Trigonometry even before our era. Owing to this venerable connection between crops and stars, however, the successive astronomers had conceived a peculiar notion that each spot of the earth, and to a certain extent each person, was under its own star, and was subject to the influences of that star. Hence the Court "recorder" kept regular notes of what had happened under such stars, to each place and prominent person: thus he gradually foretold the events which would probably arrive. This explains why astrology and divination were treated by the First Emperor as positive sciences like medicine (which after all is, as distinct from surgery, apt to be even in our own times as vague as divination). It also explains why Chinese calendars are imposed on subject states; why to this day lucky days are chosen for solemn events; and why tyrants have appropriated particular months for the commencement of their reigns. I am disposed to think that the abnormally long reigns of the semi-mythical emperors are to be accounted for by the early Chinese having begun a new "year" not only at the winter but also at the summer solstice. Probably some similar confusion accounts for the great traditional ages of such personages as Methuselah.

Now, Sz-ma Ts'ien and his father had both been "recorders" at Court. Moreover, the old man was a Nihilist philosopher,—if I may use that expression in its best sense for the *raisonné* Marcus Aurelius-like fatalism of so-called Taoism,—and had thought deeply

and curiously about the things of derring-do which were going on in those active times. Hence he conceived the idea of writing a consecutive history; hence, also, it comes that the "recorder," who was originally a kind of Druid or *pontifex*, came to mean an "annalist" for the whole Empire, instead of a mere "stringer of starry events" for one of the feudal states, of which, previous to his times, the royal or imperial domain had only been *primus inter pares*. In his original capacity of astrologer, therefore, it came about that Sz-ma Ts'ien was instructed by the Emperor to reform the calendar, which he accordingly did, in conjunction with two successive commissions of *savants*. Amongst many improvements in instruments and systems of observation, one result of these commissions stands out very prominently: three lunations were added to the year B.C. 104, and in all future years the first day was ordered to begin, not as above described so soon as possible after the solstice, but with the lunation during which the sun enters a point in the ecliptic sixty degrees beyond the winter solstice. As one Chinese author says: "Now for the first time were there clear notions about New Year's Day"; and all of them agree that this was one of three great turning points in chronology. This innovation is therefore of extreme importance to us in calculating back Chinese dates, more especially as the birth of Christ occurred, during the confiscated period of three months, 104 years later. The day was now divided into eighty-one parts, and the lunation was fixed at $\frac{81}{80}$ of a day over twenty-nine days. A day which included in anticipation the odd half was called a "male day"; and the day from which the odd half was excluded was called a "female day." From this time, too, dates the introduction of "style dates," or rather the perfection of the idea which had been incompletely put in action in B.C. 164. Up to then each year had been as our legal years still are: "First James the Second,"

and so on; but, ever since then, each Chinese James or John has been in the habit of adopting a "style" like "Old Glory," or "Big Deeds." This is not so bad when a monarch adheres, as the present dynasty has done, to one style during each whole reign; but when he changes it capriciously every year or two, history gets rather confused. The present Manchu Emperor of China is in pursuance of this system called "Bright Continuance."

A short usurping dynasty (not included in my tables) which intervened for a few years between the Western and Eastern Han, in A.D. 9 appropriated one month (the last) of his predecessor's reign; but I do not know if this act in any way affected chronology. The Eastern Han dynasty (A.D. 25-220) found it desirable to make modifications (A.D. 84) in this reformed calendar; further improvements were made in "orreries"; and eclipses of the moon were either first discovered or were "located" in some way I cannot understand. The man who found all this out, one Liu Hung, detected an error of $\frac{38}{10000}$ of a day in the odd quarter of a day which had to be added annually, thus making one day after every 1,460 days. About this time an apparatus half concealed in the earth, and something like the hydraulic machine described further on, was invented. A writer of this period says the pre-Confucian system of astronomy was Ptolemaic, *i.e.* "the heavens were round like a canopy, the earth flat like a chess-board."

In 237 the usurping Wei dynasty absurdly shifted a spring month into summer, but in 240 it had to go back to the old way. The first Sung dynasty (which reigned at modern Nanking whilst the Tartars at the same time ruled in North China) advanced one step farther: a specialist constructed an orrery or globe out of steel, and in 445 introduced a new calendar. About A.D. 438 it had been discovered that the moon had very small but definite "superfluities" at the kalends,

ides, and quarters; but, as to what this exactly means, my mental attitude is quite as Confucian as that of Confucius was. At any rate, the year was found to consist of 365·2425 days—that is, of ·0011 less than it had been before. I may here digress a moment to remark that the Chinese word for “ides” means exactly the same as the Greek *ἰδεῖν*, and the Chinese words for “announce the kalends” mean exactly the same as the Greek *καλεῖν*, when it is stated a sheep was sacrificed: it is also a coincidence that the Chinese word for “last day” of the year means “hunt,” because the captures of the chase were sacrificed.

Over another half-century again elapsed, when, under the same dynasty, one Tsu Ch’ung-chi first discovered an annual error in the sun’s movement, owing to the shifting of the North Star one degree from its supposed permanent station. Meanwhile the Toba Tartars were by no means idle; instruments came from India, probably brought by one or the other of the Hindoo bonzes then so influential in North China. In 452 the Tobas introduced a new calendar which had been invented in a petty state called Northern Liang, then under strong Western influence. Half a century later one Chang Tsz-sin discovered “that the mutual path of the sun and the moon had an outside and an inside; also that the five planets had quick, slow, and retrograde motions, besides being sometimes apparently stationary.” After another thirty years, one Liu Ch’oh detected an “advance and a backwardness” in the sun’s motion, and he made a new calendar. This was during the Sui dynasty (581–618). Artificial horizons are mentioned at this time, and one astronomer, dissatisfied with the Ptolemaic system, argued: “If the heavens are really circular, then in disappearing and reappearing they must travel down into and up from the sea.” Also: “Comets must derive their light from the sun, because in the evening they point east, and in the morning west.”

When the illustrious T'ang dynasty had reunited the Empire and gained direct rule over Turkestan, ideas on a larger scale seem to have been exchanged with the West; the old globes and orreries were collected and compared, and after this a fixed system was introduced. An instrument called "the circuit of heaven," cast in copper, was in use for illustrating the Ptolemaic system as distinguished from the "globe theory." That Hindoos had influence over the calendar is specifically mentioned, for it is stated that they "understand the Metonic cycle very well, and keep their records upon palmyra leaves." It is also certain that "West Asia" was responsible for a calendar called the *Kiu Chih* (Nine Holdfasts), which, however, was found "too loose" for general use. About A.D. 665 a very brilliant astronomer named Li Ch'un-fêng introduced a new machine consisting of three concentric circles, representing the ecliptic, the sun, moon, and stars, and the four cardinal points. He also wrote a commentary on the ancient book upon Mensuration above referred to. This zealous scientist pointed out that the divisions of the Metonic cycle and the 72-year period were both irregular, and he introduced a system called "entering the kalends," in order to escape the painful spectacle of the moon reappearing on the last day of a lunation. Here again my attitude becomes Confucian; but I suppose this is the "central vitality" and intercalary question cropping up again in another form. During the reign of the Empress Wu (Chinese Catherine No. 2), priests were very much to the fore as generals, artists, and men of science;—even as lovers of the Empress. Like all Chinese tyrants, she tried (in 687) her hand at shifting the moons to suit her whims, but in 700 it was found necessary to leave the order of months as before. A very distinguished bonze named Yih-hing, shortly after her death, introduced a new calendar called the *Ta-yen*, and made some calculations (concerning the varying length of first days of the moon, and the eclipses of other minor

dependent bodies) so profound that I cannot even translate them. Alexander Wylie says *Ta-yen* also means a formula analogous to the Hindoo *Cuttaca*. Envoys were certainly sent to Ciampa (the modern "Faifo" inland from Tourane) to take observations, and possibly they learnt Hindoo methods there; for I noticed many Hindoo ruins when I visited Kwang Nam hard by. In the year 725 a hydraulic wheel was constructed, moving automatically in a direction contrary to the heavens; it was sunk in the ground so as to leave half the sphere above the surface. Two wooden men fixed to it struck a bell every two hours, and a drum every quarter. Two other wheels outside it carried representations of the sun and moon, their motions being regulated so as to fit in with the real time of those bodies. In the year 744 the dates began to be counted by *tsai* (courses) instead of *nien* (harvests), but this innovation did not last long. In 761 an attempt was made to put the year back to the winter solstice, but it failed. Nearly a century after all this, one Sü Ang detected "three errors" in the supposed duration of solar eclipses, and emphasised his discovery by introducing still another calendar. Apparently the allusion is to first contact, totality, and last contact; for modern Chinese astronomers, in describing eclipses, always speak of these, and besides introduce two other sub-phases, one on each side of totality. One hundred and thirty-six years subsequent to Sü Ang's discovery, a certain Yao Shun-fu for the first time found that there was even in totality "an error of floating superfluity," which I suppose refers to the nimbus or contact.

The Five Dynasties for the most part continued the arrangements of the collapsed T'ang house. In 956 it is recorded that a Hindoo bonze came "with some silly yarns about eclipses."

When after a period of anarchy the Great Sung dynasty reunited the greater part of China (A.D. 960), the last

month of the year was once more changed—that is (apparently) the solstice again began the new year; a new calendar was introduced in 963, and nineteen years later a fresh automatic orrery was invented. I have not yet come across any statement setting forth when New Year's Day was put on again to its original place; but I think it must have been in 700. The Kitans, who ruled in the north whilst the Sung governed China Proper, seem to have been complete ignoramuses, "for their records are absolutely the only ones destitute of a chapter on astrology." So says the historian; but I find in the Kitan history that they had carried off all the astronomical instruments from the Chinese capital (K'ai-fêng Fu) when they raided it in 947, and they had found there a modified calendar introduced by one of the half-Turkish emperors of China in 939. But they seem to have accepted in the end the old system of Tsu Ch'ung-chi (462). In both instances local men tried to pass these calendars off upon the rulers as new ones—their own; but luckily the Chinese historians, however tricky in the flesh, are always truthful in their records. As we shall see, the Nüchêns and Mongols both used Tsu's calendar in a modified form for some time.

Although the Sung dynasty holds the record for elegance of learning, it so happens that I have not yet made an abstract of their astronomical science, which doubtless is very rich. In 976, the whole Empire was ordered to hunt for competent astronomers, and a conference of them seems to have resulted in the elaboration of a new globe above mentioned. In 983 there was a change of calendar. During the next century there are numerous mentions made of new clepsydras, astronomical instruments, and further changes in the calendar. A certain Su Sung wrote an illustrated book on these matters, and this book is still in existence; but it appears to me that much of the new mechanical work described therein had already been anticipated as detailed above.

The late Alexander Wylie says that it is "the oldest work we have on the *Hwăn-t'een* [globe-heavens] system." But the Mongol history distinctly says that the inventor, in 979, of the then improved orrery was the last man who really understood the same globe system.

The Mongols, having begun their career by absorbing the Ouigours and Mussulman nations of Turkestan, Affghanistan, and Persia; being moreover ignorant themselves, free from priggish Chinese conceit, and anxious to avail themselves of talent and light wherever found, were naturally active in the matter of correct calendars. The Nüchêns, when in 1126 they took the same Chinese capital the Kitans had taken two centuries before, carried off the Sung instruments to Peking, where they suffered much from exposure and rough handling. Moreover, having been manufactured in 1050 for the south, they were not adapted to the meridian of Peking. When the Nüchêns in turn had to fly before the Mongols back to the capital they had once plundered, two clepsydras were the only things they had time to move, and even these were destroyed when the Mongols took the place (modern K'ai-fêng Fu) in 1234. As I have stated, the Nüchêns made use of the system of 462, as slightly modified or perfected by a certain Chao Ch'î-wei; and this was what the Mongols used at first too, as again corrected by Genghiz and Ogdai Khans' able minister, the celebrated Kitan statesman and author Yelü Ch'u-ts'ai. But in 1267, when Kublai was firmly seated on the throne, a Persian named Djamar ud'Din brought a number of instruments from West Asia, and introduced a second calendar called *Wan-nien* (Myriad years), which, however, never came into general use. There was a Fulin man, and therefore either a Syrian or a "Frank," named Aisie or Isaiah, who also acted as astronomer at the Mongol Court. In 1283 a priest from West Asia proposed to submit certain astronomical results, but he was argued down by an Ouigour (pupil of the celebrated Tibetan sage

Bagspa) named Arhun Sari. All this shows that Hindoo, Syrian, Nestorian, and Arab influence was strong at the Mongol Court. In mathematics, as in religion, the broad-minded Khans kept the ring for champions to dispute in on equal terms. In 1280 an astronomical commission reported to Kublai the result of their labours. They said: "In the past 1356 years (excluding the changes of the past 174 years) there have been 70 calendars and 13 new methods or schools. We have now decided, counting the fractions day by day, that the time between each solstice, winter and summer, should be $\frac{2}{30}$ of a degree less than the Ta-ming calendar [*i.e.* the modified one of A.D. 462]. In the said calendar each year is 365 days 24 hundredths and 25 ten-thousandths; these 25 ten-thousandths being the annual superfluity of the present calendar to make junction with the moon." They went on to say, in connection with the sun's orbit and the moon's "separation," that three-tenths of a day would have to be added to the Ta-ming numbers. There are other matters which I cannot understand, but which seem to refer to right and left ascension, azimuth distances, and so on; in fact, any competent mathematician will at once see that I am endeavouring to repeat as a parrot that which I do not comprehend. Anyhow, each degree was to be henceforth divided into exactly 30 parts, and sunrise, sunset, etc., were to be calculated from Peking instead of K'ai-fêng: 62 and 38 "quarters," or hundredths of a day, respectively, were to be the standard for longest and shortest days and nights.

There were three other very excellent Chinese mathematicians during Kublai's reign; one, Kwoh Shou-king, the best China ever had, was also the engineer of the famous Grand Canal. Another thing decided about this time was that "in 24 hours the moon gets 12 degrees ahead, and catches up the sun in 29.53 days."

The belated Ming historians, writing in 1742 of the period 1368-1644, complacently congratulate themselves

that "in no science have we advanced more than in astronomy." They count only sixty-two changes of calendar from ancient times up to the reign of Kublai, "whose calendar we followed in a modified form for 270 years, but always concurrently with the Mussulman calendar, until we began to find eclipses going wrong." In their opinion the three great standard calendars of history are the one of the eunuch in B.C. 104, that of the priest in A.D. 728, and that of 1281. So far as I can understand the subject, they style the calendar which Kublai published in 1281 the *Shou-shū*, or "Time-giver," and the slightly modified form of it accepted by themselves (to suit Nanking), the *Ta-t'ung*, or "Universal." When the capital was in 1420 permanently transferred to Peking, confusion arose once more. But it also appears that the founder (1368-98) in 1382 caused the Mussulman calendar which he found at Peking to be translated and used as well; its use was, however, partly abandoned after his death. This calendar, which was translated with the assistance of an *ulema*, named Masha Ike, is defined as having "been made by Mahomet of Medina, beginning in 599, the year when his rule began." (It has been explained by Gabriel Devéria how the Chinese came to retrospectively mistake the year of the Hegira, owing to the fact that a Mahometan lunar year did not coincide even approximately with either a Christian or a Chinese year.) The Chinese adaptation of it had no intercalary moon, and the sidereal year consisted of 365 days of 12 months, with one intercalary day in every $4\frac{1}{2}$ years, or 31 in 128 years. At the same time it had a lunar year of 354 days in 12 lunations, each one of either 29 or 30 days, with 11 intercalary days in 30 years, but always in the 12th moon, the solar and lunar years and days coinciding every 1,941 years. The important remark is added that this Mussulman calendar was practically the same in principle as the "Nine Holdfasts" of the T'ang dynasty, and also as

the one made for the Mongols by Djamar ud'Din. It begins with the "Arabi" year 599, and 360 degrees (each of 60 minutes, each of 60 seconds) make one daily revolution of the heavens, 30 degrees going to a "mansion." One daily revolution of the sun is 1,440 minutes, contained in 96 quarters, or 24 hours; beginning at noon, spring equinox, sign Aries. There are seven days to a week, and the solar months are consecutively of 31, 31, 31, 31; 32, 31; 29, 29; 30, 30, 30, 30 days. Eclipses of the sun are considered to take place "before or after noon of a given day," *i.e.* the day begins at noon.

It is not easy to say how far the historians of the Ming dynasty, who did not complete their labours until a century after its fall, echoed the opinions of Ricci, Pantoja, des Ursis, Longobardi, Schaal, Terrenz, etc., or of their native friends the Chinese astronomers Paul Zi and Paul Li. Their story is that, whilst no instruments can be absolutely exact, the ancients worked entirely by "triangulation" (or whatever *kou-ku*, "the long and short sides of a right-angled triangle," may mean), and "never got beyond adding or subtracting errors" discovered. The Mongols advanced a step beyond mere arithmetic, and "calculated the heavens purely," by which, I suppose, they mean "algebraically." Unfortunately Kwoh Shou-king's works have perished, but those of his contemporary, Li K'ien, partly survive, "describing the use of Euclid, the telescope, arcs, ascensions, planes," etc. The defects of the Mussulman calendar (which, however, was better than either the "Nine Holdfasts" or the "Myriad Years") arose from the fact that it was written in a strange tongue, and all calculations were made from an "earth platform" (? unsteady emplacement). It is added that the Mussulman eclipse failed in 1527, but turned out right in 1583. It was found that in about 1,700 years the winter solstice had got three days wrong—apparently in the Mongol-made calendar—"owing to the Mongols having misquoted

the Han records." Paul Zi, having proved one eclipse, secured the appointment of Chief Astronomer. He demonstrated that the chief trouble arose from shiftings of the dynastic capital. In 1292 Kwoh Shou-king at Peking had found the error to be 0.24.25 of a day, but Zi made it 0.24.21. After Zi's death in 1633 fearful squabbles took place between rival astronomers, to cut which short the Emperor in 1643 by decree ordered the European system to be adopted; it was defined as being "the same as the Mussulman, but more exact." Previous to this time the Ming calculations had been based upon the incomplete Mongol system, but without the indispensable "rapid means" (? logarithms). In 1384 the tropical year was found to be 675 seconds short of $365\frac{1}{4}$ days, that is, according to the old decimal system, 365 days, 24 "quarters," 25 decimals; if we add the "sidereal error" or annual precession of 1 quarter 50 decimals, we get 365.25.75 for a complete revolution. The longest Pekingese day has $15\frac{1}{4}$ hours *plus* $12\frac{3}{4}$ minutes (61 quarters, 84 decimals), and the shortest $9\frac{1}{2}$ hours *plus* $2\frac{3}{4}$ minutes (38 quarters, 16 decimals). It may be interesting to give here an apparently very rare and curious Chinese picture of Ricci and Paul Zi, for which I am indebted to the Jesuits of Shanghai (see frontispiece).

James Rho (Italian) and Adam Schaal (German) were found living at Si-an Fu when the Manchus came to Peking; they were at once summoned to the Astronomical Board; but, as Alexander Wylie somewhat harshly remarks: "along with their new formulæ and improved tables, they took advantage of their position to foist upon the Chinese the antiquated system of Ptolemy." After Rho's death Schaal was appointed President (1645), and so gained the young Emperor Shunchi's confidence that he had things all his own way. The Mussulmans, however, were gnashing their teeth with jealousy all this time, and during the regency of 1664 brought accusations against poor Schaal, in

consequence of which they got one of their co-religionists appointed in his place. But when the youthful K'anghi came to the throne after Schaal's death, he was intelligent enough to perceive the superiority of European methods, and entrusted the correction of the calendar to the Dutchman Verbiest, who was made President of the Board. K'anghi's angry dispute with the Popes about ancestor worship and the proper word for "God" did not interfere with his zeal for science, and in 1713 he sanctioned the publication of a work embodying the latest astronomical discoveries. As to all later matters connected with the Chinese calendar, readers are referred to the painstaking labours of Wylie, Fritsche, and others.

GLOSSARY

Abkhaz. Probably a Tartar word meaning "sky," "heaven."

Ainos=Aino word *Ainu*, "men." The ancient Chinese call them "shrimp barbarians," and as the vulgar word for "shrimp" is *hia-mi*, this is probably the origin of the Japanese *ye-bi*, "shrimp," and *yebi-su*, "shrimp people," or *Ainos*.

Aksu=Turkish "White Water."

Aktagh (Turkish). Apparently the Chinese *Peh-shan*, or "white hills" north of Harashar.

Altai. The Kin-shan or "Gold Mountains." The word *Altun*, *alchu*, *asin*, appears in many Tartar forms.

Amoy. Local pronunciation of Hiamên, "gallery-gate."

Annam=Chinese "pacifier of the south," a title granted to the rulers of Kiao-chi, just as Antung, or "pacifier of the east," was granted to the rulers of Corea.

Ausgleich=German for "that which evens out."

Binh-thuan=Annamese form of Chinese *P'ing-shun*, "run smooth"; but, query, which language has precedence.

Bogdo Khan. I suppose this is connected with the Russian *Bog*, "God." The Chinese *T'ien-tsz*, or "Son of Heaven," reappears in the Hiung-nu *Tengri-kudu*, the Turkish and Ouigour *Tengri-khagan*, the Arabic "Facur" (Marco Polo), the Japanese *Tenshi* (*Sama*).

Bonze=Japanese *bo-dz*, being their pronunciation of the modern Chinese *fou-t'u*, which in the sixth century spelt *Buddh*.

Boxer. Translation of *K'üan*, "fist," or *ta-k'üan*, "to box." The *I-ho K'üan* are the "Patriotic Harmony Fists."

Burma=Burmese "Bamma," or Miamma, first called *Mien* in Mongol times. An earlier Chinese name was *P'iao*, the people called *Byu* in the early Burmese records.

Cambalu=Khanbaligh, "Khan's citadel."

Cambodia. The word *Kam-put-chi* occurs in mediæval Chinese history for old Fu-nam country. This last dissyllabic word seems to occur in *Pnom* (*penh*), the present capital. It is curious to note that the Chinese name for the ruins of Angkor is "Temple of the Ts'in King," which looks as though the visit of Antoninus' envoy had left some tradition in the land.

Chagan Khan=Mongol "White Khan."

Ch'ang-sha="Long Sands."

Chefoo=*Chi-fou*, a very ancient name of no very intelligible meaning.

Chemulpo=Corean pronunciation of Cantonese *Tsaimétpo*, or "mandarin" *Tsi-wuh-p'u*, "Porterage Cove."

Ch'eng-tu="Has become a centre."

Chingnampo=(Rice)-steamer-south-cove.

Chinkiang = *chên-kiang* "rule the river."

Chit (Hindoo *Chitthi*), a word in universal use in India and China for "letter," "memo.," "I.O.U.," "notice," etc.

Chow, or *chou*, in such words as Wênchow, Wu-chow, is simply "flat-land" or "plain," followed by a place-name, descriptive or original. In accepted names like Foochow the popular form is used throughout this book.

Ch'ungk'ing = "Double Joy."

Chusan = *chou-shan*, "boat-hill."

Ciampa. The word *Cham* appears in several forms of the Chinese name. I take *pa* to mean "country" in some Hindoo tongue, for Singpa in Chinese means "Pânjâb," or "land of the Sikhs," or "Singhs."

Compradore = Portuguese "purchaser." The business factotum in most foreign "houses," banks, consulates, etc.

Confucius = K'ung fu-tsz, "the philosopher K'ung," as Mêng fu-tsz is Mencius. In both cases the *fu* can be omitted, and "Conscious" or "Menfucius" would do as well. Out of the sages Tsêng and Chwang we might create Cincius, Sancius.

Coolie. This is an Indian word, but in "mandarin" fitted with Chinese characters to mean "hard work."

Corea = Corean *Ko-ryê* (pronounced exactly like the English word), being the local form of the Chinese *Kao-li*, or *Kao-kou-li*, "the Kou-li state of the Kao clan."

Cowloong = Cantonese for *Kiu-lung*, "Nine Dragons."

Daimyô = Japanese pronunciation of *ta-ming*, or "great name," a term not used historically or officially in China.

Dalny = Russian "distant" (Talien Wan).

Decima. I suppose Japanese *De-shima*, "go-out island."

Dolonor = Mongol *dolon-nor*, "Seven Lakes."

Ephalites. In old Chinese *Ipiat*, the Corean pronunciation of which is still *Ëptal*.

Esmok. The Burmese have a way of putting a final *k* at the end of Chinese words, just as the Russians put a *znak tverdi*, or "hard sign." I noticed the sign-board of a Chinaman named Liu Ts'ai, at Bhamo, marked "Lew Ch'aik." "Sz-mao" is an impossible mouthful for a Burmese.

Fah-hien = "Law's manifestation."

Faifo = corrupt Chinese *hwui-p'u*, or *hwei-an-p'u*, "assemblyshops," or "assembly-of-peace-shop."

Fiador = Portuguese "surety-man"; in pidgin English, "hab got man can skewer."

Foochow = "Happy region," locally *Houk-chiu*, or, by euphonic rule, *Uchiu*.

Formosa = Portuguese "beautiful."

Fusan = Chinese *Fu-shan*, "Pot Hill," in Corean *Pusan*.

Gayuk = Mongol *kuyuk*, "clever."

Genghis. The Hiung-nu khans called themselves *shen-yü*, which is retrospectively equivalent to something like *zen-ghî*, or *ζένχυ*; possibly there may be some etymological connection.

Gialbo. The Chinese always write this Tibetan title *tsan-p'u*.

Hainan = Chinese "sea-south."

Haiphong. The Chinese *hai-fang*, or "coast defence."

Han. A proper name; rarely has any literary meaning.

Han Wu Ti = "Han Military Emperor," or *Divus Martialis*.

Hankow = "Han (River) Mouth."

Hanoi = "River-interior," the Annamese (*ha-noui*) form of *Ho-nei*, Cantonese *Ho-noi*.

Hideyoshi. His Chinese name is P'ing Siu-kih.

Hinterland = German "behind-land."

Hoang-ho = "Yellow River": *hwang* is one syllable, and not *ho* + *ang*.

Hing-hwa = "Start civilisation."

Hiung-nu = "Hiung slaves."

Hoihow = Cantonese for *Hai-k'ou*, "Sea Mouth."

Hong = Cantonese pronunciation of *hang*, "a store" or "shop"; but the word is little used except in reference to foreign "houses," and native "trade-guilds."

Hung-tshih = "Vast Marsh."

Hwai-k'ing = "Cherish joy."

Ich'ang = "Should be glorious."

Ili. In the sixth century the Turkish Khans already used the style Ili-Khan, which may possibly be the "Ilkhans" of Western writers.

Irrawaddy = in part Arabic *waddi*, "a river," but I cannot say what *Irra* means. The Chinese used to confuse the Upper Irrawaddy with the Upper Yang-tsze, or Gold-sand River.

Issyk Kul = "Hot Sea" in some Tartar tongues; *Denghiz Nor* in others; the Chinese also call it *Jeh-hai*, or "Hot Sea."

Japan = Chinese *Jih-pên*, "sun's origin."

Java. From ancient times known as *She-p'o*, or *Djaba*; later *Chao-wa*, usually misprinted *Kwa-wa*.

Javartes. In old times Chinese called the *Yok-shat*.

Junk. Probably *shün*, the Cantonese form of *ch'wan*, "a ship."

Kachyn = Burmese "wild man." They call themselves *Singp'o*, or "men."

Kalgan = Mongol "Gate," called in Chinese Chang-kia K'ou, or "Chang-family Pass."

Kalmuck = "remaining ones"; those of the Dzun ("right" or

"east") who were "left," when Uriankhai abandoned the "Wala," or "confederacy." Hence Kalmuck, Dzungar, Eleuth, Oirat, Wala, Turgut, are all much the same thing. The Boron ("left" or "west") tribes fell under the power of the Kirghis, and were absorbed; hence "Borongar."

Kanagawa = (I suppose) Japanese "Golden Stream."

Karakitans = Turkish for "Black Cathayans."

Kazaks = "vagabond"; the Kara-Kirghis call themselves "Kirghis"; the Eleuths call them "Buruts"; the Kazaks call them "Kara-Kirghis." The Kazaks, or Kirghis-Kazaks, speak the same language as the Kara-Kirghis, whom they detest.

Kewkiang = "Nine Rivers."

Kiao-chi = "Parted toes." I myself was struck in Annam with the extraordinary "apartness" of the big toe. Possibly our word "Cochin (China)" comes from this. Another name is *Kiao-chou*, "Mutual Plain."

Kiao-chou (German) = "Glue-plain."

Kia-yuh Kwan = "Beautiful Gem Pass."

Kilung = "Chicken Hamper."

Kirghis = (according to the Chinese) "red-faced" in the Kirghistongue.

Kobé = Japanese "Divine-portals."

Kokand. Until Manchu times usually known by names corresponding to "Ferghana."

Kokonor = Mongol "Blue Sea," or "Lake."

Kongmun = Cantonese for *Kiang-mên*, "River Gate."

Koxinga = local *Kwok-sing-ya*, "State's-surname-sire."

Kublai = Mongol *hóbilai*, "re-embodiment."

Kumchuk = Cantonese *Kom-chuk* (*Kan-chuk*), "sweet bamboo."

Kunsan. The Corean form of *K'un-shan*, "Flock Hill."

Kutlug=Turkish "happy."

Lama Miao= "priest temple." The Tibetan or Mongol word *lama* is now adopted into northern Chinese.

Lao, Yao, Miao, are the T'ang, Sung, and modern names for the ill-defined wild tribes (not Shans, and not Lolos or Tibetans).

Laokai=Chinese for "Old market-street"

Lao-tsz, or *Laocius*. Usually translated "Old Boy," but really "the Philosopher Lao," or "the Old Philosopher." He might be called "Lafucius," if it were not that (in his case) the *fu* is always omitted.

Lao-wa T'an= "Crow Rapid."

Lappa. Apparently some aboriginal word which cannot be written in Chinese; nevertheless the two words *Tai-pa* and *Lappa* (Islands) seem to mean "rubbish-grounds."

Lari=Tibetan *lha-ri* "god-mountain." Compare *Lhasa*.

Lau Vinh-phuc=Annamese for Liu Yung-fuh (Cantonese *Lao Wing-fuk*), formerly Black Flag Rebel chief.

Likin=Chinese "percentage," or "per mille."

Likin, liküen, li'ou= "percentage."

Loess=German *löss*, "loose."

Lolo=*No*, the native word for themselves. Like the Kirghis, they have black and white "bones," or castes.

Loochoo. The word first appears in A.D. 600 under its present form *Liu-k'iu*, which, if it is anything more than an imitation of native words, seems to mean "string of beads," i.e. "islands."

Macao=Ma-ao, or Ma-ngao, "God-dess' Bight"; but it has many other Chinese names; the usual one is, locally, Ou-mun, "Bight

Door," in "mandarin" *Ngao-mên*.

Malay. I cannot find more than one trace of this word before the *Mulayu* of Kublai's time. The Chinese never seem to have conceived the existence of a Malay "state" *par excellence*.

Mali-kha and *Nmai-kha* are Kachyn words for "Little" and "Great" *kha* or "rivers." *Kha* is perhaps allied to the Chinese *ho*, still pronounced *ha* in Corea and Annam, and *ka* in Japan.

Manchu. According to the Emperor Kienlung, this word is connected with the *Chushên* tribe of Tunguses. In Confucius' time they were called *Sushên*. It is just possible that the Buddhist word *Mañdjuśrī* may have been adapted or utilised, as the earlier Turks and Tunguses often took Buddhist names in compliment to themselves or their country.

Mandarin=Portuguese *mandarim*, "a ruler."

Mangu=Mongol *möngge*, "persevering."

Manila=the local river of that name.

Manipur. Only known to the Chinese as *Kasé*; the Burmese say *Kathé* (*th* as in English *thin*).

Manzi. The Chinese *man-tsz* or "Southern barbarians," a word I have myself seen in a proclamation issued by the Tartar General of Canton, referring haughtily to the Cantonese.

Masanpho= "Horse-hill Cove."

Mei-ling= "Plum Ridge."

Mêngtsz=in the Shan tongue, "the district Tsz."

Mikado=Japanese "Imperial Gate," "Sublime Porte."

Ming=Bright.

Mokpo, the Corean form of *Muk-p'u*, "Wood Cove."

Mongol = "silver" (perhaps). The word "mungku" appears at least 1000 years ago as a tribe of Turko-Tungusic origin near the Shilka River.

Mukden = This seems to be a Tungusic word for "glorious capital." Its ancient name in Corean times was Shên-yang.

Nagasaki = Japanese "Longpoint."

Nanking = "South Metropolis."

Nepaul. The oldest Chinese word is Nip'olo; then Parpu (Palpa), and now Kwo-r-k'a (Goorkha).

Newchwang = "Cow-village."

Ningpo = "Calm the Waves."

Novgorod = Russian, "Newtown."

Nüchêns = a supposed native word something like "Djurchi," meaning "west of the sea."

Octroi = "authorised (charge)," or "grant."

Odontala. I believe this word means "Thirteen Seas," but I have forgotten the number.

Ogdai = Mongol *ogedei*, "superior."

Ordos. This word first appears 600 years ago.

Ouigour. Name of one of the Tie-le or Tölös tribes. The Turkish tablets recently discovered never use the word; only the word Tölös, or sometimes "Tokuz Uguz," which corresponds to the Chinese "Nine Surnames" of the Ouigours.

Oxus. In old Chinese called the *Wei* or *Kwei*, the Oech of Zemarchus.

Pakhoi = Cantonese for Peh-hai, "North Sea."

Pamir. This word appears in Chinese as *po-mit* in the eighth century (*pa-mir* according to philological rule).

Pecul = a Chinese cwt. of 133½ lbs.

Peh-seh = "100 colours," probably some Shan word.

Peking = "North Metropolis."

Persia. Always called Po-sz (= Pas, or Pars) by the Chinese.

Pescadores = Portuguese *pescador*, "fisher." The Chinese name is P'eng-hu, "Lake P'eng."

Philippines = Spanish Filipinos, or "(King) Philip's (isles)."

Pingjang, Corean *Pyông-yang* = "even soil"; a very ancient name.

Ping-shan = "Flat Mountain."

Pirouz. In Chinese *Pi-lu-sz*.

Port Arthur (from Captain Arthur) in Chinese Lu-shun K'ou, or "Port Agreeable to Travellers" — a hopeful name.

Po-yang = "Spread out."

Pulo Condor. The Malay *pulo*, "island," and the Chinese *K'un-lun*; but, query, which language has precedence.

Quelpaert (Dutchman's name), called Tan-lo, or Tamra, by the Chinese and Coreans.

Samsheu = Cantonese *sam-shiu* (*sam-shao*), "thrice distilled."

San-tu Ao = "Three centres bight" (cf. Macao).

Shamien = "Sand-surface," pronounced in Cantonese *Sham'in*. The flat islet constructed from the rubbish of the "Thirteen Hong's" after the second war, much on the principle that Decima was set apart for the Dutch in Nagasaki Creek.

Samsheu = "Three Rivers."

Shan-hai Kwan = "Mountain-sea Pass," or "Barrier."

Shashu = "Sand Market."

Shimonoseki = Japanese *shimo-no-seki*, "pass or barrier of the lower."

Shroff = Hindu *sarráf*: the handler of dollars and other coins in most large foreign concerns. "To shroff" has come to mean to "test," or to "sample," or "taste."

Si-an Fu = "West-peace City," the more modern name of Ch'ang-an, or "Lasting Peace."

Sikkim. Known to the Chinese by an imitation of the native name "Demajong."

Si-ning = "West Peace."

Songchin, or *Syöng-chin*. The Korean form of Ch'êng-tsin, "City Ford."

Soy = Japanese *shō-yu*, the Chinese *tsiang-yu*, or "sauce-oil."

Strogonoff. There is a Russian word *strogi*, "strict," but I cannot say if it is the origin of such a word as "strictly ruled ones" (genitive plural).

Sui. The founder was hereditary Duke of Sui. Nearly all dynasties were "territorial" by name, until the "Iron" (Kitan), "Golden" (Nuchên), "Chief" (Mongol), "Bright" (Ming), and "Clear" (Manchus).

Sumatra. This name first appears in Kublai's time as one of many petty states in the island, which never had a Chinese name as a whole.

Sung. A proper name; no meaning in literature.

Swatow. Local form of *Shan-t'ou*, "end of the Shan (river)."

Sz-ma = "Rule the Horses" — Captain-general.

Tael. The Chinese *liang* or "ounce," said to be the Malay *tail*, which I suppose is allied to the Siamese *tical* (pronounced tick-all).

T'ai-p'ing = "Great Peace," or by extension "Reign of Peace."

Takow = Ta-kou (Cantonese *ta-kao*), "beat dogs," probably a corrupted Formosan word.

Taku = "Great Reach."

Ta-lien Wan = "Purse Bay."

Tang. A proper name; no meaning in literature.

Tangut. This word does not occur often in Chinese. When it does it seems to refer to a common language including the civilised Tibetans and the wandering tribes of that race. So far, I have not

come across any Chinese use of the word anterior to the Manchu dynasty. There were Tang-ch'ang and Tang-hiang tribes in Kan Suh, but Marco Polo's Tangut is never called anything except Hia, or West Hia, being the whole Ning-hia region of to-day.

Tartar. From ancient times the word *Tatan*, *tata*, *tata-r*, or *ta-tsz*, has been used for loosely-defined tribes between the Turks and Tunguses. The word *ta-tsz* is still used jocularly by the pure Chinese in the vague sense of our word "Tartar."

Tashkend. Turkish *tash*, "stone"; Persian *kand*, *kent*, "city." The oldest Chinese name is Chech or Djedj, in imitation of the ancient native word *Djadj*, corrupted by the Turks to *Tash*. The Chinese also call it *Shih-ch'êng*, or "stone city."

Tashkurgan = Turkish "stone-tower."

Ta-tsien Lu = "Strike arrow stove," a meaningless imitation of Tarsando (Tib.).

Ta-ts'in = "Great Ts'in," or, in the older form, *Dzin*, which is probably *Syr* or *Syria*. The later Chinese form *Sz-li* occurs in reference to the inhabitants of the Syro-Persian region.

Tea = local pronunciation *té*. It is pronounced *ta* in Foochow, and *isha* in most parts. The Russian *tchai* is simply the Pekingese *ch'a-ye*, "tea-leaf."

Tibet. The Chinese first called the civilised Tibetans *t'upo*, usually mispronounced *t'ufan*. The second syllable is *bod* (what the Tibetans call themselves).

T'ien-shan. "Heaven Mountains": the Tengri Tagh of the Tartars.

Tientsin = "Heavenly Ford"; a modern name.

Ts'ing = Clear.

Ting-hai = "Settle the Sea."

Toba = "born in the sheets," but the Chinese give other fanciful meanings for this Tungusic word.

Tōkyō. The Chinese words *Tung-king*, "eastern capital."

Tonquin. The Chinese words *Tung-king*, "eastern capital."

Ts'in-wang Tao = "Prince of Ts'in's Island," probably alluding to the conquest of Corea by Li Shī-min, who passed that way and had borne that title (seventh century).

Tsung-li Yamén = "General-management Office," short for the full title "General-management of different countries' affairs Office";—Foreign Office.

T'umu = "Earth Tree." I have twice been there.

Tungkwan = "East Sedge"

Tung-t'ing = "Cave Court," probably alluding to the royal centre of the aboriginal races.

Türk = Turkish word "*türk*," or "helmet," from the shape of a mountain in their earliest habitat.

Tsaidam. Said to mean "marsh" in some local tongue.

Tsushima (pronounced almost in two syllables like Tzhima) is written by the ancient Chinese *Tui-ma*, or "Facing Horses," a cannot say which language give the original sounds.

Tycoon or *Shōgūn*. The first is the Japanese way of pronouncing the Chinese words *Ta-kun* or *T'ai-kun*, a term, like the corresponding Korean *Tai-wōn-kun*, applied to the second personage in the state. The second is simply the Chinese *tsiang-kūn*, or "generalissimo," being the word "Imperator" in its original military significance.

Uliassutai. This seems to be the Chinese word *t'ai*, "post-station," added to the Mongol word *usu* Ulia-usu, the "River" Ulia.

Uriangkha. I do not know if this is the Eleuth tribe mentioned under "Kalmuck," but there are still Eleuth settlements in Tsitsihar and Kokonor as well as in Ili.

Vladivostok = Russian "rule the east."

Wangpoo = "Yellow Cove."

Wei. A proper name; no meaning in literature.

Wei-hai Wei = "Awe-the-sea Garrison."

Wei River of Si-an Fu, not to be confused with the Wei River of Wei-hwei Fu (written differently). The first-named is dubiously mentioned 3,000 years ago as being either clear or muddy, and the *intellectuels* disputed for 2,000 years which of the two it was, until the Manchu Emperor Kienlung ordered the learned Viceroy of Kan Suh to go to the source in the desert, and follow the stream personally all the way down to its junction with the King, so as to close the question for ever.

Whampoa = Wongpou, "Yellow Quays," the Cantonese form of Hwang-p'u.

Wōnsan = Chinese *Yüan-shan*, or *Ngüan-shan*, "Head Hill"; in Japanese *Genzan*.

Wo-nu = "Japanese slaves."

Wuhu = "Jungle Lake."

Yamén = Chinese "gate of the *ya*." The *ya* was first "a flag"; then the entrance to the camp-gate where the flag was planted; then "head-quarters"; then "nomad court," or "ordo." *Yamén* now means "public residence," or "office."

Yang-tsze = the "philosopher Yang": the old name for the modern salt depôt of Ichêng near Chinkiang, and of the Great River in that vicinity. The usual

translation "Son of the Ocean" seems incorrect.	<i>Zanzibar</i> . This word seems to occur in the Chinese <i>ts'êng</i> or <i>Dzăng</i> , "black slaves" from which place were imported by the Arabs. As to <i>bar</i> , see the remarks on <i>Ciampa</i> , <i>Singpa</i> , etc.
<i>Yedo</i> =Japanese "River-door."	
<i>Yin-shan</i> = "Sombre" or "hyperborean" mountains.	
<i>Yuan-kung P'u</i> = "Duke Yuan's Cove."	<i>Zuider Zee</i> =Dutch for "South Sea."

NOTE.—In GILES' *Anglo-Chinese Dictionary* I have given the pronunciation in eight dialects (also in Corean, Japanese, and Annamese) of every important Chinese word. In the Philological Essay contributed to the same work, I have explained the etymological rules involved. For the Mongol words I am indebted to Mr. Zach, of the Foreign Customs in China.

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GENERAL MAP OF 18 PROVINCES
AND BORDERING TERRITORY, TO
ILLUSTRATE TRADE CENTRES.
Reduced by courteous permission from
Dr. E. Bretschneider's Map, (1st Edition.)

English Miles
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- Frontier of Provinces
- Capitals
- First Class, or Fu Cities
- Chou Cities
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